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Since World War II the five historic Central American nations, Costa Rica, EI
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, underwent a period of aggregate
economic growth which was followed by a collapse of dramatic proportions. All five
countries experienced an economic downturn in the latter 1970s which led to several
years of declining GDP and GDP per capita, together with an economic and social
2disarray which is typi혜ly referred to as "la crisis" in Central American literature.
The intent of this study is to present an argument for the position that the
economic collapse of the five Central American nations was due in considerable p하t to
their 떠ilure to pursue economic dε:velopment in a manner which would generate
sustainable increase. Based on a conception of modern economic growth and the
statistical studies of Simon Kuznets and others since the 1940s, a set of indicators was
selected for the purpose of cl따ifying the structural transformation referred to as
economic development. This formulation of economic development was then used to
distinguish the process from the simple aggregate expansion known as economic
growth.
The economic development indicators were also applied to the statistical records
oftwo 않st Asian economies which were comparable in many respects to the Central
American nations shortly after World War II. Both Taiwan and South Korea, like the
nations of Central America, emerged from the 1940s as dominantly agricultural,
dualistic, importers of manufactured consumer goods.
The study begins with an examination of the growth versus development issue in
economic theory, proceeds to discussion of the historical record of the two sets of
nations, consideration of the indicators, evaluation of the data, and conclusions based
on the data.
The development indicators clearly dis다nguish the records of the Central
Ameri않n nations from those of the 않st Asians. Whereas both Taiwan and South
Korea illustrate the expec따tions of structural transformation in economic development
as defined by Simon Kuznets, the Central American nations obviously do not.
Conclusions are drawn that the p이icies which were followed by the two east
Asian nations generated the complex structural transformation which characterizes an
industrialized economy. The strictly market driven p이icies of Central America, on the
3other hand, generated simple aggregate growth for a number of y않rs without a change
in the structure of the economy.
The study presents evidence that the Central American nations avoid벼
structural change during the post-World War II period in anticipation of receiving the
benefits of growth without undergoing the costs of a change in structure. Such a
change in structure would have rl여uired reorganization of long-standing historic
patterns of national soci외， economic and political interaction.
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CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND COLLAPSE IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Due to increasing prices, trade in prim따y commodities during the latter 1940s
and the 1950s generated relatively high returns for many of the less developed nations
of the world. Favorable terms of trade, together with the active involvement of the
developed countries which was experienced by those nations provided the basis, both
financial and poli디C떠， for much of the private and government expansion of the period
and for expectations of more of the same.
The five Central American nations (CANs), Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador,
Nicaragua and Costa Rica, on which this study will focus, were among the recipients of
the good fortune. The traditional exports, coffee and bananas, brought relatively high
prices which initiated a rise in GDP. This increase provided the basis for attempts at
economic expansion which continued into the 1970s. But by the late 1970s, however,
the CANs had entered a period of economic and political crisis which still dominates
the region.
For many of the succeeding years, the per capita GDPs of the CANs have fallen
and stayed below even the relatively modest numbers of the late 1970s. Even the
aggregate GDPs fell below those of the latter 1970s. For three of the nations aggregate
GDP is still below that level. No one, even the Central Bankers of the five nations
who are known for exaggeration of economic outcome, has described the performance
of the five CANs as anything but dismal for more than ten y않rs now.
2It is the position of this study that although the CANs underwent simple
economic growth during the 1960s and 1970s, they failed to engage in the process of
economic development which would have provided a sustained inc!않se in national
output. The hypothesis to be tested in this study is that the process of development of a
national economy from the underdeveloped state of dominant primary production to
that of a complex modem industrialized economy is in considerable p따t a function of
the application of policy which compels structural change. In order to test the
hypothesis, a set of development indicators have been chosen. These indicators, it is
an다cipated ， are capable of distinguishing the process of simple economic growth from
the complex changes in structure which characterize modem economic development.
The indicators, which will be discussed in depth in chapter four, are based on the
extensive statistical studies of development by Simon Kuznets during the middle and
latter p따t of this century. I
Although during the 1960s and 1970s considerable effort was expended and a
great deal of money was spent on p이icies and programs designed to promote economic
growth among the CANs, most of the expectations for economic increase and
improvement since World War II have simply not been met. All five are still
dominantly agricultural nations. Although per capita Gross Domestic Product grew
during the 앓rly P따t of last three decades, it has not done so for a number of y않rs
now. Science and technology has in some respects been introduced into the economies,
but in a very un~ven manner and often in 때 almost directly imported form.
Policymaking among the CANs has often been described as having been
concerned with maintaining an historically limited form of economic and political
1 Simon Kuznels has written a great deal on !he structure of mo‘lem economic grow!h. Many are listed in !he
bibliogrnphy 까Ie key r패:rence here. !hough. is Modem Economic Growth: Rate. Structure nnd Soread. Yale Unj，써rsity Press.
New Haven‘ 1966. A morc conιise statement of !he concept is to be lbund in KuznιIs 1973 address 10 !he Americlln Economic
Associalion. published as 'Mαlem Economic Grow!h: Findings and ReOeclions·. American ECOOllll1ic R.:vi.:w. Vol. 63. Junι.
1973.
3structure. This historical basis for the post-World War II p이icy decisions will be
discussed in chapters V and VI. In keeping with that constraint on policy, however, it
will be noted that policy focused on sustaining a pI잃sing and unmanaged climate for
investors through consistently and 따다tici외ly low interest rates and through subsidized
direct importa디on of labor-saving technology in labor surplus economies. They
consistently indulged investors, in other words, at high cost to labor, to consumers and
to the national economy as a whole.
A conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the economic collapse in 외l
five of the CANs in the latter 1970s was due in considerable p따t to their failure to
pursue economic development in a manner which would generate sustainable increase.
To highlight that phenomenon, the records of two other na디ons will be examined in
conjunction with those of the CANs. Taiwan and South Korea, two eastern, newly
industrialized countries (ENICs) ini다ated the development of their economies during
the same post-World War II period.
During the middle of this century the two sets of nations, the CANs and the
ENICs, had much in common. Besides doing relatively well in sales of prim따y
products in the post-World War II market, 외I of the nations were sm떠I and they had
large popula디ons relative to available resources. All seven nations also were described
as having agriculture-based dualistic economies and low per capita Gross Domestic
Product‘
At the same time, all of the nations were understood to have been committed to
the neoclassical economic model as the policy context for achieving the economic
growth or development which they sought. All made quite clear in early discussion
that economic and soci외 improvement provided the contextual focus for economic
policy decisions. This improvement was expected to result from the economic growth
or development which was being pursued. In this they had the active support of the
4United States and of multi-lateral agencies such as the United Nations and the
development banks.2
Some thirty Y없rs later, however, the two sets of nations have come to differ
profoundly. The two ENICs are widely acclaimed for their development successes. By
almost any standard their development efforts have been successful. The exercise of
policy in the last three decades has brought both soci외 없ld economic structural change
which has incorporated the majority of the pop비ation of both nations in a substantial
improvement of well-being.
The ENICs have successfully resisted the external economic shocks and the
slowing of global trade which profoundly affected many other developing nations.
Contrarily, the CANs have all been deeply impacted by the external shocks. The
dramatic changes in fuel prices in the 1970s, the debt problems and the interest rate
increases of latter 1970s and 1980s, the global σade slowdowns and many other
external impacts are blamed both individually and as a group for the CAN crises.
Finally, the structural changes which describe the development of the ENICs fit
the expectations of modem economic growth described by Simon Kuznets in his
numerous writings on the subject since the 1950s.3 In both cases, the dominance of the
agricultur.떠 sector has been replac벼 by the industrial and services sectors. Per capita
GDPs have increased substantially in both nations in spite of the accompanying
population increase. Productivity has increased in all sectors and science and
2 A f능w of the many descriptions of the 0꺼ginal inlenlions include Edua며애 Liznno F. La C꺼 sis d마 Proceso de
Intel!racion de Cenlroamerica. Institulo de Investigacionιs Economicas‘ Univ.:rsidad de COSIn Rica, 1968. Miguel S. Wionczeι.
깐꺼e Rise and ~cline of Latin Ame바an Economic Inlegralion·, Joumalllf Common Markel Sludies. Vol. IX. #1. 1970. Isaac
Cohen Ol'llnles and Ger! Rosenthal. ·Ref1야lions on the Conceptual Framework of C‘:Olral American Inlegration·. 드트E흐L
E략논~， United Nations. First Half 1977.
3 Simon Kuznels. Modem_Economic Growlh: Rale. Slruclure and SoNad. Yale Universily Press. New Haven. 1966.
And Kuznets 1973 address to the American Economic Associalion. published as ·Modem타onomicGrowth: Findings and
Ref1야tions·. American E‘:onomic Review. Vol. 63. June. 1973.
5technology has become an integral element of development expectations in both
nations.
Of the two sets of na다ons， the two ENICs can be safely described as having
successfully generated the sought-after sustainable economic development. The CANs,
on the other hand, did not accomplish sustained economic growth during the decades
following the 1950s, nor is the structural change which would have accompanied
Modem Economic Growth in evidence.
The difference in the experience of the two groups of nations can, in essence, be
said to be a function of policy decisions made by the leadership of the nations. In the
broadest terms, it app않rs that although both the CANs and the ENICs were operating
within the theoretical context of the neoclassical model, the interpretation of the role of
leadership in the context of the model differed profoundly. In keeping with insistent
U.S. policy regarding access to markets, the CANs followed a 1외ssez faire or free
market approach to many markets in their nations while paradoxically attempting to
tightly control others.4 The labor and the capital markets, for example, were
consistently controlled with the intention of maintaining a favorable climate for
investment. In retrospect, it appears that such a policy tended to create an atmosphere
of political manipulation and instability rather than a favorable climate for investment
and economic growth.
The ENICs chose instead to consciously manage thεir economic growth as an
evolutionary process. Writing in 1988, K.T , Li makes the point about the development
process in Taiwan that "In the transition growth process.. .liberalization of the
4 The slated requirements of u.s. development assiSlance is d닝scribed 감om many p띠nls ofview. Some examples
include: Miguel S. Wionczek. "Latin American Integration and U.S. Eωnomic Policies"‘ in International 0 l'l!ani7.l1tion in the
Western Hemisnhere, Roben W. Gregg. Ed.. 1968. Roben E, Denham. "The Role ofthe U.S. as an External Actor in the
Integ때tion of Latin America". Journal ofCommon Market Stu‘lies. Vol. VII. #3. 1969. Michael Stohland Harry R. Targ.
"United Slates and the Thi벼 Wor삐: The 5‘ruggl.: to Make otheπ Adapt" , in ’Th i벼 World Policies of Industrialized Nations,
Phillip Taylor.E찌itor. Greenwood Press. 1982. Jam.:s D. Cochrane. "U.5. Policy Toward Recognition of Governments and
Promotion of Democracy in Latin Amι꺼ca". J‘,lUrnnl of Latin American Studies, V\l!. 4. #2. 1972? Susanne JOllas. "Cenlral
America as a Theatιr \lf U.S. Cold War Politics" , LalinAmericnn Pcrsn,:clive‘. V\ll. IX. #3. 1982.
6economic system does not imply complete laissez faire or a complete abandonment by
the government of all economic roles. ,,5 The policymakers in the ENICs made clear
that their intention was to generate a dynamic process of structural development in their
economies. This was done, in the long run, through the use of policy instruments
which were design여 to encourage investment which drew upon the use of science and
science-fed technology. Earlier in the process, policy was 외so specifically geared to
the encouragement of domestic saving, the attainment of skills and of other forms of
pop비ar engagement in the economic development process in specific targeted sectors of
the economy.
This study is will examine the record of the two sets of national economies in
order to ev외uate the advance, or lack of advance, of each toward modern economic
growth. To accomplish this, the "growth versus development" issue in economic
development literature, an important p따t of the context for this study, will be
examined.
There is no doubt that the economic growth versus economic development issue
is a vital one with a notable history. It is enmeshed in current concerns about tragic
economic conditions in many third world nations and it also extends back to
immediately post World War II theoretical discussions about the adequacy of
neoclassical growth theory. It is not a new issue. From the point of view of this
study, however, it is an issue which has taken increasing importance over the recent
decades and is relevant to the comprehension of the economic problems confronting
Central America.
In subsequent chapters the policy approaches used in the two interpretations of
the neoclassical model will be considered. The two ENIC nations seem to have taken
5 K.T. Li. Th.: Evolution Of Policv &hind Taiwan's D.:v닝IOOOl.:nt Success‘ Yale University Press. New Haven. 1988.
p.141.
7the neoclassical perspec다ve as a guide, a basis for conceptualizing economic goals over
디me， and within which to generate the conditions for decision-making by market
P따ticipants. Though both na다ons depended upon m따kεt decisionmaking as the
ultimate tool for allocation decisions, both substantially guided national and sectoral
allocation through government intervention. The CANs app않r to have taken an
alternative approach. They can be described as having taken the theory as a recipe, a
method in itself for generating growth. And, consistent with the theory, they saw
economic growth not as a dynamic process of structural change, but as a simple
cumulative process, a process of increase without the necess따y structural change.
Decisionmaking on both national and sectoral levels for the CANs was left to the
market.
Edelberto Toπ'es-Rivas ， an active and well published Costa Rican economist,
has stated clearly in numerous writings that what encapsulates the long list of specific
failures in the process is the obs~rvation that in the final analysis the economic structure
in Costa Rica did not change. It did not develop toward that of a ’modern ’ economy.6
Torres-Rivas suggests that much of the blame for the failure of development lies with
the inappropriate modeling of the process with respect to the specific requirements of
Central American development needs. By that he means to challenge the dependence
on unmanaged market decisionmaking in lieu of intentional policy geared to the specific
needs of the five nations.
The World Bank, on the other hand, represents the orthodox economic
perspective on the problem from the vantage point of the industrialized nations. In this
case the economic crisis in the 1980s is seen as primarily the result of unfortunate
external impacts - fuel prices, the world debt crisis, ill-fated internal wars and so on.
6 See for example. Edelbe l10 Ton엉s-Rivas. Crisis del Poder en Cenlro떼mc:ricn. San Jose. EDUCA. 1989. The english
reader can lind similar conclusions in his 깐"he Central Amenιan Mlldelllf Growlh: C센is fllr W11l11ll?’, L:llin American
월탤뜨뿌~' Vol. VII‘ 1980.
8In fact, when the decades of the 1960s and 1970s in Central America are mentioned in
World Bank literature, it is to describe them as successful pe더ods of economic g쁘반뇨，
not as periods of unsuccessful economic develooment which laid the ground for the
crises of the 1980s, as is seen by Torres-Rivas.?
The theoretical background for this study includes both the nεoclassical
perspec디ve and the expansion of the neoclassical theory representεd by Simon Kuznets
and others who focus on the need for a dynamic concept of development. The essential
question is that which is often addressed in the literature as the "growth versus
development" argument. The argument centers on the fact that neoclassical theory is
built upon a model of the national economy which is static in nature. Thus, with
respect to time, at best the neoclassical model comprehends the subject economy
strictly at distinct points in time by comparing only a set of static states of the
economy.
Those who are concerned with the dynamic aspects of economic expansion, on
the other hand, argue that neoclassical theory presents a model which is inadequate to
comprehend the changes over time. In general, the argument suggests that long-term
sustainable economic development requires that the sod외 and economic structure of the
nation change in order to support the inevitably multi-faceted process of economic
development. Thus, since the neoclassical model is not capable of representing the
dynamic processes, it requires at least a supplemental model of the development
process and at most a completely different model which portrays economic
dεvelopment as a dynamic process.
7 In tenus of비e pe때ective described here, 미I ofthe World Bank studies and repons ofCentral Americaare
consistent. A coupl샤 of specific referenιes， howev다" are; EI Snlvador: Count rY Eo씨nnmic Memorandum. 1989. where the fall in
per capita incomo: since 1978 (aner햄hteen years of growth) is desc꺼bed as duo: simply to the internal war; and I멜￡
LiberaliZDtion and Economic Inlel!ration in Central Ame꺼ca.1990.
9Recognizing that economic development is, of necessity, a dynamic process, a
number of theorists in recent y않rs have suggested that a development theory must
comprehend the process of change itself. Generally the concern for that comprehension
is related to the intent of guiding, or managing, the change.
The neoclassical theory, on the other hand, treats the process of change as a
black box where only input and output can be noted. The process - a function of the
market - is a ’natural ’ one which must be left to function unimpeded. In terms of the
question posed by this study, it is the way those conclusions were interpreted which is
the key to the radically different results in the two sets of national economies.
The Central American leadership, in concert with clearly stated admonitions of
the U.S. government, chose to interpret the neoclassical theory literally. Markets were
left to work essentially untended. Government functioned primarily to provide the
infrastructure required by the markets and thus indirectly by foreign suppliers of
capital. Intervention by government was essentially limited to moves which would
encourage investment without discrimination.
The original conditions in Central America were far from those assumed by the
orthodox model. Competition, for example, in nearly all markets was a function of
power, both political and economic. The same was true of South Korea and Taiwan,
of course. That is virtually p따t of the definition of underdevelopment. But whereas in
Central America the large gap between the theoretical and the real world conditions
was ignored, the ENIC nations recognized that what was assumed in the theory would
have to be encouraged and created in the real world economy.
The ENICs located the neoclassical model within a larger context. Specifically
why or how they did that is not within the purview of this study. Recent books and
articles cite the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen in Taiwan and Confucius in both Taiw삐
삐d S. Korea as important to the partie비ar form of government intervention in the
10
economies.8 What is important to this study is that for the ENICs there app않rs to
have been an overview which informed and provided goals for policy decisions, which
guided the application of the th∞ry.
Thus, given the conceptu외 distinction between growth and development, the
comparison of the experience in structural development of the two economies requires
that the structural relationships be examined over time. This implies a theoretical
perspec다ve which goes beyond the neoclassical as such.
DISTINGUISHING GROWTH FROM DEVELOPMENT
The argument as to whether an economy developed or simply grew requires that
indicators be established which will dependably distinguish economic growth from
economic development. The aggregate indicators of the neoclassical model, GDP and
GDP per Capita, are the archetype growth indicators. At best these measure only the
aggregate expansion or contraction of the national economy. They give no indication
of change within the structure of the economy, and no indication of the changes which
mark the development of the economy from the level of mainly producing traditional
prim따Y goods, to that of an industrialized modem economy.
Indicators which distinguish growth from development must present a
disaggregated view of the economy in order to allow evaluation of the structure and of
the changes in the structure which should take place over time. The work of Simon
Kuznets on the structure of modern economic growth provides a foundation for
conceptualizing economic development. Kuznets ’ work approaches the process of
8 Two exanψles are Paul W. Kuznets. "An 티sl Asian Modι1of Econmniι Devo:iopmenl: Japan. Taiwan and South
Korea". E노anomie D엉veloomenl and Culluml Chan!!e. Vol. 36. #3. 1988 Supph:menl p. S35: lind K.T. Li. The Evolulion Of
Policv Behind Taiwan's I>eyeloomenl SucJ:~eSs. Yale Univeπily Pn:ss. New Haven. 1988. pp. 9. 24-25. 38-39.
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development from the empirical side. He saw his work as recognizing the historical
changes in structure which accompanied the economic expansion of recent historical
periods.
Walt W. Rostow described the process of economic development in a work
published in 1990, in which he asserts that his concept of the ’mature’ economy is
comparable to the Kuznetsian notion of modern economic growth.9 The basic question
for the comprehension of economic development, says Rostow, is whether it is possible
to define it in terms of GNP per Capita. He observes that it is not possible to
comprehend development in such aggregate terms and that ultimately it is necess따y to
define it ".. .in terms of the degree to which the p。이 of then-existing technology had
been efficiently absorbed" in the economy.
For Rostow, as similarly for Kuznets, the stage of economic maturity has been
achieved "when a society has effectively applied the range of modem technology to the
,, 10 rrl.~ :_，.I:~~""， pn ..'" I..~ ..n~，.I :bulk of its resources." J. V The indicators to be used in this study are based on the
statistical studies of the historical patterns economic development which were published
by Simon Kuznets in the 1960s and 1970s. Kuznets found that the indicators of
development included GDP per Capita, the relationships among the three major
economic sectors, consumption, savings, investment and education. That list is by no
means exclusive. There are other indices among the Kuznetsian findings, but these are
key in the list.
In this study the indicators which have been examined over time for the seven
natIOns are:
GDP and GDP per Capita,
9 Walt W. Rostow. 꺼Iι Stal!O:s of ECllnomic Growlh: A Nlln-C" l1ll1lunisl Mnnif,:slll. Thi며 Edition. Cambridgo:.
Cambridgc University PNSS. 1990. pago: 242.
10 Walt W. Roslow. 까1': Sln l!O:s ofε:llnlll1lio: Grllwth: A Nlln-Conullunisl Mnnif.:stll· 끼Ii떠 Editilln. Cambridgι ，
Cambridgc Univcrsity PNS.~. 1960. pagc 59.
12
Agriculture, Industry and Services Sectors as Parts of GDP,
The Use of Output in the form of,
Consumption - Per Capita and as P따tofGDP
Savings as P따t ofGDP and
Investment - per Capita and as P없t ofGDP
Literacy.
These indicators and their value for distinguishing economic development in 때
emerging nation will be discussed in the fourth chapter.
If Kuznets, Rostow and others were right about the economic development
process, these indicators can be expected to illustrate a significant ch없1ge in structure in
the developing nations during the post-World War II decades. These changes should
lead to characteristics in the developing economy which are consistent with what
Kuznets refers to as modem economic growth. The Kuznetsian perspective suggests
that in the latter twentieth century the process of developmental change requires that the
leadership of the nation manage the economy with deY리opment as a clear intention.
Thep이icy intervention, in the case of the ENICs, was oriented to managing the
외location of resources within the sectors and to the creation of infrastructure within the
economy as a whole in order to make best use of the resources in the expansion of the
base for the economy.
Howard Pack and L따ry Westph외， in 뻐 article in the Journal of Develooment
Economics, discuss the selective intervention in the Korean case which ".. .is focused
on industries judged to be in Korea’s dynamic compe때ve advantage".11 By "dynamic
Comparative advantage" the writers mean to characterize the strategy of exploiting the
comp따ative advantages of one level of primary production or basic industrial
production while building a comparative advantage in a technically higher level
industry. They refer specifically to the process by which "infant industries are
developed by market agents ac디ng in response to non-neutral promotional p이icies and
11 Howard Pack and Larry W~stphal. "Industrial Strnt~gy and T.:chnological Chang.:" , Journal of Dev~lollm~nt
훌띤딛꾀댐‘Vol.22, 1986. pag.:s 87·128.
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under the strong influence of direct non-price dominated interventions in decision
making and resource allocation. Other industries - suppliers of inputs and users of
outputs - are affected by these measures insofar as their behavior is constrained or
otherwise conditioned by the selective inteπentions to foster infant industries. ,, 12
The important point in this process of government intervention in, or
management of the development process, is that in South Korea, as in Taiwan, "The
monitoring (or intervention) process has assur，해 that (investments) are both privately
13and socially profitable in the medium term, though not always in the short term."! ,] It
is the emphasis on the ’socially profitable' aspect of the allocation of resources which
distinguishes the policy of the ENICs from that of the CANs.
For the ENICs, government intervention in the economy was specifically
intended to accomplish the characteristics of modern economic growth as described by
Kuznets. That is, as will be discussed in chapter seven, the management of the
development process for the ENICs was expected to result in a sustained increase in
GDP, together with a more equitable income distribution, an increase in education and
skills in the population, an increase in techn이ogical capacity for the economy, and an
increase in economic welfare for the nation as a whole.
This implies intentional management of the economy in a manner not unlike that
of a new business venture. The national resources at hand must be marshaled and
allocated with the intention of providing the basis for expansion in the next phase. The
Kuznetsian approach emphasizes the importance of the incorporation of knowledge
through application of science and technology as the means of leverage through which a
sustained increase in total output can take place. This implies continued investment in
12 Howard Pack and Larry W,:slphal. IIp. ιil. ‘ pago: 98.
13 Howard Pack and Larry Weslphal. op. cil •• pag.: 101.
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education and other resources for the incorporation of technology into the production
process.
As will be seen in subsequent chapters, examination of the historical data for the
seven countries illustrates dramatic differences in the two sets of nations. While the
pattern in the indicators which is represented by the ENICs confirms the expectations
drawn from Kuznets’ studies, that of the CANs illustrates clear failure to move toward
modem economic growth.
The ENICs, with policies intended to change the structure of their economies,
will be found in this study to have generated the changes required for economic
development. In the decades since World War II, that is, the two ENICs pursued
policies which created economies which will be found to approximate the profile of
economies characterized as modem economic growth.
The five CANs, on the other hand, pursued policies geared strictly to the
aggregate growth of their economies, leaving specific investment decisionmaking to the
market process. There was no overt management of the economies for the purpose of
allocating resources for long term development. They depended entirely on the market
to make allocation decisions for economic expansion. The resultant statistics show a
number of years of aggregate GDP growth, though GDP per Capita was disappointing
throughout the period, followed by the collapse which is ctiaracterized as lithe crisis" in
Central America. With the partial exception of Costa Rica, the CANs uniformly fail
the tests of modern economic growth drawn from the findings of Kuznets.
Presently, among the CANs, the focus on export-led-growth is being understood
as the p이icy which, if applied properly, will - like yeast in bread - cause the economy
to rise. Exportation is being pushed as the recipe for the extraction of the CANs from
the crisis. This essentially reductionist view of the national economies sees them as
entities which, when properly adjusted, will arrive at stable forms which will simply
15
increase in size. The World Bank, The IMP and the United Nations have been
producing studies, evaluations and specific proposals regarding the correct actions for
getting the nations 'back on the σack’ 14
The United Nations Development Program is engaged in seeking renewed
financial help for the governments and for the regional efforts to rebuild the collapsed
economies. The striking thing about the approach is that the efforts by both the UN
and the five CANs are very much like those of the 1950s and 없rly 1960s. These are
the policies which set the tone for the subsequent y않rs of unstable growth.
As a result of the comprehension of the process described above, it appears that
the CANs are condemning themselves to, at best, another round of static comparative
advantage and of aid and external investment, in hopes of floating like flotsam on the
tide of world trade. This sσategy has paid off very poorly in the past. In Central
America, for example, although the 1960s generated considerable growth in Gross
15Domestic Product, their share of world trade was consistently p
The conclusions of this study suggest that the resolution to the current economic
crisis for the CANs lies in the pursuit of policies which will encourage the structural
change necess따y for modern economic growth. This refers to engagement in the
complex of activities which use current comparative advantage to provide the economic
14 A few cases in point include: the United Nalions Development Programme's Cooperacion Para Desarrollo: EI
핀암띄딛! (Internal Document- 1989’; and Cooperacion Para Desarrollo: Guatemala (Intern미 Document - 1989) and 비g 훨뜨핀
Plan of Economic Cooperation for Central America where the theme is the need ti야 ex\emlll tiRllncilll assistance \0 reeslablish the
".••successful pat써m of development (which) exhausted itself a decade ago in Cenlral Ame꺼ca." (page 4)까1e laller document
was developed in the context of the elTort to reestablish the all but defunct Central American Common Mark깅t in 1988: the World
Bank's Interim Report on Lξndin!! for Adjustment‘ 1988. where the two prime indicators are given as GDP growth and Export
growth. the internal documents. Trade Liheralizalion and Economic Inl펙ration in Central Ame꺼ca ， 1990. and g댄띄뿌쁘딛
CountrY Economic Memorandum. 1989. where the fall in per capita inιome since 1978 • after eighteen years of d때matic growth -
is described as due simply to the into:rnal war (p. I. π'.).
IS Richard Kibhey. "Constant-Markιt-Share Anlllysis of Cenlral Americlln Export Growth". 1986. PlIper prepllred for
a semiRllr on InternatioRllI Economics with Prof. Helιn Youngelson-Neal al Portland Sta써 Univer피ty. Also 앞e Mario Moravec.
"Exports of Latin American MlInufaclures 10 the Cenlers:까1eirMagnitude and Signilicanιe" ， CEPAL Review， v이. 17. August.
1982: Joseph Grunwllld. ed.. Latin America lind Ih덩 World Economv. London, Sage Publicllli매ns， 1978: lind Unit새d Nations.
Handhook of lnlernalionlll Trode and Dev녕lonmenl SllIlislics. New York. Uniled Nalions. 1980.
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resource base for the next stage in the dεvelopment process. It 외so refers to the
establishment of p이icy which involves investment in education, encouragement of
increased domestic saving and investment, pursuit of increased income equity, and
encouragement of resource allocation directed toward incorporation of technology in
domestic production.
The study does not deal with the many forces which lie beyond the realm of
domestic economic policy per see Both sets of economies have been subject to an array
of impacts which certainly affected the economic records, and which have been said to
account for the crisis in Central America in spite of any intention on the part of
government leadership.
The glob려 economy is commonly cited as the reason for the crisis among the
CANs. The international energy price increases of the 1970s, and the glob외 debt
problems of the 1970s and 1980s, for example, have been blamed for the collapse of
the Central American economies in the 1970s. It is clear that both did have large
impacts on those economies. It is 머so apparent that the Central American economies
were considerably more vulnerable to the state of the global economy in the 1970s and
1980s than were the ENICs. By the time the .global economy began adjusting to the
expansion of the 않rlier post-World War II period, the ENICs had engineered domestic
economies with sufficient internal capacity to allow advantageous adjustment to the
global impacts.
The civil wars in Central America are 외so often cited as causes for the crises.
Yet it is entirely reasonable to suggest that the civil wars are more likely the result of
the failure to promote structural change than they are explanations for the disappointing
growth in the region. Subsequent chapters will reveal that although only three of the
five nations suffered civil wars (El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) , the record of
the collapse in output in the latter 1970s is strikingly similar for 외I 턴vee
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This study proposes to deal only with the record of structural change, or the
lack of structural change, in terms of the policy intentions on the p:따t of the leadership
in the seven nations, not with the myriad of explanations and alternative interpretations
which are offered for the successes of the ENICs and the failures of the CANs. No
attempt is made here to account for the wars, the global economy, the vicissitudes of
the international markets, weather, or any of the many other environmental
circumstances which inevitably affected the history of both the growth and the
development efforts.
Rather, the study is offered as an attempt to comprehend the economic collapse
of the five CANs in the latter 1970s in terms of the inadequate economic growth
policy. This deals with, in other words, issues of fundamental causes rather than with
the many proximate causes which impacted and affected the national economies as
well.
In the next two chapters, chapters two and three, the growth versus development
issue in the literature is reviewed. Chaptεr four describes the method which has been
used in the study, including explanation of the indicators which have been chosen. The
history of the Central American economies will be described in chapters five and six in
order to elucidate the behavior of the leadership in economic policymaking du더ng the
post-Wo다d War II period. Similarly, the recent economic histories ofTaiwan 뻐d
South Korea is treat'εd in chapter seven.
Subsequently, chapter eight presents the statistics of development and of growth
as represented by the ENICs and the CANs. An evaluation of the results is made in
chapter nine, followed by the concluding remarks in chapter ten.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC GROWTH OR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THE NEOCLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE
Most wri않rs on the su비ect in dev리opment economics recognize a clear
distinction between economic growth and economic developmen t. That that distinction
is understood to be important by all sides in the discussion, there can be little doubt. A
state-of-the-art neoclassical text on the Economics of Develonment addresses the
question in what will be seen to be a revealing manner.! The major part of the first
chapter in that text deals with clarification of the distinction between "economic
growth" and "economic development".
The definitions which are offered make the distinction clear.2 "Economic
growth" , say the authors, "refers to the rise in national and per capita income and
product." This seems to be a straightforward notion with which there is likely to be
little disagreement at the superfici외 level at which the comment is made.
Disagreement app않rs in further development of the idea, in the question of whether or
not the theory should account for more than growth in the sense of simple increase.
Neoclassical economists tend to simply assume that development accompanies
growth and that the concepts are synonymous. On the other hand, when restricting
themselves to a theoretical perspective, neoclassicists define development (structural
change) out of the model. J.E. Meade, for example, in the Introduction to his A앨Q:
I Malcolm Gillis. ':llll. Economics of D.:vo:loll l1l.:nl. W.W.Nllnon and Co.• N.:w York. 1983. Prepared und.:r tho:
auspices of Haπa며's Inslilul.: for International D.:v.:lopm.:nt.
2 Gillis‘ .:1 al. op. cit .. p. 7 IT
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Classical Theorv of EconQmic Growth, states that one is likely to have a II ...desire to
watch this system grow through time... (In the context of this theoretical perspective,
however,) we shall confine ourselves to watching the process of growth on the
assumption that the growing system remains in equilibrium. 1I3 The components of the
growing system, in other words, simply increase in constant proportion with the
economy as a whole. From the point of view of the neoclassical theory, Meade is
telling us, development as change in the structure cannot be accounted for.
The authors of Economics of Develooment tell us, as do m때y others writing on
the subject, that IIEconomic development, in addition to a rise in per capi따 income,
implies fundamental changes in the structure of the economy".4 This p따t of the
definition is not so straightforward, nor is there wide agreement, even at this superficial
lev밍， as to what such a change in structure would entail.
The authors go on to list the fundamental changes which are likely to
accompany economic development. The three m매or ones are, 1) a rising share of
industry in national product, 2) an increasing percentage of people living in cities and
3) the population as a whole must be p따ticipants in the process which gives rise to the
changes in structure. The list includes other structural changes as well. Those include
acceleration (then deceleration) of population growth, alterations in the structure of the
age of the pop비ation ， and 떠tera디ons in the consumption patterns.
Later in the chapter the authors recognize that their list of anticipated changes in
the process of economic development is similar to the concept of modem economic
growth as described by Simon Kuznets. With the exception of three references to
specific statistical contributions by Kuznets later in the book, however, Kuznets ’
3 J.E. Meade. A Nell-Classical TIt‘orv (lr E.:onllmic Growth. Unwin Univ.:rsity Books. London. 1964. p. 3.
4 Gillis. et al. op. cit .. p. 7 π
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concept of modem economic growth is pursu려 no further in the Gillis text on
economic development. The significance of this minimization becomes clear with the
recognition that through the decades of his concern with modem economic growth
Kuznets stated consistently that such growth could not take place without structural
changes such as those described above. These were not simply desirable or likely
changes, they were neces잃ry ch따acteristics of economic "growth" in this period.S
The Gillis text is based primarily in the neoclassical theoretical perspec다ve.
This is a static model of national economies which cannot deal with the dynamic
changes in structure which are necess하Y to Kuznets ’ MEG. Nor, of course, can it deal
with the implications of ’economic development' as described in the text itself. Even
so, this text continues to discuss the characteristics of development in the introductory
chapter as though they are somehow integr외 to the model of economic growth on
which the text is based.
The matter becomes dramatically cl없r in the second chapter which is entit1때
"Obstacles To Development". Here, Gillis, et al, shift from describing the
ch따acteris다cs of development as objectives to describing them as inherent in an
underdeveloped national economy. These are not changes in the economy which are to
be pursued. They are changes which will automatically app않r when the obstacles,
economic, government, social and international, have been removed.
Given that the neoclassical model is a static one it is to be expected that the
accompanying concept of ’development’ is one which attempts to identify the attributes
of an underdeveloped national economy which app않r to keep it from functioning like a
5 See for examplι. Simon Kuznets. ·M찌ern ε:onomic Grow!h: Findings and R샤t1ections·. Ame꺼C‘an Econllmic
~싹 Vol. 63. June 1973. pp. 247·258. Also헬 Simon Kuznets. ·Toward a끼lCOry of Economic Grow!h·. in Natillnal p，이icv
for Economic Welfare at Home and Ahmad. Rohert L랴achman. Editor. New York. Russell and Russell. Inc.. 1961. In !hat
article Kuzne lS cites several publications d떼ng from the late 19408 which huild toward !his immediate predecessor to his nr뼈em
economic growth ar훌ument. 끼le MEG perspective can he found in Kuznets' Modem 타llnomic Gmwth: Rale Structure and
~쁘. New Haven. Yale Univ녕rsity Pre잉s. 1966. amI in succ야ding artic1ιs and hooks citιd in the hihliography.
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fully developed market economy. The solution, then, is essentially the removal of
those obstacles. Once the obstacles are removed, it is assumed, the economy will
naturally begin to function as a developed market economy.
Having described development, clearly distinguishing it from growth in chapter
one, the Gillis text then uses the term ’development’ throughout the balance of the text
as though the terms were interchangeable. The authors state that "In the definition used
in this book, economic dεvelopment includes both growth and wide distribution of the
benefits of growth. ,,6 They go on to make clear that distribution of the benefits of
growth is a function of the policymakers, it is not an integral p따t of the growth
process. For that reason, the first topic under "Patterns of Development" in chapter
three is Gross National Product. "The great advantage of the GNP concept" , they tell
us there, "is that it encompasses all of a nation ’s economic activity in a few summ따y
statistics that are mutually consistent. ,,7 That GNP, a strictly growth measurement, is
the key measure of development for these authors leaves the reader with no doubt that
the terms ’economic development' are simply being used to mean ’economic growth I •
Neoclassical theorists reduce the issue to one of static and comparative static
models. Many have specifically addressed the problem. In a 1968 article on
development Gottfried Haberler stated that ".. .it is not true that a static theory, because
it is static, is debarred from saying anything useful about a changing and developing
economic world. There is‘ .• ’comparative statics' (which is at least helpful) in dealing
with a changing situation. ,,8 He admits that what can be done in a dynamic
environment with a static theory is limited. A dynamic theory, he argues, would be
6 Gillis. et 01. op. cit•• p. 26.
7 Gillis. et 01. op. cit.• p. 41.
8 Goufried Haberler. "Inlenuuionnl Trodc and Ecl.nomic 0ιv.:lop ll1.:nt" ‘ in Ja ll1ιs D.꺼lcbι멍c. cd. 트암띤띤암섣.!ll
Trod.: and Dcv.:lonlllcnl. John Wilιyond Son잉‘ Ncw Yl.rk. 1968. p.I06.
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more appropriate. The best he can offer in the realm of trade theory, however, is II the
rudiments of a dynamic theory" which was described by Hla Myint and which was
based in the classical perspective of Adam Smith and J.S. Mill.9
Bruce Herrick and Charles Kindleberger, in the fourth edition of their E잎쁘쁘힘
Develooment text, deal with the problem by first clearly describing the difference
between growth and development. Thereafter they state that in 뻐y case they cannot
imagine the possibility of growth without development. In 삶ct， as will be argued in
later chapters, growth without development is entirely possible for a limited time,
though it is by no means necessarily desirable. In any case, Herrick and Kindleberger
also end up thoroughly confusing the implications of the two terms relative to
10neoclassical theory by using them interchangeably.
THEISSUE
Recognizing that economic dev리opment is, of necessity, a dynamic process, a
number of theorists in recent y없rs have suggested that a development theory must
comprehend the process of change itself. As is to be expected in such a modeling
endeavor, the concern for comprehension of the process is a function of the intent to
guide or manage the change.
The neoclassical theory itself, on the other hand, treats the process of change as
a black box in which only input and output can be noted. The issue of technological
change and dynamic change in structure are avoided. From that perspective, the
9 Haberler, op. cil.‘ p.106.
10 Bruce Herrick and Chari넙s P. Kindl.:be멍:er. Economic Develoomenl. McGraw-Hili. Nιw York. 1983 (4th Edition).
See especially pages 21 and 22. and pages 49 through 52 where. in the s.:ction enlill.:d NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. the reader is re파rred to Chapler 2 where ’ NolOζlassical thιories of economic growth were
described .... then Iπaled to a descriplion of the~ polilical-economic polπpιclive which "modem neoclassicisls .. .Iargely
l멍gm‘o아야)1πre"
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process of development - a function of the market - is a 'natural’ one which is best left
to happen unimpeded.
If the basic neoclassical model for economic growth (as distinct from economic
development) is to be accep얻d at face value, the implications are cl않r. All markets
must function without intervention. In fact am매or effort must be made to remove
obstacles to free markets in order to as nearly as possible approximate ’perfect’
compe때on. Economic participants must be expected to behave predictably ra다on외ly.
Intervention by government is to be thoroughly circumscribed. Although the model
assumes a closed system, foreign trade will function through open markets as the
’engine for growth' ... and so on. These observations are to be found in 때y of the
orthodox neoclassical growth or 'development’ texts, including those mentioned in the
previous section of this chapter.
W. Arthur Lewis is one of the undoubtedly orthodox economists who
recognized and discussed some of the problems the neoclassical model has in
comprehending economic underdevelopment. After describing the temporally
circumscribed chara'다er of the theory in his Theorv of Economic Growth, Lewis
point강d out that we must look beyond the boundaries of contemporary economic theory
11when we are concerned with long term issues. ’Economic growth (better understood
as economic development from the point of view of this study)" , he says, "depends
upon attitudes to work, to wealth, to thrift, to having children...and so on." On the
whole the book represents an attempt to transcend the narrow limits of neoclassical
theory, to incorporate much of the range of concerns which orthodox economists have
defined out of their theory.
11 W.A삐lur Lewis. Theolγ of타onol11ic Growth. Unwin University Books. umdon. 1955. pD양s 12-18.
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Lewis I book is prim따i1y focused on I’the growth of output per head... ", the
archetype neoclassical concern. 12 Many pages are devoted, however, to arguing that
by narrowing their field to the study of a very limited range of "proximate causes" (as
distinct from underlying causes), economists have limited themselves to building tools
for short-term an외ysis only. "If we are concerned with long term studies" , the author
argues, "we have to look beyond the boundaries of contemporary economic theory. ,, 13
Another orthodox economist who clearly recognizes the need to σanscend the
limits of theory rather than using the theory as a rule book is Hla Myint. Haberler is
described 않rlier in this chapter as having mentioned Myint who, in 1968, recognized
the classical economists, Adam Smith and 1.S. Mill, as the unique contributor of "the
rudiments of a dynamic theory" .14 That Myint is one who would agree with Lewis
can 외so be seen in his 1982 writing on the development experience of Taiwan. In that
article he states that that country ’s experience "...points to a number of weaknesses in
the conventional ’International Trade Theory' approach." 15
In the case of Taiwan, he states, in order to take advantage of the abundant
labor supply it was necess따y for the government to make institutional adaptations in
other realms in order to move toward a process of industrialization which would avail
itself of that "comparative advantage". In other words, he recognized that the mere
removal of obstacles to allow the latent forces of the market to asseπ themselves would
have been inadequate to ac다vate the comparative advantage.
12 IAwis. Ope cit.• p.IO. Melhodology.
13 IAwis‘ Ope cit•• p.13.
14 0。이tfried Haberler. ’ IntematillOlll Trade and E씨lnomic Devιl ‘’pment·. in Jamcs D. Thcberge. ed,홀띤믿꾀뜸과E
Trade and Develollmenl. John Wit삐y Dnd Sons‘ N잉w York. 1968. p.I06
IS Hla Myinl. 'Comparaliv<l Analysis 01‘ Taiwan's Economic D<lv<llllpm<lnl Wilh 01싸rC‘.lUnlri <ls· ‘ in EXl1criences and
Lessons of Economic Dιv<llopmcnt in Taiwan.Kw‘’holing Li and ’rzong-shia l1 Yu. Edilors. CinicD Aca‘l<lmica. Taipei. Taiwan.
1982.p떼，ges 71 Dnd 72.
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Another orthodox economist, Michael Todaro, has concerns about the theory
which are closely related to those of both Lewis and Myint. In essence he suggests that
a development model must recognize and respond to the unique domain in which the
development is to take place.
Writing in 때 article on "Current Issues in Economic Development" , he places
that requirement in 때 historical context when he describes the "Unfortunate
, 16여evelopment) experience of (recent) decades of m때y third world nati
points out that "While the thought processes of (orthodox) economics may have
universal validity, the models themselves are often culturally and institutionally
specific." Orthodox economists, for example, tended to pay little attention to the fact
that third world economies are likely to be highly fragmented and that disequilibrium
rather than equilibrium relationships predominate. "Development εconomists
(therefore)...must 머ways be searching for ways to adapt their traditional concepts and
models to the very diff농rent structural and institutional settings of the third world
nations. II 17
In the 1940s and 1950s Simon Kuznets wrote actively about his concern that the
generally accepted aggregate indicators of economic growth, those indicators which
provided the motivation for data collection, were inadequate to model a growth process
18which involved substantial structural reorganization in the growing economy. 10 He
argued that in order for 'economic growth' to represent a sustainable increase in
16 Michael P. T，여aro. 'Cummt 1ssuιs in Economic Dllvlllopmllnt". in 타onomic p，ι 1'!'(1 11Cli "，Il S ， Mauricll Ballabon,
Editor. Harwood Academic Publishllrs. New York. 1979. pages 221-'잭2. Also 않e MichaιI P. Todaro, Economic Develooment
in the Third World,Seclmd Edition, NllW York. 1981.
17 T，여aro. op. cit.. p. 225.
18 For llxample, see Simon KUznlltS. "Toward a Theory ofEc삐삐lic Growth" , in National Policv for Economic
Welfare at Home and Abroad. Robert Lek야hman. Editor. New York. Russ삐l1 and Rus싸II. Inc.. 1961. In that article Kuznets
cites several publications dating from the lale 19405 which build toward this il\lJl\ediate predeeιssor to his MODERN ECONOMIC
GROWTH argument. 끼1e MEG perspllctive can be fllund in Ku킹lets' Modem ECOnllmic Growth: Rate Structure _and Spread‘ New
Haven. Yale Univeπity Press. 1966. and in 엎veral succeeding articlιs and books cited in the bibliogra(’hy.
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national economic welfare, the economy must experience "major changes in the shares
of the various components of national product and (concomitant changes) in the
grouping of populations".19
This implies a concept of ’growth ’ which transcends the static orthodox model.
Kuznets suggests here and in later writing that the aggregate measures are inadequate to
account for or to allow accurate policy guidance of the process. In 1980, writing on
the "Driving Forces of Economic Growth" Kuznets states quite clearly his conclusions
that since "economic (development) is a socially bound process" ... the 띤다화 as well as
economic costs of the process must be monitored for" ...guidance in our interpretations
,20and in p이icy implications.
It is clear that the issue is and has been for some time a significant one among
mainstream neoclassicists. Yet since World War II economic ’growth ’ policy in many
third world nations has been limited to the narrow, literal interpretation of the model
which disallows guidance of the process. There are many more critics of the model
who do not refrain from stating clearly that a static theory which is concerned with
aggregate growth of the economy as quantitative statics is simply inadequate to portray
the qu외ita다ve dynamics of the development process.
Shortly after World War II Gunnar Myrd외， an economist and ac다ve public
servant, wrote a great deal about the inadequacy of the "inherited" theoretical approach
to deal with economic underdevelopment.21 In a work of the mid-1950s he states that
"In the main, economic theory has not so far concerned itself with the problems of
19 Simon Kuzn.:ts. Mod.:m Economic Growth: Rat.: Stroct‘Ire and Spread. N.:w Hav.:n. Yal.: Univ.:rsity Press. 1966.
page 17.
20 Simon Kuzn.:ts. "Driving Fon:.:s of Economic Growth: What Call W.: L:am from History?", Wdtwirt!lChaftliches
흐뜨파y， Band 116. Heft 3. 1980. pages 427 & 428.
21 S.:e. for .:xompl.:, Myn!ol's D.:velopm.:nt Th.:orv and Und.:rdcvd‘”’‘ld R.:비‘’”‘.1958. Rιfill넙nCll to many llf his
oth‘ r writings will b엉 found in the bibliography as w앙II as 바s.:whιre in the tllxt of this stu‘Jy.
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underdeveloped countries. If, nevertheless it is uncritically applied to those problems,
"22the theory becom
Myrdal’s "starting point (in this p따디cular text) is the assertion that the notion of
stable equilibrium is normally a false analogy to choose when constr"ue섭괴g a theory to
explain the changes in a social system. ,,23 This position is essentially supported by his
argument that circles of causation in the economic realm are as likely to be vicious as
they are to be virtuous. Thus he concludes that in actuality, as distinct from within the
dominant theory, "the play of forces in the market tends to incrl않se， rather than to
decrease, the inequalities between regions (whether within or between national
economies). Much of the (orthodox) theory is a rationalization of the dominant
interests of the industrial countries where it was first put forward and later
"24developed.
Myrdal tells us that he foresees, correctly or not, "a new orientation in
economic theory toward greater realism...and finalliquidation of... the free trade
doctrine and the stable equilibrium approach". Even so, he says, he has no illusions
that it will ever be possible to fit such a comprehensive new theory into a neat, strictly
economic, model. The relevant "noneconomic lt variables and the relations between
them are too many, he says, to permit that sort of heroic simpli턴cation.
Writing in what app않rs to be cl않r basic agreement with Myrdal with respect to
the inapplicability of the heroic simplifications and assumptions of the neoclassical
model, Francois Perroux presents a much more articulate theoretical analysis of the
model itself in his development of the case for abandonment of "the static expression of
22 Myrdnl. ‘lp. cil.. p. III.
23 Myrdnl. op. ιil .• p. 2.'i.
24 Myrdnl. op. cit.. p. 38 nnd III.
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growth in orthodox economics" .25 He goes through a long list of theoretical reasons
for the observation that IIa comp따ison between the orthodox model and the conditions
which...are common to all developing countries shows that it is utte다y inapplicable to
them and that the obsessions to which it gives 더se are indeed extremely dangerous. ,,26
Perroux describes, in 때 extensive list of characteristics for the orthodox model,
the assumptions and limitations of that model. He then points out that, in direct
conflict with the requirements and limitations of the model, a sound strategy for
developing countries calls for changes in the historical forces which are operating.
Such a strategy requires a thorough restructuring of the economy, it extends through
irreversible time and it presupposes a shift in the power relations within the economy.
"In short", he says, lithe (orthodox) model depicts a pure market situation with perfect
competition, using mechanical analogies; it is diametrically opposed to the conditions
common to the developing countries, (those conditions) which can emerge from the
limitations of their status only through the combined efforts of the elites and the
,,27peoples (in order) to change their immediate and more rem
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Contemporary concern for economic growth is directly traceable to the central
concern of the classicists beginning with Adam Smith. For the classicists, national
output, and therefore growth in national output was a function of the three factors of
production; land, labor and capital. While land was recognized to be fixed in supply,
and labor to be a function of the gap between the market wage and the subsistence
wage level, it was the formation of capital which was the source of economic growth.
2s Francois P，ιrroux. A N~w Coneel1l of D~vo:lol1menl. Croon1 Hehn. London. 1983. page 18S.
26 Perroux. op. cit .• pag~ 64 and 65.
27 P~rroux. op. cit .• pagι 65.
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In brief, since economic growth was understood to be a function of saving, and
the only factor of production which was capable of saving was represented by capital,
the burden in economic growth fell to the owners of capital. From the perspective of
the classicists the ac다ve element in the process was supplied by the saving from profits
and subsequent investment by capitalists.
The contemporary, neoclassical, theory of economic growth differs from 않rlier
efforts(those by Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Malthus, M따x ， Schumpeter...) by being both
less ambitious and more precise. Commentators on contempor따y growth theory cite
the Harrod-Domar model (Harrod 1939, Domar 1946) as the prototype post-Keynesian
growth model. Although it is recognized to be a relatively simple early formulation of
the contemporary model, later growth theory represents departures from the basic
theme stated in the Harrod-Domar model.
Explication of the Harrod/Domar model itself can be found in 때y text dealing
with economic growth.28 The production function which represents the essence of the
Harrod-Domar view of long-run growth relates the generation of total output, Q, to the
available capi때 stock, K, via the capital-output ratio, v. The resultant function ,
Q=K1v, assumes that the capital-output ratio is a constant one. Capital, in the original
Harrod-Domar model, is the only factor of production, and labor combines with capital
in fixed proportions.
Many questions can be and have been raised about the realism of this view of
the world. It has, however, seπed as a key point of departure for more recent
neoclassical growth theory as applied both to developed and to underdeveloped nations.
The model has undergone many modifications in subsequent years, however. Those
include the recognition that there exists more than one factor of production, that income
28 Two pop비ar I없15 cil~d ~arli~r pl'\)vid~ ad~qual~ cas~s in poinl. S~~. for ~xam(l l~ ‘ M미ω1m Gillis. ~I al.닫으띤파침
of Q~velomIl~nl. W.W. Norton and Company. New York. 1983. pagψ5 121·125; or Brucι Hιmck and Chariι5 Kind1ebe멍cr.
Economic Develonm~nl. McGraw-Hili Book Cllmpany. New York‘ 1983. pages 28-32.
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distribution is not irrelevant to aggregate savings and that technological change is likely
to have a significant impact on changes in output.29
Albert Hirschman, in 삐s influential1958 treatment of development economics
warns that the attempt to apply the economics of growth to the economics of
development, particularly to the development of underdeveloped countries, may
generate more of a detour than a shortcut.30 Specifically, he is referring to the fact
that the Harrod-Domar pers야ctive ， which represents the origin of contemporary
growth theory, grew out of the concern for stagnation of the 1930s and 1940s. Even
though the economics of growth of that period represent an advance over the Keynesian
model itself, he says, it is a direct descendant of the model.
In concern about growth in the industrial economies, writes Hirschman, the
princip외 focus has been on the savings function, induced versus autonomoils
investment, and the productivity of capital. 깨e authenticity of these concerns has
seemingly been validated through empirical research and, on the whole the concepts
ap앨ar to be useful for analyzing courses of action regarding growth.
RIGOR VERSUS RELEVANCY
W. Arthur Lewis, in his post World-War II work on economic growth pointed
out that neoclassical ’growth I economists have limited themselves to a very sm외lp따t
of what one might think to be their field of study. As a result, he says, "some of the
most elegant work of εconomic theorists in recent years has been concerned
with...economic growth. ,,31 Beginning by assuming capi떠list institutions
29 Regarding the πcognition that there exists more than one factor ofproduction. see Solow (1956) and Swan (1956).
Representative ofconcern for distribution of income aπ Robinson (1956) and Kaldor (1 961). For discussion oftechnological
change in the model see Solow (195끼 and Kaldor (195끼.
30 Albert O. Hiπchman. The Stratel!v of Economic Develooment. Yale University Press. New Haven. 1958.29-33.
31 W. Arthur Lewis. ’The Theorv of Economic Growth, London. George Allen and Unwin. Ltd., 1955. p. 13π
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and habits, says Lewis, these economists built mathematical models which oscillate or
rise toward a limit. Coefficients and relations between parameters (propensity to save,
birth rates or determinants of investment decisions) are assumed and the results follow
accordingly. Such models, he insisted, sacrifice potential effectiveness for precision
and elegance.
Statistical inquiry based on these models, Lewis points out, has been in search
of consistency within the model rather than of ques다ons regarding the appropriateness
of the model. The result, he says, is an indispensable tool for short-term analysis. If,
on the other hand, "we are concerned with long term studies of changes in
propensities... " we must look beyond the boundaries of contemporary economic
theory.32 In other words, if we are concerned with economic development rather than
economic growth, contemporary neoclassical theory has been rendered inadequate as a
model.
As though in illustration of Lewis' point, in his roughly contemporary work on
the theory of economic growth, J.E. Meade states in the introduction and illustrates
throughout, that the neoclassical model is a rigorously limited one which cannot
33comprehend changes over time..J.J The basic assumptions, states Meade, include that
the economy is closed, that it exhibits perfect competition, and so on for several pages.
Versions of the list can be found in any introductory text. This basic description of the
growth model highlights, for Meade, the observation that although "We desire to watch
this system grow through time,II we must "confine ourselves to watching this process of
growth on the assumption that the growing system remains in equilibrium. II This is
growth in its essential form. Structural change is ruled out of the model by definition.
32 W. A. Lewis. op. cit .• page 13.
33 J.E. Mιad.:. AN.:‘’‘:In~’‘ieal 끼1ιllrv “f Ee‘\11‘’miι Gmwlh. μlndon. Unwin Univ.:rsity Book~‘ 196 1. pages 1-7.
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Gerald M. Meier, writing on "Free Trade and Development Economics" ,
dispenses with the problem of a model which app않rs to be inappropriate. Meier
asserts that on the one hand the docσine is fundamentally unassailable from the
standpoint of static efficiency conditions. Yet, he says, the "dynamic 때d structural
problems of poor countries now ap야ar to transcend the criterion of maximizing world
production efficiency under static conditions. II He 외so recognizes that the assumptions
of the theory app않r to be unrealistic for a developing counσy. Those doubts,
however, are readily tossed aside because they are IInon-economic objectives ll • The
discussion is to be restricted to "the more serious economic arguments only".34
Albert Hirschman puts these comments in perspective in a chapter on IIGrowth
Models and Development Processes ll • 35 He suggests that the use of the Harrod-Domar
type model to create a loose notion of the amount of capital which may be used in the
growth process is proba비Y of no serious harm. But if the user of the model thinks that
the relationships assumed in the model stand as a meaningful description of the
development process, the model may well become more of a hindrance than a help in
achieving a comprehension of the development process.
Hirschman points out that although the model appears to be quite general, it was
developed for use in a growth-type environment where the structure of the developed
economy is 외ready present. In the radically different context of the underdeveloped
economy it has considerably less relevance. It is inappropriate, therefore, for the
economics of development to borrow substantially from the economics of growth. The
economics of development, he states, must be based on a model whose abstractions are
particular to the process of development.
34 Gernld M. Meier. ·Free Trnde and Development Economics·. in Value. Capital and Growth. J.N. Wolfe. ed..
Edinburgh. Edinbu멍h University Free Press. 1968. p. 385 and 386.
35 Albert O. Hirschman. The Slrntel!V of EeonOlnic Dev‘:Iofllnent. Yale Univeπity Press. New Haven‘ 1958. sιg
especially pages 32 and 33.
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This is an important point for Hirschman. He does not address his disagreement
to the growth model as such. Rather, his essential point is that the use of the growth
model in a situation which requires the creation of an industrial type of economy from
a pre-indusσial base is both inadequate and misleading.
GROWTH THROUGH REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES
During the post-Wo다d War II period the neoclassical growth theory, developed
to illuminate perceived problems of stagnation in industrial countries, became the
accepted model for economic development for underdeveloped countries. This
application, as was suggested by Hirschman, was quite different from that for which it
was designed.
Michael Todaro describes this "traditional (neoclassical growth) paradigm" as
one which is based on the neoclassical view of the world where change is gradual,
36equilibrating and non-disruptive..:Ju He cites the plethora of single and du외 sector
models which followed introduction of the original Harrod-Domar model.37 These
models, he points out, tended to focus on optimal savings rates under the assumption
that the prime constraint on economic increase is capital. Most attempts to apply the
neoclassical growth theory to problems of third world development failed to take
account of the unique institutional and structural nature of third world societies.
As development tools, then, says Todaro, these models thus were rendered
"inappropriate and irrelevant". Writing to discuss the apparent failure of third world
development efforts since World War II, he says that "specifically, the orthodox
development models could not adequately deal with the ubiquitous phenomena of rising
36 Michael Todaro. "Currcntlssues in Economic Development". in Economic Per.;l'lectives. Maurice Ba l1abon‘ ed.‘
New York. Harwood Academic Publishel영‘ 1979.225.
37 Those inclu‘Ie Lewis (1 954). Chenery (1 961). Jorgenson (1 961). Kaldor-Mirl‘:es (1962). and so on.
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unemployment, growing (income) inequality and deepening rural poverty which seemed
topeπade the third-world development efforts. ,,38 These were, and for the most p따t
still are, highly fragmented economies characterized more by disequilibrium than by
equilibrium relationships.
That such concerns regarding third world dev리opment efforts are still simply
ignored by contemporary orthodox theorists is illustrated in another of the products of
the Harvard Institute for International Development. The 1991 publica다on ， Reformin g:
Economic Svstems in Develooing: Countries, contains fifteen articles by twenty five
authors.39 Almost all are associates of the Institute and all are economists who are
W려I plac잉 professors, research associates and advisors to third world governments.
In the introduction, Perkins and Roemer, the editors, state that "The dominant
vision of the past decade and more has been rooted in powerful propositions of
neoclassical economics: the core of economic reform efforts should be devoted to
achieving development through competitive markets. ,,40 The succeeding five hundred
pages are focused on illustrating that point from a variety of perspectives.
Dwight Perkins, in the lead article, observes that the industrial nations establish
the frontiers for the world economy, and that growth in those nations is determined by
the rate of capital formation. 41 He then cites two levels of "follower nations". The
first are those who manage to overcome sufficient barriers to growth that the rate of
savings and capi때 formation is high enough to generate increases of 6 to 8 percent in
GNP per capita. The second are those nations who have not overcome enough of the
38 T때aro ， op.cit .. p. 226.
39 Perkins. Dwight H. and Michael Ro.:mer. Editoπ. Refomlinl! Economic Svslems in Develollinl! Countries‘
Cambridge. Harvard Univ녕rsity Pn:ss. 1991.
40 Perkins and Roemer. op. cit .. p. 1.
41 Perkins and Ro.:mer. IIp. ιit .. p. 29.
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obstacles to growth to take full advantage of being in a "follower" relationship to the
industrial economies.
The third, and lowest, economic level for the lesser develop혀 nations is that
characterized by nations which have not yet entered into a period of economic growth.
These nations are in a stagnant relationship to the industrial economies due to a
thorough failure to remove the obstacles to growth. They have demonstrated an
inability to raise capital formation above a replacement level and to use productive
inputs eff농ctively.
Perkins describes a current Harrod-Domar type model in which the rate of
growth is a function of the increase of capital and of its relationship to labor.42 It is
used to describe a World Bank study of sixty-eight developing nations in which the
conclusion drawn is that the factor inputs (labor and capital) account for a very small
P따t of the growth rate of GNP. The largest p따t is accounted for by the "productivity
residual". Therefore, he concludes, it is productivity growth which a developing
country must seek. That is accomplished by removing the barriers to a well functioning
market system.
Michael Roemer opens the next article in the collection by citing the orthodox
argument that lithe seeds of today' s economic problems (in the developing nations)
were sown in the mid• to late 1970s when oil p더ces soared, prices of primary
commodities first rose, then plummeted... inflation... interest rates... 1143 That is, it
was external impacts, not internal structure which accounted for the economic tragedies
of the 1980s. What is required in order to deal with the economic problems which
resulted from the external impacts is economic reform.
42 Perkins and Rll<:l\1er. op. cit•• p. 30-33.
43 Perkins and Rocmcr. op. cit•• p. 56 and 57.
36
Roemer makes it quite clear that since the neoclassical argument is based in the
paradigm of competitive markets, and since the less developed nations deviate
dramatically from the "idealized (neoclassical) model" , economic reform requires that
corrections for the market failures be prescribed and carried out.44 In his argument for
the removal of obstacles, Roemer points out that when time is added to the ideal
competitive market model, it can be mathema다cally demonstrated that income growth
will be maximized. The reform which is required, in other words, consists of
removing obstacles to the ready functioning of the market in order that the
underdeveloped economy maya미lieve growth, in emulation of the elegant
mathematical model to which W. Arthur Lewis refers in the Theorv of Economic
닫파만뇨.
, 45Albert Hirschman describes obstacles as "forces corroding development’ ."t.J He
is referring not to en때es but to a kind of comp비sion ， a dynamic energy. These forces
tend to cause "abortive development,...stagnation, and decay of ventures that looked
hopeful at firs t." Aside from the structure of things in the underdeveloped nation prior
to attempts at development, he says, there are forces which are hostile to development
that the development process itself brings into being.
Hirschman concludes the section on forces corroding development by suggesting
that development be approached with something like a learning model. This would be
a dynamic model, that is, not one which is self contained and predetermined. "We do
not propose a rigid model of economic development," he says, but rather, "a theory of
,46development strategy. ’
44 Perkins and Roemer. op. cit.. p. 57 and 58.
4S. Albert O. Hiπchman. Th잉 Strnle!!v of Econnmic Develonment. Yale Univ녕r셔Iy Press. New Haven. 1958. p. 44.
46. Hirschman. op.cit.. p.49. In the 1986 discussion ofhis experienιeas a W'lrld Bank sponsored advisor to an
und뼈eveloped utin American nation in the 1950s. Hiπchnum slales that "Thι point (‘lf l11Uιh of his disagreement with recιived
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Limits of the Theorv
As suggested above by I.E. Mεade ， the neoclassical model is intentionally
limited to comprehending an economy as increasing over time in 액uilibrium ， without
47accounting for a change in the economic structure itself."t I To some extent that is a
function of what both Lewis and Hirschman describe as the elegant mathematical
48structure which has come to contain 때d to constrain the theory. "to But it is a result of
the historic dev리opment and the intent of the theory as w리1.
According to the theαry ， 'market forces' account for the development of the
industrialized nations of the tum of the century. The considerable guidance,
intervention and alignment of the developing nations of the 18th through the 20th
centuries is generally overlooked or assumed. Evidence for the assumption appears in
the writings of those theorists and textbook writers who merely mention the role of the
elite in the industrialization process in passing. Walt Rostow, for example is well
known for having mentioned throughout his work on The Sta!!es of Economic Growth
that the role of the elite as determiners of the process is critical.49 Textbook writers
also typic외ly make broad mention of the importance of the leadership.50
The neoclassical theory of growth, then, looks at the growth process as one
which can be understood through comparison of two or more static states of an
economy. It also looks at the particular structures of the developed economy as given.
policy) was to get aw매 from the excessive simplicities of certain growth models.' Sι@‘ "A Dissenler’sCon다ssion". in센앨l
Views of Markel Socielv. Vikin멍 Pr잉ss. Nιw York. 1986. p. 24.
47 See. for example. J. E. Meade. op. cil .. page 3.
48 W. Arthur Lewis. op. ιil.. page 13. and Alh떼 o. Hiκιhman. IIp. cil .• pagι 32 and 33.
49 Wall W. ROSIOW. The Sial!앉 ofEe“nomic Growlh: A Nlln-C삐삐uni써 Manit넌I“. Camhridge UniversilY Press.
Camhridge. 1969. Among many olhιr such referencιs thn1ughl1ut Ihe bo‘,1k see pagιs II. 39 an‘15 1.
SO Herrick and Kindleberg잉r‘ op. cil .. make m잉nlion of the importance of the rol앙 of the leadership on page 226. for
example. among their commenls on the rolι ofgovemm잉nls and oth‘:r 01딛ani7.Dlions in Ihι growlh pnlCess.
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Such structures are merely obscured by the pre-dev리oped state of the underdeveloped
economy, and time is recognized within the growth process as that unaccountable
period between two states of the economy.
Thus, the taking into account of the critically important dynamic element in the
transformation of the economy from i.mderdeveloped to industrialized is left to what
Rostow, for example, refers to as "the role of a leading elite in economic growth" .51
That crucial element of the process is passed over lightly by neoclassical theorists as
outside the realm of economics.
The atemporaI and perspectival1y constrained nature of the neoclassical growth
model is addressed by Albert Hirschman ’s suggestion that development should be
approached with a "learning model" , not one which is self contained and
predetermined.52 Such an approach suggests opening the process to the incorporation
of both historic (contextual) time, and time internal to the process. This is a concept of
development which is responsive to both the internal circumstances and the external
influences on the developing nation.
There is a set of key issues which form consistent themes through the
commentary of the entire range of writers, from those on the orthodox (the growth) end
to those on the strictly development end of the issue. Those include:
The necessary role of the elite.
The involvement of the entire population in the process.
The need to reach beyond the narrow range of the economics discipline
in order to comprehend economic development.
!~e !nadequacy of the s~t~c "'!odel to portray ~ dyna~m.ic eve~t~
The inappropriateness of the rigorous assumptions of the model.
The inappropriateness of a g띤쁘따 model for what is a develooment
process.
The need to guide the process (via policy) rather than presumably
leaving it to the market.
SI W. W. Rostow. up. ιit .. page SI.
S2 Albert O. Hirschman. op. cit.• pugι 49.
39
In general, this study recognizes the need to move toward the modeling of the
organized complexity implied by reference to the broad domain of economic
dev리opmen t. Such a conceptualization must represent a perspective which is
essentially interdisciplinary. It must recognize the close interaction of the nation ’s
economic production per se with the realms of health, education, science, technology
and politics. Any development model must recognize the complexity, and it must at
the same time encourage specificity in applica다on. That is, it must encourage
adaptation of the analysis to the cultures and institutions which are under investigation.
In this study in p따ticular ， the definition by Simon Kuznets of modern economic
growth will be accepted as a valid description of the current conception of the highest
attainable form of development. That is to recognize that while economic development
is a process which must continue from one identifiable stage to another, modern
economic growth represents a CI않rly definable present stage in that process. Modem
economic growth then, implies the accomplishment of a sustained increase in economic
output based on a dynamic process of structural change which necessarily incorporates
a wide range of social, political and economic aspects of the nation.
CHAPTER TIl
THE NEOCLASSICAL ’THEORY EXPANDED FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EXPANDED PERSPE다1VES FOR DEVELOPMl퍼T
Since the middle of the century a great deal has been offered by theorists in
economics to expand the concept from neoclassical economic growth toward the more
comprehensive and complex economic development. Key contributors include Kenneth
Boulding, Albert O. Hirschman, Jan S. Hogendorn, W. Arthur Lewis, Hla Myint,
Gunnar Myrdal, Francois Perroux, Walt W. Rostow and Simon Kuznets. All have
indicated concern for the injurious limitations on the effort which are imposed by using
exclusively the neoclassical growth model.
The concerns of those economists start with the applica디on of the insights of the
model as though they were adequately inclusive of the f않lity of development. Rather,
the situation of dev리opment is too complex to be adequately portrayed by such a
simplistic model, and it is too dynamic to be appropriat리y represented as a s띠tic
process. Further, the model was generated in an historical and cultural environment
which was dramatically different from those of the underdeveloped nations of the late
twentieth century, and it was creatl벼 to portray problems of growth in a dev밍oped
economy, not problems of structural transformation in a developing economy.
Those writing about the need to expand the concept of economic development
have 외I indicated in one way or another that the process must be understood as both
dynamic and comprehensive. Therefore the picture of the process must be inclusive
beyond the strictly economic. Referring back to W. Arthur Lewis as a case in
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point, though he is among the least adventurous of those on the list with respect to
willingness to range away from the neoclassical model itself, the list of concerns
beyond the strictly economic is extensive. It would include human behavior in the
specific cultural environment, the development of the institutions, the accumulation of
knowledge within the pop비ation ， a good understanding of the characteristics of the
pop비ation 뻐d of the resources available and of the capacity of the leadership to make
the critical decisions necess따y for healthy promotion of development. Using Lewis'
terms, this would draw on fields which economists have tended to leave I’to
sociologists, to historians, to students of beliefs, to biologists, to geographers... II •
All are insistεnt as well that the structural changes which are inevitable in
economic development must be understood by the decisionmaker. That means not
relying solely on the static neoclassical model, though it does not mean simply
replacing it with another particular model. The consensus is that it is necess따Y to
evaluate a development project using the insights of the neoclassical model in the
context of a much broader comprehension of the process.
Exclusive dependence on mathematical modeling as the language of choice by
neoclassicists in the last few decades, has 외so drawn many cautionary comments.
Hirschman, Boulding and others have suggested that there is nothing wrong with the
use of the mathematical tools of the neoclassical model as such. The danger app않rs in
the use of such tools to model a development effort in just the same way that it does in
operations research or any other use of mathematics to model reality. Users of the
models have to assume the assumptions. They forget, that is, the considerable
simplifications made in crea디ng the model. Thus the results of the mathematical
modeling effort are likely to be 띠ken as more realistic than is appropriate. The general
conclusions of such a model are often simply confused with reality. Neoclassicists
seem to be especially subject to this problem. Much of the talk of the need to ’remove
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the obstacles' to free markets reflects this confusion. The literature is full of
recommendations to underdeveloped-nation policymakers to st더ve to make the
economy look like the neoclassical model. A comment by Michael Roemer in his 1991
text is an excellent앓se in point. 1 He specifically states that since the mathematical
model demonstrates that income growth will be maximized under competitive market
conditions, the developing nation must emulate that model.
Contrary to such a suggestion, most of the theorists cite쇠 caution against
excessive dependence on the market in place of decisionmaking by p이icymakers.
What they propose comes to a guided use of the market in the development
environment. This took the form in the case of Taiwan , for example, of leadership in
the search for and development of comparative advantage within the population as a
whole.
Two other consistent themes to be found among those concerned for the
expanded context is the importance of incorporating the entire pop비ation in the
development effort, and the need to incorporate and use knowledge in the process.
Lewis devotes a full chapter to the importance of knowledge in the process. For him
the ’accumulation of knowledge’ is equal to the accumulation of capi따I as determiners
of development.2 Both of these are central themes in the work of Simon Kuznets as
well , whose work will enter into consideration in the next section of this chapter.
I Michael Roemer. on pages 57-59 in his discussio~ of "Macroeconomic Rιfoml in Develo미ngC삐삐es". in Dw뺀
Perkins and Michael R야깨er. edilors. Reflmllinl! Econ‘.1I11ic SvsleOls in DevelllJlinl! C“IInl꺼es. Camb꺼dge. Harvard Univ엉rsily
Pκ55， 1991 ‘ ilIustrales the need for caulion when he stales that the developing country musl strive 10 emulale the ideal competilive
mark잉 model because it can be mathematically demonslrale‘1thaI income growth will be maximized in 비e ideal market
environment. See also the discussion in chapler llne above of Ih‘ t이nomie gfllWth lexls ‘uch as those llf Malcolm Gilles. III al.
and H삐rri매k and Kindelberger. and the discoul양 on sIalι-of-the-art policymaking in ιhap야rtwo. A ωns바rablι Iisl of economic
advisors and teachers of policymaking for underdevelop잉d nalions advise complιlι faith in thι markιI.
2 W. A뻐ur Lewis. 꺼lellrv of Ec‘lnomic Growlh. μ)Odon. George All샤n and Unwin Ltd .. 1955. pages 164-200.
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All of the writers who are concerned with expanding the theory to more
accurately represent the development effort specifically advise the avoidance of simple
applica다on of the neoclassical growth model with its accompanying assumptions and
pre-judgmental solutions, Generally the development process is recognized to be one
of exploration and invention rather than applica디on of what Hirschman referred to as a
synthetic development pI때.
ADAPTING THE NEOCLASSICAL
Simon Kuznets' concept of modern economic growth has been a guiding
perspective for many y없rs in the development effort in Taiwan , At a 1982 conference
on The Exuerience~ and Lessons of Economic Develoument in Taiwan Kuznets was
invited as a keynote sp않ker and his work on modern economic growth was cited often
in the papers and proceedings, In one of the papers John C. H. Fei describes the
development process in terms of modern economic growth and compares the
expectations of Kuznets ’ concepts to those of the traditional and ideological values
which supported the development effort.3
Fei argues that since an essenti외 element of modern economic growth is the
expecta디on of structural change, it is important for the leadership in the developing
nation to understand whether or not the traditional values and ideology of the agrarian
society from which the modem economy will emerge are supportive of or resistant to
the process. Kuznets describes such a developed economy as being characterized by a
secular, egalitarian and nationalist qualities.4 All of those qualities, Fei feεIs ， are
3 JohnC. H. F미. 'Idιology ofEιonomi~ D.:v녕lopmιnl in Taiwan', in Tho: Exno:rillnc.:‘ and Lι‘son“lf Economic
D.:v.:lonmcnl in Taiwan, Kwoh-ling Li and Tzong-shian Yu Edilllrs. Taipd. Acadιmia Sini~a. 1982.
4 Simon KUznllls. Mod.:rn Economic Gnlwlh~_Rale. Slruclure and Spread‘ Nιw Haven. Yal.: Univ딩rsily Press, 1966.
S.:c espccially chaplcr I. π'h앙 G.:n잉ral Framo:work' ,
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supported by both traditional Chinese values and the economic principles of
development of Dr. Sun Yat Sen with which the mainland Chinese leadership arrived in
Taiwan in the 1940s. He observes, therefore, that "we may conclude that traditional
Chinese ideologies and values are perfectly compatible with the requirements of
modern growth when gauged in terms of (the qu외i다es cited by Simon Kuznets)
egalitarianism, secul따ism and nationalism.••5
The difficulty, says Fei, is that, unlike the circumstances in the traditional
agricultural society which prec않ds the developing economy and the economically
developed state which succeeds it, during the period of transition the rules of growth
are in constant flux. During that transition period the set of agreed upon economic
rules "are neither stable nor unified". ’꺼 new set of rules of growth must be found
gradu외ly during the development process." New institutions must be developed and
perfected and an officially proclaimed ideology, "a visionary theory" , must be put forth
by the leadership as a means of organizing the energy of the population toward the
emerging •new rules,.6
Fei describes the policy process in the preceeding y않rs of development as
necessarily "non-doctrinaire, because problems change during the transition process. ,,7
He suggests that the leadership in Taiwan was non-doctrinaire but well ensconced in the
set of principles derived from the early leadership of Dr. Sun and in the traditional
Chinese values which supported the qualities of modern economic growth. It is
apparent, on the other hand, that the ’unexpanded ’ view of the neoclassicists is
extremely doctrinaire. This is especially clear in terms of the definition given by Fei,
5 John C. H. Fei. op. cit.• page 89.
6 John C. H. Fei. op. cit .• pag.:s 92-93.
7 John C. H. F.:i. ‘’p. cit .. page 95.
45
that by doctrinaire he means "a vision따y， politic외， unpractical theorist, or one who
theorizes without paying sufficient heed to practical considerations. II
Taiwan’s Kuo-Min-Tang p따ty ， on the other hand, opera디ng within the context
of a thorough respect for the value of markets for allocation decisions, gui야d the
economy through two major phases of policy focus and many lesser ones. Beginning in
the 1950s with what is generally referred to as the ’import substitution ’ phase -
characterized by unemployment, receipt of foreign aid, foreign exchange shortfalls and
a push for food self SUfi감ciency - the policy guidance evolved into the ’external
orientation' phase in the mid-1960s - characterized by increasing wage rates and labor
shortages. Fei draws his article toward a conclusion with the comment that he would
"argue that the spectacular success of Taiwan during the last thirty y없rs was due
primarily to the official camp’s problemsolving orientation and pragmatic approach that
led to the adoption of p이icies that unleashed the full creative energies of the Chinese in
Taiwan, within the context of a free m없'ket economy. ,,8
In keeping with the concerns and suggestions of the several authors discussed
earlier, this study will emphasize development-type indicators which are also in keeping
with the concept of modern economic growth of Simon Kuznets. The indicators will be
weighed and evaluated in a diagnostic sort of context, in keeping with the approach to
policy 따ken by the Taiwanese leadership in the decades since the 1950s. As will be
discussed below in chapter four, the availability of the data for the Central American
nations limits the type of indicator which can be used. But the intent is to approximate
the key areas of concern in development toward modern economic growth as described
by Kuznets.
8 John C. H. F.:i. op. cit.. pog.: 98.
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"Th~ basic feature of modem economic growth" , says Kuznets in virtually
everything he has written on the subject, "is the rise in per capita or per worker
product". This incr，않se is entirely dependent upon "the capacity of the pop비ation to
respond to changing economic opportunities through education, through migration, and
through shifts in both demographic patterns and in sets of values toward greater
consonance with the opportuni디es and requirements associated with modem
technology. ,,9 It is neces잃ry， in other words, to engineer the development process to
require the development of the entire na다on외 pop비ation together with the financi외 and
technological aspects. Furthermore, says Kuznets, the importance of the state in the
development process is in the service it performs "in organizing the human element
more effectively for realizing the economic growth potential. The sovereign state unit
(is) of critical importance as the formulator of the rules under which economic activity
(is) to be carried on; as a referee in the variety of institutional innovations needed to
channel economic growth effectively; as the protector of soci떠 consensus needed...and
as provider of infrastructure that is needed by all but may have been beyond the
specific interest of anyone group. "10
TRANSFORMATIONS CHARACTERISTIC OF MODERN
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Kuznets describes the acceleration of economic activity in development as
associated with a number of other economic and social processes. The "driving
forces" , he suggests, include three key elements. The first two are, "a high rate of
accumulation of useful knowledge and of technical innovations derived from it, and
shifts in the production structure of the economy, (p따tieularly) in the shares of the
9 Simon Kuzn.:ts. Economic D.:v.:loo l1l.:nt. th.: FBI피Iv. nnd Inω111': DiNt꺼hUlion.C lImb꺼dg.:. Ca ll1bridg.: Univ.:rsity
Press, 1989. p매es 68 lind 69.
10 Simon Kuzn.:ts. op. cit.. pllg.: 70.
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produc다on sectors in output, labor and capital. ...The third m매or strand in the
unfolding of modem economic growth is the complex of functions and influences
associated with the national sovereign state. 11
In all of his 않rlier writings Kuznets described the exhaustive statistical studies
of the process of development toward modem economic growth on which his life’s
work was based. From those studies he generated a detailed set of indicators which he
concluded to be representative of the process. Those indicators, which were found to
be strongly consistent with the development experience in both South Korea and
Taiwan, took the following form.
First presented as a theory in 뻐 extensive article written in 1955, the model
was presented in its full form in 1966 in the book cited above, Modern Economic
Growth: Rate Structure and Spread.12 Aside from the anticipated rise in popula디on
growth, the m매or transformations to be expected include an increase in both total and
per capita product coupled with an augmentation in the rate of increase of efficiency of
production. Necessarily linked to that increase is the change in structure within the
three major sectors, agriculture, industry and services. The share of agric비ture in the
total product can be expected to decline, while that of industry would increase rapidly.
Services, on the other hand, which include banking, public agencies, and so on, were
found to increase slowly in the total mix. 13
Kuznets found that an important aspect of both the εxpansion and the shi단 in
structure is that it represents a sustained change. This sets forth one of the many
significant distinctions between the ENICs and the CANs. He says that "By a sustain잉
11 Simon Kuznets‘ op. cit .. "Driving Forces Of economic Growth: What Can Wt:. Learn From History?". page 8.
12 The 1955 article. "Towards a Theory of Economic Growth". appeared in the book. National Policy for Economic
Welf빠 하 Home and Abroad. edit t:.d by Robert L‘kachman. Nt:.w York. Russell and Ru잉sell. 1961. Simon KuZl삐s， 뀐역!!J!
Economic Growth: Ratt:. Structure and Spread, Nt:.w Havt:.n. Yal t:. Univt:.rsity Press. 1966.
13 Simon Kuznt:.ts. op.cit. Tht:. firstthre t:. ιhapt t:. rs deal with thesι issues. In (lanic비or. se t:. (loges 34 through 160.
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increase we mean a rise of such magnitude that it is not overshadowed by short term
fluctuations. And by a sustained trend in structure, e.g. a shift toward nonagricultural
sectors, we mean onε in which the 더se in the share of nonagricultural activities in
output (or in labor force) is not overshadowed by short term fluctuations in the
shares." 14 He goes on to point out that although it is statistically difficult to establish a
firm measure of what is meant by short term fluctuations, "a cumulative incr않se in
total or per capi없 product of a few percentage points even over a long period, say
thirty years, can hardly be considered sustained and taken as a measure of secular rise -
unless there is substantive evidence that a cyclical decline in the foreseeable future will
not reduce it to insignificant dimensions. ,, 15 The data in chapter 8 will be seen to
serve strikingly as illustrations of both sides of the question. While the ENICs fit the
description of sustained development toward modern economic growth, the CANs, for
the most p따t， illustrate the failure to generate that sustained change in structure or the
sustained increase in per capita output.
Another important transformation in the process relates to the distribution of
product and the distribution of income in the economy. Since the data on income
distribution for the CANs is all but nonexistant, and that on distribution of product is
minimal, undependable and inconsistent, it is not possible to compare the two groups of
nations on these points. The Kuznetsian expectations, however, include an increase in
the share of labor in national income and a decr않se in the share of national income
going to holders of assets. These changes reflect what Kuznets refers to as the
phenomenon of "income mobility". Groups previously low on the income scale are
rising while those previously high on the scale are falling. 16
14 Simon KuznO:ls, op. cil., page 26.
IS Simon KuznO:ls. op. cil.
16 Simon KuznO:ls. op. cit.. pago:s 195 10220.
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Kuznets found that the changes in income while a nation moves toward modern
economic growth can be expected to give 더se to an incrl않sing equality in its
distribution. This prl이ection was tested and the conclusions were presented in a World
Bank publication in 1979 in which Taiwan was concluded to have taken I’an approach
,17to growth with equity. I
There are also transformations to be expectεd in the patterns of product use.
Here Kuznets has looked at the use of output broadly distinguished between private
consumption, government consumption and domestic capi때 formation. Though the
distinctions give rise to complex internal questions of definition , the statistics generated
clear patterns on the aggregate level. It was determined that during the transition
period the share of government consumption can be expected to increase by several
percentage points of GDP, private consumption is likely to decrease as a percentage of
GDP, and gross domestic investment should increase during the period of development.
It sho비d be clear that while private consumption will decrease as a fraction of GDP,
the same figure per capita is expected to increase substantially. This is a function of
the increasing product per capita, and it can be expected to increase in spite of the
larger p따t of GDP devoted to investment and to increased government consumption.
Kuznets, in connection with others in the context of World Bank efforts, has
pu비ished many more detailed studies of the changes in structure to be expected of a
developing nation. 18 While these relate to sped턴cp이icy questions for a nation
undergoing the transition process, they are related to the broad question of growth
versus development in a much more complex way, and in a much more country
specific way than is appropriate to enter into in this study. In this study, indicators
17 John C. H. Fei. Gustav Ranis and Shirley W. Y. Kuo. Growth with Eauitv: 끼1e Taiwan Case‘ New York. Oxfo벼
University Press (Published for the World Bank)‘ 1979.
18 Besides the Kuznets works cilιd above. lhe Fei. Ranis and Kuo book ιxploNS income data in detail. and lh엉 several
works by Hollis Chenery and others 잉xplore the issue through sιveral ways of temporally slicing and manipulating the dalB.
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based in the broad catagories will be used in the effort to demonstrate whether or not
the economies in ques디on established a record of transition development which is
consistent with the model of modem econ01nic growth.
In the 1990 edition of his The Sta~es of Economic Growth, W.W. Rostow
discussed the definitional aspects of the process of development in a section entitled
"Reflections On The Debate As Of 1990". He describes his concept of stages as
directly comparable to Kuznets’ transition to modem economic growth. 19 In doing so
he offers a definition and a description of the process which highlights the character of
development.
The issue for Rostow is focused in the question: "Should one define modem
economic growth in terms of GNP per capita, or in terms of the degree to which the
?,,20pool of then-existing technology had been efficiently absorbed in a given s
The latter criterion, he points out, requires disaggregation to the level of sectors within
the economy, and to the point where the introduction of innovations can be accounted
for.
Neoclassical growth modelers, Rostow states, have been committed to a pattern
of concepts that concealed technological change in a highly aggregated black box.
Aggregate growth, therefore, is included by Rostow in the expectations for
development as a necessary but insufficient aspect of the process. The activities within
the various sectors interact with the growth phenomenon in a wide v하iety of ways,
some waxing and others waning, but on the whole, in agreement with Kuznets, Rostow
19 Walt W.R싸lOW. Thll Sla l!lls of Economic Growth: A Non-Cnnullunisl Manni!싸!‘’. Th i띠 Edition. Cambridgll.
Cambridge Univllrsily Pruss. 1990. page 242-25ll.
20 Walt W. Rostow. l'p. ιit.. page 242.
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describes "the take-off as the period when a society begins to yield a more or less
regular incrl않se in output per capita. ,,21
At the same time, however, the ’take-off’ and the ’drive to maturity' require
that the society absorb new production functions in ways which generate the spreading
effects on which the development of the economy depends. This preparation includes
attributes such as a "build-up of transport capacity" , a "quantum of literate and
technically σained personnel" and other "overhead capital".
In keeping with similar comments by Kuznets, Fei, Ranis and others, a key
distinguishing feature for Rostow is the "changes in the rules of behavior". By this he
refers to an elite which, besides launching the leading sectors, will follow up in the
secondary and tertiary sectors, creating links "backward and laterally to the leading
sectors. "
But in the final analysis, for Rostow ’s "stage of economic maturity" , similar to
Kuznets ’ 따rival at modern economic growth, it is "the period when a society has
effectively applied the range of modern technology to the b비k of its resources which
distinguishes the stage.22 This stage is reached through a succession of stages which
represents an economic building process in which earlier, techn이ogically more
primitive forms of industrialization are replaced by technologically more sophisticated
ones.
Historically, the particular forms characterizing the process have varied with the
resource endowments, the historical period, and the nature of the social environment.
For the United States, Germany and France, Rostow cites the railroad as the takeoff
technology, with the subsequent phase concentrated on the development of "post-
21 Wall W. Rostow, op. cit.. pag.: 245 , quob:d fl'\llll W.W. Rostow (ιd.) ， 11,,: Ec‘mOlllics ofTake-ofT Inlo Sustained
E띄보쁘. Lond매n. Macmillan‘ 1963. pages xxiv-xxvi.
22 Walt W. Rostow. Th.: Sta낀':5 Il f Econlln따 Growth: A Nlln-Clllllnlllni5t Manni다sto ， Cambridge. Cambridge
University Pn:ss. 1960. pa딛0:5 9.
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railway technology" , central of which is the elaboration on steel. For Sweden the
"take-off· indusσy was timber export, followed by a shift into milled lumber, mining
and hydro-electric power sources in the latter nineteenth century.23
The stages described by Rostow represents a constant transformation of the
economy. The σansformation is based on exploitation of some capacity of the nation
which is treated as a compe디디ve advantage. The ini디al capacity provides the basis for
the initiation of the structural change which culminates in thε absorption of the then-
current state of technology. The interim structural change, says Rostow, again in
keeping with the criteria for modern economic growth described by Kuznets, is notable
through two important changes in the character of the nation. The first is that there are
large scale changes in the real wage, the skills, and the attitudes of the working force.
The nature of work is changed for the majority of the nation. The second is that the
nature of the leadership changes. From the early, relatively adventuresome, pioneers,
the leadership becomes transformed into something more approximating efficient,
professional managers.
Rostow describes economic development as a non-linear, dynamic process
which is driven by the changes which characterize it. Prime among these are changes
in population, in resource availability, in investment and in technology. Like other
non-linear, dynamic systems, such as the growth of a biological organism, the
developing economy can be expected to be in perpetual disequilibrium.24 "Economies
exhibit something akin to structural ’phase transitions' as they undergo the creative-
destructive process of absorbing new technologies."25 The disequilibrium, however, is
23 Walt W. Rostow. op. cit.. pag.:s 70·72.
24 Walt W. Roslow. Th.: Sla!!.:s of E.:llnO l1lic Gn'뻐lh: A Non-Cmnmunisl Mannil싸10. Third Edition. CaOlbridg.:.
Cambridg.: Univ.:rsily PI'Il!s. 1990. pag.: 2.~ J.
2s Walt W. Rostow. op. cit.. pag.: 253.
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subject to guidance through indirect forces such as price mechanisms, as well as
through the direct and intentional techniques of government p이icy.
As a result of the fact that economic development is a complex, interactive
process which is characterized by disequalibrium, says Rostow, economic development
processes cannot be expected to follow a p따다C비ar pattern. They do, however, "yield
recognizable patterns capable of cross-comp따ison", even though the initial conditions
are never the same from one country to another, nor is the historical period, nor many
other of the p따ameters of the process. What is important for Rostow is that we "can
detect elements of univεrsality in the performance of economies" in the development
process.26
Those elements of universality, which are described in the preceeding
paragraphs for Rostow, are consistent with those found by Simon Kuznets in his
statistical studies. Besides the requirement of a leadership which has the will to
promote the change in structure, the labor force as well becomes transformed through
education and through changes in the real wage. As with the achievement of modern
economic growth for Kuznets, the stage of ’maturity' for Rostqw is marked by the
effective application of modern technology to the resources available to the economy.
26 Walt W. RONIOW. op• .:il•• pagllN 252-255.
CHAPTERIV
THEMETHOD
DEVELOPMENT DATA AND THE ROLE OF POLICY IN DEVELOPMENT
The literature reviewed in the previous chapters make it clear that the role of the
leadership in national economic development is crucial. Because a sustained incr，않se in
total output requires an underdeveloped nation to undertake structural transformation,
government policy must encourage or even compel a transformation in economic
production.
Thep이icy which results from the intention to transform the economy is
expected to give rise to a pattern of change in the economy which is consistent with the
results of the statistical studies by Simon Kuznets which were described in the previous
chapters. Kuznets found that historically, among the industrialized nations of the
world, a consistent set of patterns emerged in the economic data.
Kuznets emphasized that the data must be examined over an extended period of
at least two or three decades. For some of the earlier developing nations the process
involved up to a century. As the level of science and technology on the globallevel
increased, however, the period of development decreased.!
GDP was found to undergo a sustained increase over the development period of
at least 2 to 3 percent per year, and GDP per capi따 underwent a sustained increase of
1.5 to 2 percent per year. Two of the three major economic sectors 외so underwent
profound changes. In essence, agriculture and industry reverse their importance in the
1 The statistic:11 studies and the conclusions with I'll ιpeιtto lilt씨em /!cnno.’/Iic growzh aN described in detail in Simon
Kuznels, Modem Eeonol1li~ Gmwth: Rate SlrnctuN and Snread.Nιw Haven. Yale Univιrsily PNSS. 1966.
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makeup of total output. W피Ie agriculture tended to start the period of development as
at!<않st40 뿜rcent of GDP, it fell to 10 to 20뿜rcent in 와I of the nations which
achieved modem economic growth. At the same time, industry started at 20야rcent or
less, and climbed to 40 or 50야rcent of total production. For services as a percentage
of GDP, on the other hand, the statistics showed no marked trend. Although the
makeup of the services category changed, for services as a p따t of total output there
was little change.
In terms of the use of to따I output, private consumption per capita was found to
have increas려 to 3 or 4 times the initiallevel, while private consumption as a
percentage of total output deer，없sed from over 80 percent to 60 or 65 percent of GDP
in 행ite of the population incrl않se which accompanied the process. Domestic savings
incrl않sed ， at the same time, from less than 10뿜rcent of GDP to between 15 and 20
percent.
Gross Domestic Investment as a percentage of GDP was found to increase from
approximately 10야rcent to something between 20때d 30뿜rcent ， generally over 25
percent. At the same time Gross Domestic Investment per capi없 increased
consistently, the specific amount depending upon the rate of population increase.
As indicated in the previous chapter, Kuznets found that education was a key
ingredient in the development process. During the period of development large s않Ie
investment was made in education, and the entire popula:다on of the developing nation
was involved. The expectation of universa1 literacy, therefore, can serve as a basic but
dependable measure of the level of engagement in education for the developing nation.
A highly generalized pattern of the data found to be consistent among the
statistical findings by Kuznets is presented in Figure la below. Although the horizontal
없is represents the passage of time, three decades, in the panel below, the vertical axis
is simply an 때chor for the indicators. The panel is intended to illustrate the relative
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incrl않se， dec~없se， or lack of change in the indicators over time. The indicators are
arranged in the panel from the top down 피 the order discussed above. No hierarchic
implications should be drawn from the arrangement.
This study is more limited in terms of the indicators available than the same
study of a single countη might be. In this case it was neces앓ry to limit the indicators
to those which are both available and consistent among the Central American Nations
and the two Eastern Newly Industri외izing Countries. For a similar study of a single
nation it may be possible to collect data for some of the more telling indicators such as
income distribution, employment by specific sectors and breakdowns within the sectors.
For this study the decision was made to limit the indicators to those which could
be generated from data published primarily by international agencies. The agencies
chosen were The World Bank, the Interna디onal Monetary Fund and the United
Nations. That left the further problem, however, that da떠 for Taiwan, The Republic
of China, is not published by those agencies. Taiwan has not been a member of the
U띠ted Nations for 22 y없rs and has never been a member of the World Bank. That
meant that it was neces잃ry to resort to data genεrated and published by Taiwan itself.
πle first question, whether or not there was data available which could be reconciled
with that published by the international agencies, turned out to be answered readily by
the fact that Taiwan collects and publishes an elaborate set of data. This is data which
is collected for the purpose of guiding the dε~velopment process. Fot that r않son there
is data available which readily fits the indicators described by Simon Kuznets as
representative of modem economic growth.
For Taiwan there is deta피ed data available on education뻐d literacy, on income
disσibution by geographic region and economic sectors, on employment, health, debt,
foreign trade and so on. Therefore, reconciling the data of Taiwan to that published by
the international agencies was not the limiting factor. The limitation was on the side of
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the relatively slender amount of development-related data published for the Central
American Nations.2
Taken together, the need to incorporate data beyond the economic and the ne응d
f야 locally informed judgement in policy decisions regarding the 앓arch for dynamic
camp따ative advantage, result in 때 approach to dev리opment policy which looks
considerably like that used in Taiwan since the 1950s by the ruling p따ty ， the Kuo Min
T없19 κMT). There the general policy direction is typi않lly described in terms of three
dis파lct phases in the period of development toward modem economic growth.
It was with the publication of Simon Kuznets 1966 work, Modern Economic
Growth: Rate Structure and Snread, that there emerged something of a theory 없ld
language for the process of economic and organizational metamorphosis through which
the nation was passing.3 John C. H. Fei, in publications since the 1970s on tfie
economic development of Taiwan, has related the process to Kuznets ’ studies.4 In
keeping with the portray외 of the process by Kuznets, he describes the starting point in
Taiw없1 as the agrarian one which is typi않1 of other LDCs as well. Taiwan, like the
Central American Nations, started with an economic structure based on the eχport of
primary products and the import of fmal manufactured goods.
In the 1988 publication cited above, Fei describes a set of successively more
complex lev리s of economic development, each of which depends upon the preceeding
one. "So", he says, " the transition growth process can be viewed as a metaporphosis
2 See Richa며 Kibbeγ， π'he Crisis in Central America: Failure of Economic Growth Policy", schedul때 to be
publi야led in the late filII of 1993 in !be International까Ii펴 World Studies Journal, Volume 5, Number 4, 1993. 까Ie issue of the
la‘ k of development orient때 dl!ta among the Central American nations is e찌찌。red in this article.
3 Simon Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth: Rate Structure and Spread, New Haven. Yale University Press, 1966.
4 For example, see Growth Wi!b Equity: The Taiwan Case, New York. Oxfo벼 University Press (for !be World Bank),
1979 and "A Bird's Eye View ofPoIicy Evolution on Taiwan" in K.T. Li,꺼Ie Evolution ofPolicv Behind Taiwan's Development
S뿌뜨짚， New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988.
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characterized by phases occurring in a reasonably definite 앓quence. ,,5 Any economic
development effort for an LDC begins with what Fei describes as a set of exogenous
factors. πle three key groups of factors which affect the transition process are the
world 많onomic environment, the p:하ticular economic geography of the nation and the
cultural and historical background of the nation. It is that unique set of factors for each
developing nation which makes government in the pr，α=ess neces앓ry.
Within that set of factors Fei describes the forces which act on the evolution of
policy as either objective or subjective with res야ct to a given development p~이ecl.
πle objective forces are those which are given for the policy makers, the economic
geography or the conditions of the world economy. πle subjective forces include the
ideology of the policymakers themselves and the consequences of previous policies.6
Fei, along with Ranis and others writing on the experience of Taiwan and South
Korea, refers to government policy in the development process as the requisite
intervention into the functioning of the market process. 까lesep이icies address specific
arl않s of guidance, such as interest rates or taxes, says Fei, but they 외so function on the
level of specific policy coordination referred to as planning.
πlese policies are seen, both by Kuznets and by Fei, Ranis and others writing
on Taiwan, to have two prime purposes. They seπe to promote the development of
the economy itself, but they 외so promote an important sense of national unity through
the incrl않se of broad economic welfare. Both, says Kuznets, are neces잃ry to the
emergence of modem economic growth.
5 John C. H. Fei••A Bird’s Eye View...·, op. cit., page 28.
6 John C. H. Fei. op. cit., page 31 π.
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THE INDICATORS OF GROWTH VERSUS DEV파OPMENT
In keeping with Kuznets’ findings, both GDP and GDP per Capita have been
established for the seven nations as a basic indicator. πlese are neces앓ry though
insufficient indicators. An underdevelo야d economy which is not increasing in total
output as well as in output per capita is not undergoing the fundame때I requirement of
n때sition toward modem economic growth. Furthermore, as describ잉 above, the
expansion 피 both GDP and GDP per Capita must be a sustained one in a developing
economy. As Kuznets put it, a developing economy in which the increases are
overshadowed by interim fluctuations cannot be considered to be undergoing the
requisite transition.
’The second category of indicators, those which represent the sσuctural change
in the economy on an aggregate level, is the three m폐or sectors represented as
percentages of GDP. As sugges얻dinp따t two in this chapter,뻐 economy which is
undergoing σansition toward modem economic growth will show a replacement of
agriculture by industry as a significant aspect of total product. At the same time, while
agriculture shows a strong decrease and indusσy a similarly strong incr，않se， the service
sector떠n be expected to increase, though to a minor extent.
In the third category, use of the incr，없sing ouφut ， Kuznets found clear patterns
which are to be anticipated in the transition. For the seven nations, data will be found
in chapter 8 on private consump디on ， savings and domestic investment. In a developing
economy private consumption is expected to decrease as a fraction of GDP and inc~않se
on a per capita basis. Consistent with the decreased consumption, domestic savings
should show an increase as a p하t of GDP, as will domestic investment. Those three
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indicators are 피ustrated in the next chapters and all three generate suggestive insights
with res야킹t to the growth versus development issue in terms of the ENICs and the
CANs.
Afo따th Ji앓1m of critical concern which was big삐ight벼 by Kuznets for a
developing nation is education. It is education which represents both investment in the
pop띠ation of the nation as the criti<때1 factor input for a modem economy and the
infusion of knowledge and science into the production process as essential to the
developing economy. In the 1966 study Kuznets concluded a discussion of the
increasing income to labor in the developing economy saying, lithe share of labor in the
growing net output has increased because greater investment has been made in
maintianing and increasing the q때lity of labor. 117 For this study the rate of literacy
will be 너sed as the indicator which will represent investment in and achievement of an
advancing level of education. Literacy was chosen simply because it is the only
indicator related to education which was both available and consistent among the seven
nations. As will be seen in chapter 8, the rates of literacy published by UNESCO for
the seven nations are in some cases not very current and in others rather sparse. But
there is enough data for 외1 the nations to draw conclusions which support and are
consistεnt with the rest of the data.
The pattern for which this study is s않rching is based on the ex야ctations for an
economy in 얀ansition toward modern economic growth as defined by Simon Kuznets.
The pattern as a whole includes the set of indicators described above, with the GDP
indicators providing the context for the others. GDP indicators are normally thought of
as growth-type gauges, and, by themselves, simple growth is the best which can be
taken from them.
7 Simon Kuznets. op. cit.. page 18S.
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But while they are necessary elements of the transitional pattern to modem
economic growth, they must be accomI뻐너ed as well by the internal, structural
indicators. Those are the three sectoral indicators, the use-of-output indicators and the
educational indicators.
An implication of this study is that in때 underdeveloped economy the
application of policy should incorporate an awareness of the indicators discussed in this
chapter. But the indicators are not of eq따1 value or meaning throughout the
development process. Thus it is important to recognise that some of the indicators
described here are causal and others are effect indicators. Which they are, however,
mayv따y over time as the development process changes the relationships among them.
Initially, for the policymakers, for example, education is a causal variable. It is
the key to preparing the economy for the incorpora디on of science and science fed
technology. Education will positively impact the changes in indusσy and agriculture
which Kuznets distinguished as characteristic of modem economic growth. Figure lb
describes these relationships in a schematic representation.
As education represents a key causal variable for policymakers, it can 외so be
used as an effect variable in just the way it is being used in this study. Literacy, here,
functions as an indicator of development because an economy which is characterized by
modem economic growth requires near universalliteracy.
On the other hand, the incrl없sing role of industry and the decrl않sing role of
agriculture in the economy function 잃 effect variables for the policymaker as well as
for the evaluator of the policy. In either때se the percentage of output attributable to
industry and agriculture are the results of other policy application including that of
education. Domestic savings also may function 잃 a causal variable, particularly with
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respect to gross domestic investment, but at the same time it functions as an effect
variable with respect to GDP.
Private consump디on per capita is seen here as an effect of GDP per capita,
while private consumption 잃 a percentage of GDP is represented as an effect of
domestic savings and gross domestic investment. Gross domestic investment per
capi따， like private consumption per capita, is cl없rly an effect variable in that it is a
function of the abs이ute value of domestic investment and the size of the pop비ation.
GDP per capita as well, is simply an effect variable in that it is simply a function of
GDP and population size. And yet, like the other effect variables, it should provide
development policymakers with an ev외ua디ve look at the economy for the application
of causal policy tools, many of which are not mentioned in this evaluative package.
What is important for this study is not the yield of any particul따 indicator,
though m때yare telling in their own righ t. Rather, it is the indicators taken together,
the pattern of the combined indicators, which will allow conclusions to be reached as to
whether the economies have undergone development or growth.
Comprehension of the progress from the pre-development level of the economy,
theprim따y production level, to the mature economy which incorporates the current
techn이ogy ， requires indicators which illustrate the change in structure. Those are
indicators, such as those described 않rlier in this chapter, which will disaggregate the
’growth ’ to reveal realignments within the sectors.
The writings of both Kuznets and Rostow support the selection of indicators
discussed in the previous section. In this study the distinction between simple growth
and the complex transformation of development in keeping with the statistical findings
of Simon Kuznets. A nation will be observed to have undergone development if all the
following criteria are met:
1. GDP - a sustained increase of at least 2% per year.
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2. GDP per Capita - a sustained increase of at least 1.5 % per y않r.
3. The three major sectors as percentages of GDP:
a. Agriculture - a decrease of more than 20%•
b. Indusσy - an increase of more than 20%.
c. Services - no significant change.
4. The Use of Output:
a. Private Consumption
- as a percentage of GDP - a decrease to no more than 65% of GDP.
- per capita - an incr，않se of three times the initial level.
b. Domestic Savings as Percentage of GDP - an increase to at least 15 % of
GDP.
c. Gross Domestic Investment:
- as percentage of GDP - an incr，εase to at I않st 25% of GDP.
- an Increase per capIta.
5. Literacy - an increase to approximately 90% of the adult population.
Pack and Wesφhal stated the key requirement for policy focus on development in their
1986 article, "Industrial Strategy and Technological change".8 In the developing
economies of Taiwan and South Korea the intervention by the leadership of the nation
has been geared to seeking "profitability" on a sociallevel as well as on a private level.
Resource allocation in the circumstances of a developing economy must be
geared to increasing the capacity of the nation as a whole. This is a long range
objective which requires careful interim decisionmaking. Sub-national decisionmaking
under those conditions is subject to national objectives.9
8 Howard Pack and Larry Westphal. "Imlu써더미 Strategy and T，‘:ιhnological Change" ‘ Journal of Development
Economics‘ Vol. 22. 1986.
9 In the case of these small countries sub-national decisionmaking would typi때lIy ref，잉r to that made on the level of the
firm. Gene뼈lIy. however. it would imply any decision made out서dι the con써raint of nati‘.mal ιonc.:ms.
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It is this element which was missing among the CANs during the period of
growth 때d collapse following World War II. Among the CANs the sub-national
decisionmaking was not subject to concerns for national "profitability". Economic
policy among the CANs was based on the assumption that the state of the national
economy would be ’naturally ’ or automatically strengthened through the function of the
free market mechanism. On a theoreticallevel the assumption was that sub-national
decisions would automatically conclude in improving the welfare of the nation as a
whole.
Among the CANs, as a result, with the p따tial exception of Costa Rica, theeε
was little investment in either the physical infrastructure or the human capital aspects of
the development process. There was also no guidance of private investment to generate
a "dynamic comparative advantage" as was consistently and intentionally pursued in
Taiwan and South Korea.
As will be seen in the next chapters, through intervention and guidance of the
development process the ENICs accomplished the sustained increases in GDP per
Capita, the changes in the relationships among the sectors, the changes in the uses of
output, and the increases in the education in the education and skill levels of the
pop비ation which are associated with the accomplishment of modern economic growth
as defined by Simon Kuznets. That is to say, in the terms of Kuznets, the ENICs
managed to accomplish the incorporation of science and science-fed techn이ogy into the
m매ority of the economy.
The next chapters will also illustrate the failure of the CANs to achieve modern
economic growth through the policy of reliance on strictly market-based decisions made
on a sub-national level. The CANs, in fact, failed as well to achieve the simpler goal
of sustained economic growth alone. Although many sub-national units, individuals
and firms , did very well during the pe꺼od ， these nations suffered disasterous decline.
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The following chapters, five through seven, describe the historical
circumstances for the economic policy decisions by the two groups of nations. In
chapter eight the statistics for the seven nations will be presented for the period under
consideration. In chapters nine and ten observations will be made and conclusions
drawn regarding the demonstration of consistent patterns of development among the
seven economies, as structural transformation. This is in keeping with the expectations
ofKuznets’ modern economic growth.
The nature of the development process as described by Kuznets emphasizes the
fact that it is characterized by a complex change in the economic and soci외 structure of
the nation. Given the v따iety of starting points for the development effort, the
historical and physical environment and the cultural differences among the developing
nations, tracking the process requires a search for patterns of change rather than
expectations of partic비따 changes.
None of the individual indicators can be taken alone as indicative of
development. The studies by Kuznets and others illustrated that the achievement of
modem economic growth involves the complex of changes represented by the 따rayof
indicators depicted in Figure 1above.
In this study the expectations for development include 감rst ， a sustained incrl없se
in GDP, secondly, a sustained increase in GDP per capita, and thirdly, a structural
change in the three major sectors characterized by a decrease in agriculture as a
percentage of GDP with a consistent increase in the industrial sector and little change in
the services sector. Forth, changes in the uses of production should app없r as
decreased private consumption as part of the total output while private consumption
increases on a per capita basis, together with increased savings and increased domestic
investment as a part of total output. And finally , a substantial investment in education
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should be evidenced in an increase in literacy commensurate with the high level of
literacy necess따Y to an industrialized economy.
It is approp더ate to make something of a disclaimer in this chapter of the study.
There are many alternative explanations for the crises among the CANs and the
successes of the ENICs. The fact that the two groups of nations approached expansion
policies on such different bases is, at best, 0띠yp따t of the story.
Aside from the cultural and historic differences which will be briefly explored
in the next chapters, there are many other distinctions which undoubtedly contributed to
the two very different outcomes. While both Taiwan and South Korea were recognized
to be populous small countries after World War II, 0띠Y EI Salvador among the Central
American countries would have been described as heavily po뻐lated. The other four
CANs still had a relatively high ratio of land to population. Thus, a number of
international development agency studies,않rly in the post-war period, advised labor
policies which made the high unemployment problems worse.
Another important difference between the CANs and the ENICs was the
strength of the governments. Both of the ENICs were governed by an authoritarian
elite which was able to establish and maintain p이icies with security. This created an
atmosphere of relative stability which far exceeded what the CANs were ever able to
attain. Thus internal policy could be applied and caπied out with certainty, and
external relationships could be used to advantage as well. No doubt that is part of the
reason that the ENICs were the beneficiaries of more substantial flows of both foriegn
aid 때d capital investment than the CANs.
Another clear disadvantage for the CANs was the looming presence of the
United States throughout the period. Not only did the U.S. dictate broad p이icy
guidelines to the CANs, but it 외so accounted for the m에ority of their external markets.
The U.S. made clear several times during the post-World War II period that it would
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not tolerate a strong nationalist government on the isthmas. Thus, the Central
American governmεnts were regularly preoccupied with both internal and region외
strife throughout the period. Whether these circumstances provide an adequate
explanation for the failure to sustain economic expansion is, to say the least, open to
doubt. On the other hand, that the failure or inability of the Central American
governments to undertake the structural transformation necess따y to sustained εconomic
expansion contributed to the high level of strife in the region has been suggested by
many commentators.
Finally, it is worth mentioning here that the author was warned both at the UN
and at the World Bank that all statistics from Central America must be viewed with
skep디cism. The Area Officer for the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the
C하ibb없n at the United Nations stated that "You must be careful with any of the
figures from the World Bank Studies. They always exaggerate, the (Central American)
governments I mean, when those figures are collected." A World Bank economist who
has been working primarily with EI Salvador confirmed the truth of that comment,
stating that he was startled recently to discover that the data from El Salvador shows an
"a very high level of income equity...amazing!"
In terms of this study, that simply has to be viewed as one of the constraints.
An ameliorating consideration here, however, is that errors and exaggerations will tend
to be either absorbed, or to become more obvious in the three-decade span of the data.
They will also tend to have overstated any development among the CANs. A potenti외
problem which, as will be seen in chapter eight, does not seem to have damaged the
case for drawing clear distinctions between the ENICs and the CANs. The distinctions
between the two groups, based on the Kuznetsian indicators, is dramatic and clear.
The ENICs developed entirely consistently with the expectations of Kuznets while the
CANs clearly did not.
CHAPTER V
THE CULTURAL AND GEOGRAPHIC BASIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II - SPANISH COLONIES AND INDEPENDENCE
Central America was a backwater of the Spanish empire throughout its colonial
history. In keeping with the character of imperial Spain, the conquest generated
fiefdoms throughout the area, accounting for decades of feudal warlord-like politics and
for the character of an elite with a sense of divided interests and identity.
Historically, Central America was made up of the five small nations, Costa
Rica, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Each of the tive are distinct
in some respects, but most differences are a result of the interaction of geography and
the historical, particularly colonial, response to it. Guatemala, for example, was from
the time of the conquistadors the center of political and economic power for the region.
It was geographically suited to plantation agriculture and it had a substantial indigenous
pop비a디on to be incorporated into a forced labor system.
Guatemala was not a major prize for imperial Spain, it had little in the way of
precious metals, but it did produce some agricultural wealth for the empire. Costa
Rica, on the other har벼， was of no economic consequence. It is a very mountainous
region which was sparsely populated, and so, produced nothing of interest to the
colonists. The other three nations which have a shared history existed somewhere on
the continuum between Guatemala and Costa Rica. They had some capacity for large
scale agricultural production and some indigenous population for labor.
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Several commentators place a good deal of emphasis on the fact that the area
shares a mutual history and that there has long been a tendency among Central
Americans to identify the five Central American states as a single nation.! Besides the
common language, the common culture and the history, since independence from Spain
in 1821 political unification has been a strong and multifaceted theme in Central
America. A recent manifestation of that theme is the Central American Common
Market (CACM) of the 1960s and 1970s, around which was woven considerable
discussion of poli다cal integration. The potenti외 for political integration was firmly
thw따ted by the elite in 않ch of the five nations, however, as it has been regularly since
the breakup of the federation in 1838.
Independence essentially fell upon the five Central American states in 1821
through their temporary annexation to Mexico. By 1823, while Mexico was convulsed
by civil war, a Central American congress proclaimed its independence from Mexico
and established the IIFederation of Central America".
After a stormy fifteen years of existence without adequate financing , the
Federation finally collapsed over the refusal of three of the five states to grant taxing
authority to the Federation. Since 1838 the region has been composed of the five
independent nations which still function politically autonomously within a loose
identification of common interests.2
Both during the colonial period and during the early period 하 in핸pendence ，
江ocal elites, landowners and merchants, guarded their autonomy zealously and viewed
the colonial (and independent seat of government) in Guatemala City with considerable
I Sllll. for llxlI01plll. Jllhn W，ιIlks. 까III ECllnn01써s ofCllnlral A01c꺼ClI. NllW Yurk. Hulinιs lind Mllier. 1985. pllges 8-
II. lind thll cllIssic on thll SUbjllιt.R미ph Lell W，‘，llldwlI여. Jr. C닝nlraJ A01.:riclI: A NlIlinn Divid.:d.N 강W Yllrk. 0χfll매 Univ.:πity
PπSSe 1973.
2 PlInl101ll lind B.:liz‘: bUlh hllv,: II dislinct origin lIml historiclIl dιvι101"01ιnl.
71
antipathy. ,,3 That the autonomy of the local elites is still zealously guarded is clear in
p이피cal interactions right up to the present. Both the form of the CACM and its fairly
rapid demise were a function of that zealousness. The fact that the organization had
almost no supranational authority has been commented upon regretfully by many
Central American writers.
The Elite
The intentions and the capacity of the elite to govern is of considerable
importance for any development process. In his The Sta2:es of Economic Growth , for
example, Walt Rostow made quite clear that a necessary condition for ’take-off’ in a
nation which is undergoing economic development is an elite which is capable of
opposing the traditional landed interests. More specifically, this 리ite must be
"prepared to regard the modernization of the economy as serious, high-order poli디cal
business. ,,4
Among the five historic nations of Central America there is considerable reason
to observe that that preparation is missing. The elite on the whole are far more readily
characterized by their resistance to modernization than by their encouragement and
support of it. Hector Perez-Brignoli, Professor of History at the Universidad de Costa
Rica writing about the current c더sis says that" .. .landowners and business people were
unable to transform the agrarian capitalism instituted at the close of the nineteenth
century." "It matters little whether we refer to the ruling class as bourgeoisie,
oligarchy, or aristocracy. The fact is that they did not succeed in forging a new
collaboration and consensus to replace the crumbling colonial paternalism. Control
rested therefore exclusively on exploitation, violence and terror. ,,5
3 W.:.:ks. op. cit.. p.9.
4 W.W. Rostow. Thll SIDl!IlS of Eωn‘’mic Growth. Nllw York. CDmhrid얀 Uniwrsity Pres‘. 1969. p. 9.
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Perez-Brignoli further states that, "The profitability of businesses and use of
modern technology are not at issue. Rather, it is economic efficiency without
coπ'espondingly suitable social relations, and growth without distribution. ... the lack
of political will and the cultural precariousness of the ruling elite (are key determiners
of the outcome of the development effort). ,,6 Among Central American writers this is
not an unusual perspec다ve. Edelberto Torres-Rivas has written many books and
articles which cite the 떠ilure of the 리iteM In a 1980 따디cle ， "The Central American
Model of Growth: Crisis for Whom?ll , Torres-Rivas argues that p이icy decisions on the
P따t of the elite were clearly g없red to avoiding the structural changes which
characterize the development of the industrialized economies.7 Torres-Rivas develops
the theme in more depth in his Centroamerica: La Democracia Posible (1987) and
Crisis del Poder en Centroamerica (1989).8
John Weeks, another well published writer on the subject, seeks to "...explain
the uniquely rl않ctionary nature of the region in terms of i압 land-tenure systems" in 뻐
article in the Latin American Research Review (1986).9 There are many more, but
these give a sense of the well-recognized nature of the problem of leadership for
development in the region. Although some industrialization has taken place in recent
decades, the economies are still dominantly agricultural, the industrial production is
5 Heclor Perez-Brignoli. Breve historia de Centroamerica. Madrid‘ Alianza Editorial. 1988. p. 181·182.
6 Perez-Brignoli. op. cit .. p. 182.
7 Edelberto TllrNs-Rivas. "111e C‘mtral Am떠can ModιI of Gnlwth: C꺼sis for Whom'!" ‘ L.1lin American Pιr8llecliv녕S·
Vol. VII. #s 2 & 3. 1980.
8 Edelberto Torres-Rivas. Cenlro삐삐ca: μ Oem“cracia Posihl닝. EOUCA. Sun Jos.:. C‘)sla Rica. 1987 and 드꽉i샘!of
Poder en Cenlroamerica. EOUCA. San Jo앓. Costa Rica. 1989.
9 John Weeks. "An Interpπlation oflb‘: C.:ntral Am.:rican Crisis". U1linAm잉꺼can R.:s써nπh Review. Vol. XXI. #3 ,
1986.
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essentially for industrial country markets, and income distribution is so dramatically
10poor that internal markets
The Ae:ricultural Base
A study of family networks in Latin America describes the institution of the
family in Central America as the major means of preserving and using status and
W않Ith. II The study compares Central America to Mexico City and Lima in the depth
ofi잉 history. While Buenos Aires and other areas in Latin America were beginning to
emerge in the nineteenth century, "Central America was an old c이ony with deep-seated
traditions. Its institutions, labor and land tenure patterns were hundreds of y앓rs old
rl2when (those other regions) were beginning to evolve. ’
For the most part, throughout much of that history the region was one
characterized by a subsistence type of agriculture, even on the large estates, with little
internal trade and fewexports. During the colonial period, other than a trickle of
precious metals from Honduras, the first export of significance was cacao, sent to
Europe through Mexico. By the nineteenth century the region had become a net
importer of cacao, though in the meantime indigo dye had replaced it as the export of
significance. The thi띠 expoπ of any note at all was cochineal, a red dye made from
insects, which was eχportεd briefly by Guatemala in the first decade of the nineteenth
century.
The pattern of land and labor expropriation established in the αmquest was
reinforced each time an export crop was developed. Zones of subsistence or near
10 Toms-Rivas. for examph:. in 'The Cιnlmi Am.:rican Mod‘:1 of Growth: Crisis fl,r Whom?" sllItes that" ...wage
levels were so low as to sιriousiy limit the fonnation of an int.:꺼or mark앙I. (SO that) the "wage eam.:r" was not a ιonsumer." p.
28.
II Diana Balmori. Stuart F. Voss and MiI.:s Wortman. Familv N.:tworks in L:llin America. Chicago. Univ.:rsity of
Chicago Press. 1984.
언써”r·ω때마넨.빼삐’-
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subsistence agriculture became arl않s of monoculture. In 티 Salvador in the mid-
eighteenth century when indigo became the valuable crop, it literally replal않dfood
production 피 m때y 따없s. All the 않rritory within the dye producing region became
sufficiently valuable to warrant the use of force to remove Indians from their common
lands as well as the subsistence farmers. 만ris also increased the pool of low cost labor.
Fin와ly ， in the latter h외f of the nineteenth century, the region entered into the
world economy to a serious degree through the export of coffee. By 1880 four of the
five Central Ameri때n republics had begun exporting substantial 따nounts of coffee.
πIe move to coffee as the main source of wealth and power for the elite, however,
served to extend and reinforce the system of land use where concentration of
landholding confined the peasantry to marginally productive land.
Banana produc다on as well was introdu않d in the latter nineteenth century.
Banana production 외so 피σ'oduced foreign capital directly into the productive r，없1m ，
again with the result of reinforcing the land and labor use which had characterized the
region since the conquest.
The cotton boom in the mid twentieth century further reinforced the pattern,
P따ticularly in areas which were previously considered marginalland. In Nicaragua, EI
Salvador and Guatemala, cotton became either the first or second most important
expoπ in the 196Os. It also shepherded in a more capi따I intensive form of agriculture.
Unlike coffee and banana production, which require labor intensive methods, cotton is
best produced using capital equipment and inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.
πlis time when the former tenants were forced off their land there was little
employment for them in the context of the new expoπ crop. The cotton boom ag하n
increased the number of landless wage laborers who now began moving into the urban
arεas in search of industrial employment.
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Foreil!n Domination
Foreign domination has been a feature of life in Central America at I없st since
the Spanish conquest in the sixteenth century. Although exports from the region were
of minor importance to the Sp없ush empire, and there were lengthy periods when p따18
of the region lapsed into subsistence and self-sufficiency, it was clearly govern잉 with
the intent of exσacting whatever wealth was available. The Spanish colonists during
that period functioned as intermedi따ies in the process.
With the collapse of influence of the Spanish monarchy in the 없다yp하t ofthe
따neteenth century, a period of internal struggle for power characterized the politics of
the region. In p따t the struggle was a function of the fact that each of the five states
refused to forego sovereignty to any of the others. But it was 외so characterized by
what was to become a longstanding conflict which is typically describ잉 as that between
conservatives and liberals.
The Conservatives were, for the most part, looking to retain the character of
global isolation in the region. πlis is generally characterized as emphasizing the
retention of the colonial social and economic structure represented by land-based w없lth
and a dominant position for the church.
The Liberals, on the other hand, represented an 뻐ti-cleric외 attitude, support
for strengthened state power and an impulse toward engagement with world σade. This
required considerable structural change in the latter p따t of the nineteenth century when
Liberals dominated the Isthmus. In order to support an export economy it was
necessary to change the social structure and to rea뾰nge the availability of외I the
factors of production, land, labor and 때，pita1. Accordingly, the church was eliminated
as a power through, among other things, the expropria삽on of land. The local
oligarchies were forced to submit to centralized governments, and the requisite s없son와
labor was made available through revisions of the law to revive the colonial system of
forced labor.
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The considerable incr，않se in public expenditure which was requir，려 for
infrastructure of외I sorts, open벼 the' region to foreign loans, and ultimately to a wide
range of foreign investment. Promotion of foreign investment led to the control by
foreign interests of the banking, the financing of the expoπ trade and even much of the
export infrastructure. Ultimately, however, the basis for economic and p이itic외 power
for foreign capital was land 뻐d agricultural production, just as it was for the local
elite.
Labor in the ’EXDort-Led' Economv
Thomas P. Anderson in his Politics in Central America points out that "For
most of the postconquest period the c，때'Pesinos (the peasant farmers) have been
unrelentingly exploited by those who owned the land. ,, 13 During the colonial period
the indigenous people were simply forced to render tribute labor to the Spanish
conquerers. Following independence the forced labor system was dropped in favor of a
debt peonage arrangement under which the peasants were securely tied the their
landlords.
Various subsequent arrangements were made to reinforce the peonage laws. In
the latter nineteenth century in Guatemala, for example, a set of vagrancy laws made it
a criminal offense not to work a specified portion of the y없r as a wage laborer. This
law, which stayed on the books until the middle of this century, required 150 days of
work per y없r. Workers were required to c따ry a passbook into which employers
entered their job records as evidence of compliance with the law.
As described by John Weeks in the introduction to his The Economies of
Central America, though there were official justifications for these.iaws, "The actual
function was to insure a docile and cheap labor force for large scale ag꺼C비ture." 14
13 Thomns P. And‘:πon. Politics in C.:ntml Ame꺼cn.Nιw York. Pm.:딛닙r. 19112. [1 .1 1.
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The demand for cheap labor for agricultural production was even apparent in the
constitutions of EI Salvador and Guatemala. Both required that vagrancy be made a
punishable offense.
The entry of foreign capi떠I directly into agricultural production in the last
decades of the nineteenth century reinforced rather than weakening the forced labor
system. Banana production was almost exclusively a function of foreign investment,
and coffee, though an important domain of the local elite, engaged considerable foreign
investment. Both export crops were produced on the basis of the centuries-long
tradition of forced labor. With the liberal rule, however, partie비따IYwith regard to
coffee, the methods were modernized. "Governments in EI Salvador from the 1870s
onwards, under pressure from the coffee elite, granted or sold public lands to private
individuals and alienated communal or church lands with such vigor that access to land
on the p따t of the mass of the rurallabor force was severely restricted. (Therefore)
’market forces I could be used in lieu of coercion to obtain the necessary seasonal labor
,15inputs. ’ Nicaragua and Guatemala were able to use similar resort to ’the market' in
combination with the more traditional coercive approach.
With some relatively minor variations the fundamentally coercive model of
labor relations characterized the economy of Central America through the middle of
this century. Since coffee was not only the dominant export crop in the region, but the
prime source of wealth, it was critically important that it remain profitable. Therefore,
since the profitability of coffee depend잉 almost s이ely on the control of labor costs,
labor unrest was quickly and ruthlessly quelled. The history of the region is rife with
accounts of barbarous official responses to rural labor protests.
14 John W.:o:ks. op.o: it .. p. 15.
IS Victor B비111싸끼10뻐S. Tho: Plllitio:ul EO:'lnllIl1V of C o:ntrnl AII1O:마:u Sin야 1920. CUll1b꺼ugo:‘ CUll1briugo: Univ.:πity
Press. 1987. p. 2 1.
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THE POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD
Costa Rican historian Perez-Brignoli lists the characteristics of the nation-states
which formed during the nineteenth century in Central America. The strongest of these
were the centralization of administrative power, the clarification of territorial
boundaries and the creation of military forces to assure internal order and defense.
Less firm attributes include a legal framework which continued to exist alongside
갱erson외ism and arbitrariness" , a modest degree of bureaucratization with a
corresponding decrease in "personalismo" (Personal decisionmaking in government)
and something of a broader national identity within the five states. 16 This list of
characteristics is for the most paπ appropriate yet today.
In his history of the region Perez-Brignoli refers to the tirst half of the current
century as the "y없rs of impoverishing growth". This was due to considerable extent to
the unvarying dependence on coffee and banana exports as the basis for national
wealth. Both were operated as broadly extractive processes with as little reinvestment
as possible, especi외ly in land and labor. Banana production, almost exclusively
dominated by foreign interests, has from the beginning been treated with a sort of
’slash and burn' mentality. That is, when production began to decrease or become
difficult due to crop diseases or labor problems, for example, the response was to
simply move operations to another region.
Coffee exporting is described by Perez-Brignoli as allowing the region to
maintian economic growth throughout the first half of the century. This growth was
attained, however, through the reinforcement of the social order which was established
16 Hector Perez-B더gn이i. Brev잉 hisloria ‘Ie Centroa l1lerica. Madrid ‘ Alianιa Edilllrial. 191111. p. 1여.
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by the Liberal reforms of the 1870s and 1880s and the increased subordination of the
interests of the ruling elite to those of foreign capitaI. 17
That period was one of incr，않sing repression throughout Central America, and
one characterized by the establishment of a habit of internal violence which still
characterizes the region today. The United States resorted to military intervention
several times in order to ’stabilize’ the political situation and the national p이ice and
armies were used regularly to quell agriculturallabor unrest. A frεquently cited event
in that historical theme is the El Salvadorian peasant revolt of 1932. During the brief
insuπ'ection thirty landlords and overseers were killed by the rebels. The response on
the p따t of government troops left an estimated fifteen to twenty thousand peasants
dead.
This event marked something of a watershed in the seriousness with which the
military was regardεd by the oligarchy in the region. Subsequently, much of the
character of the military as the means of maintaining quiet in the countryside was based
on the fear of another such revolt. Following that uprising the military-based regimes
for which the region became known were well suppoπed by the ruling elite for the
purpose of enforcing the status quo.
World War II brought some modest prosperity to Central America. The
outbreak of war disrupted the shipping to Germany and Britain on which the Central
American nations had come to depend heavily. But the establishment of markets in the
United States changed the course of prosperity for the region. Bulmer-Thomas
illustrates the change in markets using a table which shows exports to Europe all but
disappearing by 1940 while those to the U.S. increase to account for most of the
agricultural exports (bananas and coffee).18
17 Hllctor PCNz-B꺼딛nuli. op. cit .• p. 107.
18 Victor Bulmιr-llUlIllDS. IIp. cit. p.92.
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While exports were assured, imports were more difficult to come by. As a
result four of the five republics ran a trade surplus, which, together with the post-war
increases in prices for coffee and bananas, created an environment of well-being
accompanied by a wave of reformist politics.
Especially Guatemala and Costa Rica experienced dramatic impetus to reform.
In Guatemala a weak, coπupt regime was replaced by a reform-minded pop비ar
coalition government in 1944. In the succeeding ten y없rs the vagrancy laws were
overturned, labor rights laws were initiated and land reform was undertaken. By 1954,
however, the changes had put such pressure on the oligarchy and on foreign investment
interests in the country that the popular government was declared communist and
overthrown in a U.S. CIA managed invasion from Honduras and Nicaragua. As
described by Weeks, "With the fall of (the Arbenz government), Guatemala entered a
.19dark age of repressive dictatorships shocking even by Central American standards. ’
Costa Rica fared better. In this case the reform was strictly political, not
disturbing the distribution of income or wealth. A nearly bloodless civil war in 1948
led to the institution of honest elections and to the decrease of corruption and nepotism
in national government. In 1950, under the new legitimately-elected president, the
army was permanently abolished and many labor and social welfare reforms were
instituted.
Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador similarly undertook mild reforms which
were neither threatening to the elite nor, as distinct from those in Costa Rica, were they
long lived. In 외1 five nations the ownership and distribution of land continued to be
the key poli다cal issue. Again Weeks puts it succinctly, "Economic (growth) in the
region, rather than diminishing the importance of this (land) issue, has intensified it.
Agribusiness has given the landed oligarchy a new and growing base of economic and
19 John W.:.:L:$. op. cit .• p. 27.
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p이itic외 power, so that land ownership still determines the relationship between the
privilaged and the underprivilaged. ,,20
The Al!ricultural Base
Central America entered the post-Wo다d War II period with income and wealth
based primarily on the production of coffee and bananas for export. In the 1950s and
1960s two new cash crops, cotton and sugar cane were added to the region ’s
agricultural export economy. By the 1970s Guatemala, El S와vador and Nicaragua
were producing nearly six percent of the world ’s cotton. That rapid expansion,
however, was accompanied by the displacement of thousands of small farmers in the
coastal plains of all three countries, and massive use of the pesticides and fertilizers
which have come to haunt those regions.21
Ed리beπo Torres-Rivas pointed out that "The introduction of cotton in El
Salvador is most tragic from the point of view of the country ’s displaced population. "
But further, since most of those regions had previously been used to produce food
staples, the displacement resulted in a rapid increase in food imports. In Nicaragua,
says Torres..;Rivas, food imports increased five times between 1960 and 1977, the same
rate of increase as cotton exports.22
u.S. sugar imports from Central America tripled in the 1960s. This was to a
considerable extent due to the switch of sugar quotas to that region from Cuba. As
with cotton, though in different regions, campesinos were displaced and ownership of
land was consolidated under more powerful ownership.
20 John W.:.:ks. op. cit .• p. 34.
21 S.:.:. for .:xnmpl.:. Victor Bullll.:r·Tholllns. op. cit. p.106. Hector p，ι \'t;z-Brignoli. op. cit•• p. 137. π John W.:.:ks.
op. cit.. p. 101. π.
22 ~..I .tL_. .,. .• ft!•.__ wrt n ••. .11 .• -I .• 1_ A _~._ ...... _ A __ ,.. .~_. •• _! "
...... Ed.:lbcrto Torr앙s Rivas. "티 D':S:lf\)1I0 d.: In Agricu1tura 앙nC‘:nl f\)nmcricll". in Conf.:dιracion Univιrsitarin
C.:ntroam.:ricaRn (CSUCA). Doιulll.:ntos d.: Estudios. San los.:. July 22‘ 23.1982.
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Beef is another agricultural product which became added to the short list of new
exports. It is generally ranked fourth or fifth on the post-World War II list of
agricultural exports. Though beef consumption is low in Central America as a whole,
beef production has long been a cultural phenomenon 잃sociated with wealth. Beef
consumption was, for the most p하t， a privilage of the elite. The incr않se in demand in
the U.S. for inexpensive, hamburger-quality, beef is usually cited as the key stimulator
of the increased production in Central America. From 1960 to 1980 meat exports from
Central America increased seven-fold and estimates suggest that by 1980 approximately
fifteen percent of U.S. meat imports came from Central America.23
Many commentators have described as a serious error the Central American
policy toward expansion of agricultural production through emphasis on an
"agricultural frontier". Studies by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (1953) , among others by international agencies in the early 1950s,
warned that economic development may be impeded by labor shortages. As a result,
the wisdom of the day emphasized the introduction of crops which were consistent with
the use mechanization and minimallabor. Bulmer-Thomas states that "Far from
permitting Central America to escape some of the pitfalls of expoπ-led growth, the
land frontier was used to introduce new export crops on the pre-war pattern so that the
benefits of export diversification and capitalist modernization were as naπowly
distributed as before. ,,24
Forei lZn Domination of the Al!ricultural Base
As with coffee in the five nations, though the land is often locally owned, the
infrastructure of cotton and sugar cane production i:; foreign tinanced and the links to
23 Viclor Bulmer-'꺼u\mas.op. 이I. p.157-l58.
24 Viclor Bulmer-Thomas. l\p. cil. p.I06.
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international markets are owned abroad. Trans-national corporations and other foreign
investors have long financed the production 때d the infrastructure for coff빚. Cotton
and sugar cane production was developed in imitation of that pattern, typically with the
assistance of, and often with guarentees from , the U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank
(lDB).
Banana produc디on in the region for more than the last hundred y않rs presents a
somewhat different pattern. Land, in this case, is not owned by the local elite. It has
been owned and directly controlled by what in Central America was often referred to as
"los pulpos" (the octopi). They appeared to be connected to everything. Still today
most of the banana production is controlled by United Brands, Castle and Cook and
R.J. Reynolds.
The actual production of bananas has always taken place in isolated enclaves.
As a result the banana companies established their own banks, breweries, restaurants,
stores, shoe and clothing facto꺼es ， plastic and cardboard container production plants,
and so on. Then, in the early part of this century the companies expanded their already
substantial investment in infrastructure which included utilities, ports, railroads and
communication systems.
In the 1960s, when the Central American Common Market established broader
trade possibilities in the region as well as with international markets, the companies
dramatically increased the range of food processing investment to include vegetable and
fruit farming and canning facilities , cattle ranches and more elaborate shipping
facilities. But they also began to revise their relationship to agricultural production to
more nearly approximate the pattern among the coffee, cotton and sugar cane
producers. In r，εcent decades there has been a movement toward turning over the
farming of the land to local farmers. Actual ownership of the land is typically retained
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by the company and a tenant farming arrangement is made with groups of campesinos.
This eliminates the seasonal risk for the companies while retaining complete control of
the produc다on capacity.
Cattle production, the last of the five key exports of the region, began its
expansion in the 1950s. Again, with the assistance of the U.S. AID, the World Bank
and IDB the sector expanded dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s. 냐rge percentages
of the agriculturalloans were dedicated to expanding cattle production. In 1975 a
World Bank paper noted that lending for livestock operations "continues to be the
single most important type of credit activity. "
The critical and often cited question, of course, is what the expansion has done
to land use patterns in the region. A 1983 study by a United Nations agency found that
in Honduras cattle occupied sixty five percent of the largest and most fertile
landholdings.25 Even a U.S. State Department report renεrred to it as 댐 quick and
dirty business" , where the investor exσacts profit from the operation as quickly as
possible before what is often former forestland becomes too eroded to produce grass for
26attle.
The ownership of the land and the production of cattle, though a serious
commercial undertaking in the region, is also culturally associated with privilage and
wealth. Thus ownership of the ranches is rarely in the hands of foreign investors,
though the financing generally is. The slaughter, packing and shipping processes, also
are commonly foreign owned or financ잉.
The final realm of agriculture which is foreign dominated is that of the so-called
"nontradi 디on떠 exports". During the 1970s U.S. AID introduced the catagory and
2s Jacobo Schalan. La A‘!nlindllslria v ~I Svsl~ma C닝nlnlalll~꺼canll.Mιxic‘’. CEPAL. 1983. p. 46.
26 AID••Agribll싸n~ss Employnl~nl/lnv~slll\enl Prollllllion.· ROCAP Projιcl Papιr. Washinglon. D.C.• May 15‘
1981.
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offered 턴nancial support. These exports included such things as exotic flowers ,
shrimp, sesame seeds, broccoli and snow p앓s. The stated intention of both the Central
American governments and AID was to provide additional sources for foreign exchange
and move th강 nations away from strict dependence on the five ’traditional ’ cash crops.
The nontraditionals are an almost exclusively U.S. focused endeavor. The
markets, the financing and the processing facilities are controlled by foreign , generally
U.S. , investors.27 The effort is considered to have had mixed results so far in Centr외
America where stories are rampant about small farmers who found the nontraditionals
to be more expensive and riskier than the traditional crops. The markets have also
proven often to be unrεliable. There have even been instances of U.S. producers
blocking the shipments of ripening Central American crops.
Labor in the ’ EXDort-Lεd' Economv
On the whole, the post-World War II environment for labor in Central America
is little different from that of the previous four centuries. Among urban workers, some
ac디vity in organized labor began to app않r in the 1920s, a period of relative stability in
the region. By the end of the decade, however, the activity was brought to a dramatic
end.
The onset of the depression in 1929 marked the end of the liberal oligarchic
state throughout Central America. In Guatemala, Honduras and EI Salvador labor
activity was relentlessly destroyed shortly thereafter. In Nicaragua, under U.S.
occupation throughout the 1920s, organized labor stayed moderately active well into
27 On.: ofth.: many 잉xampl.:s of Ihis activity is FI‘’“dlll'tl. a s비새idiary (If Nalional Starch and Ch.:mical which is itself a
U. S. subsidiary llf the B꺼 Ii싸IIDulιh Unilιver CllJllllralion. Fllodpro“ )ne ofsιvιral U.S. AID linancιd prodllcι I'll in Honduras.
holds an AID conlract to grow snow pιas and broccoli near Tcgucigalpa. A much largιr opιrati매n is organizιJ through the Latin
American Agribusincss 0ιvclopmcnl COJlloralion (LADD) cNated by Sa.이kAmcrica as a conduil fllr AID invcs\ll1ιnl funds. As
of 1986 LADD NpNS‘ntcd 160 lrans·r삐삐nal cOJlloralillns invcslin멍 in C.:nlral Amιricu. A USιful iniliul NSllllrcι for mON
information on this Iype llfinv.:slmιnl would be: Tom Barry and 0ιhra Prιusch. 끼I': C‘:nlral Am.:꺼ca Facl Bll“k. New York.
Grove PNSS. 1986. pag잉S 11-26 and 155-160.
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the 1930s, but by 1939 had gone into what Bulmer-Thomas calls ’self-liquidation ’ 28
Typi때lly ， in Costa Rica the response to labor throughout the 1930s was moderately
repressive but not completely intolerant.
In the mid-1940s a revival of organized labor in the urban areas accompanied
the freer economic and political environment. The activity rarely touched the rural
workers, however, except for some militancy and strikes among the banana regions.
By the latter 1940s reaction had set in among the five neighboring governments and the
prospects for labor dimmed considerably.
The small number of urban workers represent an important paπ ofthe ’leading
edge’ of any evolutionary movement toward modern economic growth. This is a
leading edge, however, which has been thoroughly hammered down by the
environment of repressive economic and p이itical p이icy. At that, this potential
'leading edge’ constitutes a very small part of the working population of the region.
As John Weeks put it, lithe Central American countries are not predominantly wage-
labor societies. The propoπion of permanent wage earners with no links to the land is
small in all of the countries, and ’the land question ’ is of tremendous social and
1129politic외 importance. II.&. :7 Following World War II the conditions for rural labor
changed little from what it had been for centuries, except that with the introduction of
the new export crops the percentage of landless rural families increased substantually.
Central American studies showed that by 1970 over one quarter of rural families were
landless in the region as a whole.30 The same studies indicated that by the latter 1970s
28 Victor Bulm.:r-TIlonIllS. op. cil. p.45-46.
29 John W.:.:ks. op. cil.. p. III.
30 S.:.:. Insliluto pura la Inl댐racion dι Am.:꺼ca uthlll. 티 Dιl:lIrollo Inhl l!mdn ‘lι C.:nlroum.:rica 잉n In Pr.:s.:nl.:
딛뜨쁘용.• Vol. S. Buenos Air.:s. 1973‘ alω. S.:c r.: lnria P.:nnan.:nl.: d.: Tratado G앙n.:ral d.: Inl.:graci‘mE‘:onomica C.:nlroamericana
(SIECA). Estadislicus sohr.: Alim삐삐삐 v In AI!바1I IIIIm ':0 C.:nlnlnm잉더cn. Gunl‘:muln. 1972 und SIECA. 드꾀밸델파잉
E.~tudistico C.:olronm ‘:더enoo VII. 1981.
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the number of agricultural families with insufficient land to sustain themselves rang잉
from sixty percent in Nicaragua to eighty seven percent in El Salvador. Much of this is
essenti외ly a function of the export-led growth policies of the period, 뻐d in that sense
not a lot different from similar historic events in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
in Europe. What make the Central American experience different is that the
commercialization of agriculture there took place in the context of a coercive system of
labor relations inherited from colonial times.
Among the small ’leading edge’ of urban workers the post-World War II
organizing activity was continued, with considerable difficulty, as a minor political
theme until 1954.31 It was in that year that the legitimately elected Arbenz regime in
Guatemala was overthrown by the CIA-organized" Army of National Liberation". As
described by Perez-Brignoli, when Arbenz stepped down from the presidency,
"violence replaced p이itics and r，않1 power passed into the hands of the mili따ry. The
Guatemalan regime came to be archtypical. The preeminence of the executive branch
facilitated the centralization of power by the military while the main source of
legitimization became approv떠 by business leaders, legalized political p하다es ， the
church and the military itself. Under these conditions p이itical participation was very
restricted with barely any popular backing. Repression, selectively applied, continued
remorselessly. Political violence was virtually an established rule of the game. ".32
Besides the political, this circumstance reflected the structure of economic
engagement by the population as well. It is a function of, and a specific continuation
of, the historical arrangement of economic and p이itical power.
31 For a subslanliv.: d':S4: riplion of th.: slru딛gl.: of1abor ‘luring thaI p.:꺼OIlsι.: Bulm.:r-Thomas. Chapl.:r 7. "Th.:
Slrugg1.: for D.:mocracy. lh.: Cold War and lh.: Labor Mov.:m':llI in th.: FiπI Pl)sl-War Dιcad.:". p. 130 π.
32 H.:ctor P.:rcz-Brignoli. l)p. cit.• p. 137. Similar obs.:rvatiol1s ιan b‘: found in .:nglish languag.: I.:xω such as those
m.:ntioncd abov.: by Buhnιr-Thomas. Torres-Rivas and W.:‘:ks.
CHAPTER VI
CENTRAL AMERICA: THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD
THE HISTORICAL BASIS
The post-Wo더d War II growth efforts in Central America were thoroughly
intertwined with the attempt to establish a Central American Common Market
(CACM). The prolific writer Edelberto Torres-Rivas commented in an article on the
CACM in 1980 that since "economic growth depends on the capacity for accumulation"
it is important to understand "who controls this process in order to understand the
forms that the accumulation takes." 1 In the case of the Common Market effort Torres-
Rivas is concerned with the failure of effective national accumulation by Central
American private enteφrise. The pro비em ， he says, focuses on the ability of the state
"to direct the capitalist accumulation".
In the case of the CACM, Torres-Rivas points out, "the process (of economic
development) was abandoned to the laws of the market, to the anarchic reign of private
interests, the results of which could not be different from those that are presently to be
obseπed. The larger problem, is not the regional disequilibrium that has been caused,
but the soci외 disequilibrium that underlies all this reality." "Paradoxically," he
observes as a final note, "the country that has the most important trade returns in its
favor, Guatemala, is the one that has the highest unemployment and the most un며ual
1 Edlllb.:l1o Torr잉s-Rivos. "111.: Cllntral Am.:ri마:oJ1 Mo‘lιI of Gmwth: Crisis for 까이0111- ， ullin Amo:rican Po:n;l1o:ctivo:s,
Vol. VII. 1980. pogo: 42.
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distribution of income. Nor is it coincidental that Guatemala is the country with the
most anti-union vi이ence." 2
To understand the failure of the Central American leadership in this effort it is
necess따y to take a look at the historical sources for the decisionmaking. With
independence in the early 19th century, conflict between the social classes and between
regions ch따acterized the political and economic interactions. With independence the
conflicts became intensified because there was no longer a regional political institution
which had the power to focus efforts on a regional level. The force of external
unification had been removed and what was left was a conglomeration of municipalities
which were ruled by the wealthier Creoles. The municipalities formed no basis for
regional or even national government because their power was strictly local both under
Spanish rule and under independence.
The establishment of the strong national boundaries which characterized
relations in the region in the 19th and 20th centuries has been traced to the Spanish
appointed regional ’intendentes’ to oversee the financial and military administration of
the colony. These provincial governors held broad powers and soliditied the increasing
autonomy and separatist spirit in the provinces in the last years of the SP~ish rule.
By the early twentieth century the successors to the I intendentes’, the national
oligarchies, had turned over considerable control of their countries to foreign planters,
merchants, financiers and diplomats. This often involved generous concessions which
were made in order to attract investment. The early part of this century was a period in
which new oligarchies emerged, primarily on the basis of the production and sale of
coffee to the developed nations. But the control exercised by those oligarchies was
heavily dependent upon foreign interests. A look at the p태od of the "banana
2 EdιIb잉no Torr~N-RivllN. op. ιil .• pllg~ 42 llnd 43.
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republics" in Central America makes clear how in디mately engaged were those foreign
interests with the governing elites in the Central American countries.
In the early twentieth century historian Dana G. Monro described the p이itical
situation in Central America in terms which were still approp더ate in the middle p따t of
the century with respect to efforts to establish p이itic외 and economic unions.
The difficulties in the way of uniting the five republics would not be
insuperable if the ruling classes were genuinely ready to cooperate in
realizing the (regional) ideal. But the men who enjoy the high offices
and the control of the revenues of the state gO'앤‘
re려Itωuc따tancπce to giving up any of their powe하r for the common good. The
Iocal political groups and the inf1uentiaI famiIies wouId necessarily be
reduced to a position of far less importance if the union were
accomplished. The realization of this fact makes many of those who are
more enthusiastic in their advocacy of a Central American union slow to
take any definite steps toward its realization. OJ
Such an observation goes a long way toward insight into the events surrounding the
Central American Common Market.
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
In the early 1950s two mildly interconnected efforts were made to achieve unity
in the region. One of these bore no fruit at all. The Organization of Central American
States (ODECA) drew considerable attention in the press and involved the upper
echelons of government in all five countries. But it proved incapable of confronting
the intensity with which the national power bases were protected. The purposes and
intentions were lofty enough. The texts describe plans to strengthen the links which
unite the countries, to maintain fraternal coexistence, to assure pacific solutions to
conflict and to search for cooperative solutions to needs for economic, social and
cultural development.
3 Da lUl G. Munro‘ Th~ Fiv~ R~flUhlics of C~nlral Amι바a. Cam댐iι End'lwm‘:III for 1mιm삐삐al P~ac~. 1918. pa양
175. 1꺼is text was d~scrib~d in th~ LATIN AMERICAN GUIDE TO HiSTORICAL LITERATURE in 1971 as 깐'he slandard
twenlieth cenlury work on C~nlral Am~rica in En엔ish ，·
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The other effort, generated in the context of the United Nation ’s Economic
Commission for Latin America (BCLA), was a narrower one based in 삐 arrayof
pragmatic economic goals designed to create a strictly economic unity based on limited
sσuctural change in the five economies. The effort was made, paπic비arly on the p따t
of the proponents of ODECA, to tie the two efforts together. But the ’tecnicos’ of
ECLA and the five economic ministers saw the danger in ODECA ’s thin and very
general objectives. They successfully dissociated themselves from the attempts to
combine the two because they felt that the likelihood of achieving regional agreement
on the more pragmatic and limited objectives of a regional market were much more
likely.
Both of the unification efforts were the outgrowth of the historical
circumstances of the region immediately following World War II. A basic ingredient is
that all of the countries of Central America experienced a period of moderate prosperity
due to an improvement in the prices of their exports on the world market. This
situation affected the countries differently due to a number of factors. The export
sectors were more developed in Costa Rica, EI Salvador and Guatemala, consequently
they benefitted more from the increased prices. At the same time the rate of economic
growth in EI Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras was almost equalled by the rate of
pop비ation growth so that per capita welfare was little affected in those countries and
may have even diminished.
. It is important to note, however, that the prosperity was not due to an increase
in production or to a structural change in the economy. Rather, it was due to the
increase in p더ces which occurred with an unchanging level of production. Some minor
industrialization had taken place, primarily in Guatemala and El Salvador, as a result of
war caused shortages and lack of external competition. But by 1950, when
industrialization dominated the developed world , Central America’s manufacturing
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represented approximately ten peπent of the total gross domestic product (GDP) with
employment of eight to fourteen percent of the economically active pop비ation.
While the impact of the increased prices for traditional primary products was to
create a sense of increasing prosperity, especially among the elite, it had little actual
impact on the Central American economies. The increased import and export 따xes ，
however, representing over sixty percent of the government revenues for the five
countries, allowed a significant expansion of the public sectors. Thus a second
significant trend emerged. That was a broadening of the ruling elite and the generation
of a modified conception of the function of government. The "depression
dictatorships" of the 1930s came to an end in a series of coups in the mid-1940s. A
general sense among the expanded elite recognized a responsibility of government to
deal with the problems of poverty within a democratic framework.
The public sector, then, began to support new central banks, increased public
works, efforts at industrial and agric비tural development and concerns for health ,
literacy and social security legislation. The values of the new elements of the ruling
population are described as focusing on nationalism and economic growth within
something of a democratic framework.4
It is particularly noteworthy that the frame of reference remained thoroughly
nationalistic. As a result the political clashes between nations in the region were
considerable. Many of the clashes involved intervention by regional or international
agencies. At the same time, trade among the countries in the region was miniscule. It
amounted to less than four percent of the imports from outside the region. The pattern
of trade initiated during Spanish rule was still very much in place in 1950. All five
4 Rob‘:11 L야 W'14.11JWlI며‘ Jr•• C테lral Am.:바1I: A NlIli‘’n Dividιl.N‘:W York. Oxli.lrd Univ‘:rsily Pr.:ss. 1976. pllg.: 5.
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countries had relatively well established transportation and communication links with
the rest of the world but little with other countries of the region.
Some externally motivated projects, such as the Inter-American Highway, had
been undeπaken prior to 1950, but they were unenthusiastically supported by the
national governments. Regional orientation was weak and essentially motivated from
outside the region, and aspirations for economic growth were uniformly seen strictly
from within a national context as a function of external "free market" trade.
The United Nation ’s ECLA was one of those external forces which were
attempting to motivate regional orientation. ECLA pushed a perspective which
recognized a dichotomous division of world production. There were the industrialized
"centers" of production (the developed nations) and the raw materials producing
"peripheries" of production. The peripheral producers were understood to be
dependent upon their export sectors for the importation of goods produced by the
centers. The resulting dependency, it can be argued, represented a worsening situation
in which the terms of trade have been historically moving against the peripheral
producers.
ECLA ’s solution for this problem was for the peripheral countries to change the
structure of their economic production. This was to take the form of industrialization in
order to remove themselves from the dependent relationship in the context of world
commerce. In Central America that required the establishment of a regional market to
support the industrialization effort. A prime requirement of industrialized commerce
was seen to be that it function in a larger market than any of the individual Central
American nations could provide. Thus, a push for regional economic organization
became integral to ECLA ’s programs in Central America.
The arguments and counter arguments regarding economic integration were
rampant, varied and often loud. But the central message as presented by ECLA was
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one of the need to restructure the standing economic relationships. This implied
considerable threat to the status quo within the nations, and between them as well.
Therefore ECLA interpreted its task as that of organizing the process so that the
national elites were not threatened, but instead were enticed by the potential in the
program.
In June, 1951 , ECLA ’s fourth annual conference was held in Mexico City. A
program for the economic integration of Central America was proposed during the
conference and a permanent regional office was established in Mexico City. This
office was to become the base of operations for the integration program in Central
America.
The Committee of Economic Cooperation, established at that time in Mexico
City, consisted of the ministers of economic affairs of the 윈ve Central American
nations supported by ECLA ’s technicians. The first meeting of the committee itself
took place in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in 1952. For several days the committee met
and discussed cooperative planning for expanded markets and coordination of both
agricultural and industrial production in the region. The separation of the committee
from ODECA was made clear when the economic ministers, functioning as the
Committee for Economic Cooperation, closed the ECLA conference on the fourth day.
They then formally reconstituted themselves as ODECA I S Economic Council for a
sep따ate one day meeting. This precaution proved to be important to the continuity of
the integration effort when Guatemala withdrew from ODECA in early 1954 claiming -
apparently correctly - that the other four participants had undertaken to support an
overthrow of the current (Arbenz) regime in Guatemala. With Guatemala’s withdrawl ,
ODECA became ineffective as a regional body for nearly three years.
ECLA ’S Committee continued to function and produce considerable results.
With the third regional conference in late 1954 the Committee had undertaken several
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S야cific prl이ects in pursuit of regional integration. A school for public administration
was to be established in Costa Rica, a standardization of customs nomenclature had
been undertaken and plans for an industri외 research institute and various specific
industries were underway. By this time the ’technicos ’ of both ECLA and the
individual nations were announcing to the press that they were "...paving the way
toward political (as well as economic) unity. ,,5
Things continued in this manner until by 1957 the ministers had approved two
key aspects of the integration program. They agreed on a Central American Free
Trade Zone and on a system of regional industries which would have special privileges
under the plan. The documents had been drawn up under the supervision of ECLA ’s
technicians but they 야alt only with basic aspects of the agreements. A separate five
nation agreement would have to be signed regarding εach industry to be inclu야d in the
regional industries pact, along with individual negotiations on tariff reductions, tax
exemptions, subsidies and fiscal benefits. This presented a cumbersome and perhaps
even unrealistic prospect.
The Free Trade Zone was also initiated in minimal form. It was established on
the basis of a limited number of items which were to be expanded over the coming
y않rs. The Committee announced in the first few days of 1959 that a Common Market
had been created. Treaties had been ratified by the individual countries which formally
established multilateral free trade and the Regime of Integration Industries. These two
instruments published the acceptance of the five countries of ECLA I S original intent:
that integration be a gradual process which was to be based on planned reciprocal
industrialization.
By the time the treaties were signed, however, the five countries were giving
clear indications of decreasing interest and disengagement from the process. The other
5 No:wY‘’r~TiI1)O:s. Novιmho:r2‘ 1954.
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side of that attitude took thε form of ECLA I S increasing frustration, leading to a push
on the p따t of ECLA for more engagement by the p맙ticipants.
From the beginning the costs to the governments were intentionally kept low by
mεans of the United Nation ’s payment of most of the costs. The government
contributions had been kept at a token $5,000 per y않r while the United Nations' p앙t
of the package began at $90,000 per y않r and reached $300,000 by 1959. These
increases included the majority of the budgets for the School of Public Administration
located in Costa Rica and the Institute of Industrial Technology in Guatemala, both of
which were in full operation by 1959.
In reality the "Common Market" which had been announced in 1959 consisted
essentially of treaties in which it was agreed to sign further treaties. Commentators at
the time felt that there was no meaningful consensus among the p따ticipants. By this
time the process was being described on all sides as "slow and painful" with concern
that no real accomplishment had yet been made.
The costs of the program had been increasing for some time. Finally the United
Nations Technical Assistance Board denied some requests related to thε integration
project due to lack of availabe funds. In late 1959 the Committee proposed that some
of the costs be picked up by the five governments.6 This meant that the national
governments were to begin bearing costs for a regional project. At the same time
ECLA began making it clear that it planned to reduce direct involvement in the project
when the regional institutions created by the treaties began to become effective.
At this point the tecnicos within the five countries found their relatively passive
support to be melting away. When the costs and commitments were negligible, they
encountered little resistance. But now the governing elite were being asked to support
the regional endeavor both financially and in terms of national structural change. Some
6 1혜aι Coh.:n Oranl.:s. R.:!!i삐101 Inh~!!ralion in C':n1ral Am.:꺼~a. L:l(inglon. Mass.. L:l(in믿Illn Bl'lllks. 1972. pag.: 24.
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national prerogatives were to be given over to regional decisionmaking and they were
facing the r;않1 possibility of short term national income loss in favor of long term
regional gain.
ECLA’s strategy for instituting the requisite change in Central America while at
the same time enabling the comfortable engagemnt of the national elites was proving to
be incapable of laying the foundation for solid structural change. The approach taken
had involved the attempted separation of the economic program from the politics of the
region, together with a gradual approach to integration which was intended to permit
slow and relatively painless restructuring of the national economies. All this was to
take place at minimum cost to the countries involved. But as a higher level
commitment was asked on the paπ of the five participant countries, there developed a
uniform loss of interest in the prl이ect.
By 1959 the outlook for the integration effort which was to have supported the
structural change in the economies, was not bright in spite of the appearance of solid
achievements. Of the five participants, El Salvador seems to have been the nation with
the most activε interest in realization of the project. A prime reason for this app않rs in
the fact that although pop비ation increase in the context of decreasing availability of
land was a common problem in Central America, El Salvador has long been recognized
as the only country which is uniformly overpopulated.7 The regional effort would not
only allow expanded markets, and hence expanded employment for E1 Salvador, but in
the final analysis would be a direct solution to the excess population since one of the
attributes of the Common Market was to have been the free flow of factors of
production - including labor - within the Common Market area.
7 Roger D. Hansen. Central Ame꺼ca: Rc!!ionallnIC!!ralil\n and Eιl'm'mic Dcv잉l‘'om잉nt.W마hinglon D.C.• National
Planning As잉ciation. 1967. page 12π.
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EI Salvador, then, had the most to lose as the integration effort lost momentum.
By that time, however, another actor in the drama had made its presence known by
expressing disfavor with the scheme. The United States stated its position clearly in
several different forums in 1959. E따Iy in the year, the conditions for U.S. support of
Central American integration were stated in 때 Organization of American States (OAS)
meeting inWashington. The key point made by the U.S. negotiators was that the
theoretical context would have to be that established in the early 1950's an외ysis of
Customs Unions by Jacob Viner. 8
Viner’s theoretical position required that p이icy be made on the basis of the
static, neoclassical an외ysis which emphasized world-wide efficiency of resource
alloca다on and strictly free market decisionmaking. This meant that the Regime on
Integration Industries, a central element of ECLA ’s perspective, an element which
involved considerable market intervention, would have to go.
Three months later, at the ECLA conference in Panama, the U.S. announced
that it would support the creation of a "realistic Latin American regional market. "9
That is, one in which there were no major exceptions to a free market policy for the
benefit of preferred interests. Any alternative, it was stated, would discourage
competion and reduce efficiency. The New York Times explained the U.S. concern
that anything more restrictive than an open, free market arrangement would
discriminate against U.S. product in 없vor of goods manufactured within the regional
market area.
That discrimination , however, was εxactly what ECLA had had in mind. The
motivating force for the effort was the perception of a need to industrialize the region.
8 Jamlls D. Cochranll, "U.S. Attiludlls Toward Cllnlral Amι마:an Imll싣rali‘10" ， Inlllr Amll꺼써an Economic Arraiπ. v.
18. 1964. pagll 75.
9 Nllw York Ti l11lls. May 17. 1959.
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Them며or means of accomplishing that, from ECLA ’s point of view, involved the
protec다on of local industry against that of the already industrialized parts of the world.
In the spring of 1959, Jose Maria Lemus of EI Salvador traveled to Washington,
D.C. with the intention of discussing Central American integration. The talks focused
on the need to re-invigorate the process and on the need for the integration scheme to
meet U.S. requirements. Ultimately a joint announcement was made by President
Lemus and President Dwight Eisenhower that the two countries would undertake liThe
establishment of an economic머Iy sound system for the integration of the economies of
the Central American republics. 10
A few months later a mission from the United States traveled to Central
America to assist in the establishment of such a sound system. By early the following
y않r the New York Times announc벼 thatECLA had called an extraordinary session of
the Economic Coopera디on Committee. The purpose was to prevent the threaten려
collapse of the Central American integration program. Three months 않rlier a three-
P따ty free trade pact which undercut the ECLA program had been signed under the
sponsorship of the United States. I1 The U.S. Mission had culminated in an agreement
by EI Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala to form a free trade area based on the
principles set forth earlier in the y없r.
By the close of the session ECLA had regained some involvement in the process
by m않ns of negotiating a new treaty which incorporated the three-party pact. What is
now known as the General Treaty of Central American Integration was initiat쩌 and
finally signed by four of the five countries in December 1960. Costa Rica ultima떼y
signed on in 1962. The new treaty, however, represented a major turn away from the
ECLA inspired approach and toward that required by the U.S. The establishment of
10 Roger D. Han야n. op. cit.. page 27.
11 New York Times. May 1. 1960.
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free trade in the region was accelerated and the core effort was reoriented from prime
concern for industrialization to prime concern for free trade expansion. Aside from the
fact that the elite in the five nations showed no signs of intention to support the regional
industrialization plan, this represented a key decision to support growth rather than
development and structural change in the region. Financial involvement by the Unit잉
States which took the form of support for the regional institutions necessary to the
effort, was a major ingredient in the renewal of the integration effort. This constituted
a program of growth rather than development and structural change in the region.
The United States had committed itself to support the project at the rate of at
least ten million dollars in the first two y않rs. Thereby the participants were relieved
of any concern for making significant financial commitments themselves. An even
more important element in the new approach, an element which encouraged enthusiastic
engagement by the governing elite in the five countries, was that the new theoretical
approach promised no threat to the economic structurε in Central America. Yet it
carried the possibility of significant increase in economic activity.
That the United States underwrote the creation of a regional bank and a
financial clearing house and vehemently opposed the Integration Industries plan is
entirely in keeping with the theoretical position which had been established.
Neoclassical orthodoxy requires that there be no direct intervention in market-place
decisions. Hence, industrial planning for the purpose of generating structural change,
as intended by ECLA, was not to be tolerated. Instead, growth was to be enouraged
through the availability of funds to the capital market.
The Integration Industries plan became an underlying theme of U.S.
involvement in the region for the next three years. It had been incorporated into the
General Treaty in 1960 in response to ECLA ’s urging and, contrary to the
disagreement on the p하t of the U.S. , its implememtation continu잉 to be encourag잉
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be ECLA. Finally in 1963 EI Salvador proposed , and the Executive Council for the
Treaty accepted, the Special System for the Promotion of Industrial Activities. This
modification effectively underc'ut the Integration Industries plan and foreign private
12investment gained a broad entry into the region.
At that point the role of external motivator and financial supporter of the
integration effort had been entirely assumed by the United Sates. As a result, the five
participant countries continued to be relieved of both financial responsibility and
serious decisionmaking with respect to the project. This role on the p따t of the five
nations is entirely consistent with the historic one described earlier. The control of the
Central American leadership had long depended upon the involvement in Central
America of foreign interests and, as restructured according to U.S. principles, there
was nothing in the form of the integratation plan to threaten that arrangement.
In 않rly 1964 the five Central Bank Presidents signed an It Agreement for the
establishment of a Central American Monetary Union." The Union was to provide the
means for avoiding unilateral action in case of balance of payments problems. As it
was being set up, however, falling world prices for coffee, cotton and bananas put
considerable stress on the individual countries in the form of decreasing export
revenues with increasing third country (outside the region) import bills. Some of the
five were also experiencing sizeable increases in imports from within the region. Costa
Rica and Nicaragua undertook unilateral solutions which moved their national crises
into the regional rl없1m by threatening the regional agreements. In mid- 1968 the
Economic Council and the Monetary Council met in a joint session and developed
"Emergency Measures in Defense of the Balance of Payments." Those measures came
12 William R. Clinι and 타1꺼que De멘ado. Economic In앤얀rntion in Centrnl Am퍼CD. Wa싸in밑on. The Bmoldngs
Institution. 1978. page 32π'. Also sec Roger D. Hansen. 매. cit.. and James D. Cochrnne‘ 0 Jl. cit..
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to be known as the San Jose Protocal and were intended as an interim solution to a long
range problem.
The Protocol was widely seen as an important tum toward more serious regional
cooperation to solve national problems. But some observers suggested that the revenue
problems being encountered in the individual nations could more easily have been
solved by raising income taxes, tightening up on fiscal incentives for industry, levying
property taxes and similar internal measures. Seen from this perspective, the San Jose
Protocol app않rs to represent the desire to avoid the domestic political consequences of
d않ling with national problems by forcing the problems into the regional level.
In the final analysis the ’tecnicos’ who assembled the protocol, in a now
familiar mode, endeavored to avoid political costs to the member countries. National
executives were given the authority to grant exemptioms from the third country import
tax to firms in industries of partie비ar importance to the economic development of the
region and to firms which would suffer greatly from its application. Also, the
consumption tax on luxury items was to be optional and the national customs agencies
were to be responsible for the administration of the taxes. One writer commented that
the measures were traditional responses to fiscal and balance of payments problems.
They were responses which required no change in economic structures nor did they
r여uire any surrender of national authority.13
Enrique Delgado of the Integration Treaty Secretariat describes the seventeenth
mee디ng of the Economic Council of the Treaty earlier in 1969 as one which adopt잉
resolutions which "were perhaps the most comprehensive attempts made to date to find
an answer to the increasing pro비ems of integration. It was within this spirit of joint
13 Royc.: Q. Shaw, C.:n1nll AIll.:rica: R.:‘lionallnt닙l!ralion and Nalional Polilical Dι깨ιInom.:nt ‘ Bouldιr. Colorado.
Westview Press. 1978. page 90.
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effort that the solutions to the overall problems posed appeared to be imminent when on
.14July 14, 1969 armed conflict broke out between (Honduras and EI Salvador). ’
The ensuing p이i다따1 and economic disruption was all but fatal to the Common
Market in Central America. Honduras disallowed Salvadorean use of the Pan
American Highway through Honduras, effectively cutting the region gξographically in
half. As Delgado put it in 1978, Central Americans" ...have waited anxiously for
resumption of full relations (between the two countries) ," but it was not until ate 1980
that a peace treaty was sign잉. The borders were reopened and the two countries
finally committed themselves to a reactivation of the Common Market. 15
In the meantime the news sources reported meeting after meeting of the
Economic Ministers in attempt to negotiate agreements and reorganizations of the
Common Market. In December 1969, Facts on File reported an agreement of the five
minis얻rs to "continue trying to rebuild the Central American Common Market...".
That meeting had ended with agreement by the Normalizing Commission on a
"temporary ’Modus Operandi II’ which was to apply until the confict between Honduras
16and EI Salvador was settled.!U The 'Modus Operandi' failed almost immediately when
Honduras set new unilteral tariffs with the other CACM nations.
Through the 1970’s more problems emerged. Costa Rica. for example,
withdrew from the Automatic Payments System due to its large international debt.
Ultimately a short-range solution - a devaluation - was agreed upon by the other four
members of the Common Market. Similar problems were encountered and dispensed
with by means of short-term, patchwork responses. The responses appeared to address
14 William R. Cline and Enrique Delgad메. Economic Intel!ration in Central America‘ Wa찌lin‘;ton. 까le Brookings
Institution, 1978, page 4 \.
15 Kccsinl!‘ Renort. January 31 ‘ 198\.
16턴땀파Fi le. December 31. 1970.
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the immediate problem but invariably avoided the clear need for structural adjustments
in the r，ε:gion외 economy. Indeed, not unlike the pattern with the international
economic system as a whole, the Common Market underwent one short-term solution
after another as the Economic Ministers continued to meet to seek I’normalization" and
"temporary arrangements. "
An important characteristic of the history of post-World War II Central America
is the firm stability of two key institutions in the region. The first, the strictly national
basis for p이itic머 decisions has stood unscathed and, the second, the national governing
elites (with the temporary exception of Nicaragua) have maintained a tight control on
the governments in spite of pressure to expand access to the political and economic
resources.
Royce Q. Shaw, writing on the p이itics of the region in 1978, pointed out that:
The traditional pattern of elite socialization in Central America has been
reinforced by the successful cooptation of the two recent marginal elites
toemε:rge in the post-war era, the industrialists and the 'tecnicos'. Like
the agricultural exporters who preceded them, (in the latter 19th and
않rly20th centuries) the industrialists and the 'tecnicos’ used external
assistance as a source of power wi띠.}Vhich they co비d bargain for a
position in the political hierarchy."l f
One ofthe ’tecnicos ’, Eduardo Lizano of Costa Rica wrote in 1975 of the built-in
problems with the Central American Common Market. Central America, he says, is
notably lacking in regional institutions,and yet, unlike the case of the European
Economic Community, there was no provision for gradual institutional changes toward
an effective supranational organization. This readily coincides with the points made by
others regarding the role of the political elite. Clearly there was no intention on the
P따t of the elite in those countries to relinquish any aspect of their control to a
17 Royce Q. Show. Cenlml Ame꺼co: Rel!ional Inlel!ralion and Nalional Polilical Dev녕Inomenl. Boulder. Colorado.
Westview Press. 1978. page낀8.
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supranation외 agency.18 The centuries-old pattern of local rule in the interests of a
small elite and in the context of foreign domination of the economies, remained
unbroken.
Lizano goes on to describe several groups which originally supported the effort
but "lost faith" in the program. The industrialists, he suggests, exhausted the easy
pickings. The I tecnicos’ quickly gave up their roles as agents of change and became
agents of the status quo. The national bureaucrats who were early supporters found
themselves faced with problems they were not prepared to deal with. And the
intellectuals saw the emergence of increased rather than decreased economic
dependency. They turned against the CACM, then as merely another opportunity for
international capitalism to dominate the underdeveloped countries. In conclusion he
states that "Political power in 않ch country tends to be vested in a relatively small
group of persons who rule in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of a
broad electorate. ,, 19 In view of that, he concludes, real integration depends on social
and political change in 않ch member country.
It is not difficult to conclude that the leadership in Central America had neither
the capacity nor the desire to cause change in the economic realm. The effort was
focused on growth without the structural transformation which was clea꺼y intend려 in
the ECLA plan.
The recent history of economic p이icy for the region is shown in Figure 5-1.
Though specific policy decisions differed among the five Central American nations,
both the character and the political ambience for the decisions were sufficiently
18 Edua며o Liznno and L. N. Wilmon:. "So:cond까loughL~ on Co:ntral America: Tho: Rosenthal RO:Jl0rt". 밀괴핀파.m
Common Market Studio:s. Vol. 13. Number 3‘ 1975.
19 0aη W. Wynia. Politics and Plnnnιrs: Economic ~vo:lonmo:nt Poliιv inC잉1lI"， 1 Ame꺼ea. Mndillon. Univo:rsity of
Wisconsin Pn:ss. 1972. page 306.
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consistent that it is appropriate to treat them as a unit. All five nations have been
primary goods exporters since the colonial period.
The dominant policy of simple economic growth through expansion of
agricultural expoπs has been essentially unchanged for centuries. In the twentieth
century, as can be seen in Figure 2, the pursuit of growth through agricultural exports
remained dominant. Economic expansion in the twentieth century took place in the
form of increasing agric비tural output, not through the restructuring of the domestic
economy such as is anticipated in the Kuznetsian process of modern economic growth.
The only effort to undertake development is to be seen in the ECLA-driven
phase of the CACM project. By the time the CACM had been instituted, however, in
the 없rly 1960s, the combination of U.S. dominance and elite disinterest, assured the
the plan was stripped of any capacity to promote change.
The import substitution plan was squelched at U.S. insistence in 1959. That
limited the potenti외 for internal management of the Central American economies. An
important step in the development process which was pursu려 by the ENICs was
disallowed the p이icymakers in Central America. The U.S. and Central American elite
insistence on unfettered free trade in the region, meant a continuation of unlimited
foreign involvement in the five economies. The nominal ’import substitution I phase,
coinciding with the existence of the Central American Common Market, was used as an
opportunity for private plunder rather than as an opportunity to strengthen the national
economies. P이icy took the form of encouraging investment for any purpose, from any
source, not of developing productive capacity in the domestic economies themselves.
Specifically, the maintenance of a profitable environment for investment
involved permanently low interest rates, permanently overvalued currencies and
permanent repression of labor. These became not so much policies, then, but
exploitative devices. The failure to develop under these circumstances app않rs to be as
much a function of weak governments faced with foreign domination as of lack of
intention on the p따t of the Central American governments.
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POLICY EVOLUTION DURING THE PERIOD OF GROWTH AND DECLINE
1900 P꺼ma~ Export-Led Growth - Focused exclusiv리yon
to coffee and bananas asurefavcetnUuI·e잉foarngdolvuexrunrmyent1950 and for import of manufactured and luxury goods.
1951 Expanded Prima~ Export-Led Growth -Diversification
to o없f1dagbreiemfl1atusrwa1e1e1xapsocrtosffto%inacnldudbea cotton, sugar1959 as coffee and bananas.
1960 Grafting of Regional Import Substitution through
1961 the CentraLAmerican Common Market to Primary
1962 Exp빡---:UROl4evJ파seeπc딛pt외irr띄oceungsEasIonOuUfmnnre.zthUfeo꺼imfrU1외eplNpolpu-rcoEtmlliCs ncumLyebAansit rciks1ctecueosthtri,paowmonmaeytbebldor: gplrmow1nt벼h19631964
1965
1966
1967 -Low interest rates.
1968
-----PFSVGemulIloasgahIdeugtfnlao외vit1lra，rIwe@￠IrpneicrttagheheUldmnsoosmonanilowaloinlgolfaynobfa-nfyhi1mflaanfsebnaa.ndotirsokave]dnestar,gcmRamspaoonlnumadrt야ms1C.ilSAmI.어pCoMrt-s196919701971
1972
1973
1974 Disintegration of Central American Common Market.
1975
--FNrae6eotnIpfia띠nb더drvgpmeeoszmχhtotmcyneimeegensx외t，pailonndmorniatpansIt-hklrngaeiggssti,r‘onuinoEcandtlu-urn∞ce때m&oipIUleeoodunfudaco!a’ntion19761977
1978
1979
1980 -Increased U.S. support of "stability" of CANs.
1981 Qfficial demise of Central American Common Market.
1982
1983
1984
1985 ---SNAhbaltahinodhnda∞oa1in1ms∞nmp 6이mIauntirugnCatsilglooetd엉efsnIratnogpoIIfkrlt1mof-e1κwnaefrxcaikdldgnbeivevrtIgteef’sd야sttlmtxSrfucCuoeshicrnpeacttllniolmglmgnmnees잉pl,r-nlasvuttece벼sas，ttimoent，
1986
1987 donment of token investment in education
1988
hg1mS:pS.SrI이SOUne야cogmfnm’ulfndoRrmS·tas’a.lbiIill6itaysImmum-1989 -Increased U.
1990 -Violent repres
핀웰댄요. Policy Record for the Central American Nations.
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AFTER THE ILLUSION
Victor Bulmer Thomas describes the early period of CACM as "the illusion of a
golden age." "By conventional measures of economic progress the decade of the 1960s
was a golden age for Central America. The rl않lity of the decade was somewhat
different. ,,20 A substantial p따t of the problem, says Torres-Rivas, was the failure to
create internal demand. "The only sector of the pop비ation which created a demand for
industrial goods was a small minority of people closely linked to foreign capital who
received a p따t of its benefits. At the other end of the scale was an over-abundant labor
force with wage levels so low as to seriously inhibit the formation of an internal
.21market. In this case the 'wage earner' was not a con
What industrialization there was took place according to an ’import substitution
model ’ which focused production on consumer goods for immediate consumptiom. It
did so by substituting some imports for others without reducing the overall import
coefficient. The permanent Secretariat for the CACM (SIECA) published import
figures for 1970 for the five nations which showed the total imports of capital goods at
95 to 98.6% from outside the CACM for the five nations. The imports of raw
materials ranged between 75 and 80%.22
As Torres-Rivas describes it, industrial activity was built around "the processing
of local raw materials or the finishing of consumer goods partially processed abroad -
all with imported caital." Foreign controlleft little opportunity for the assimilation of
20 Victor Bulmer-Thomas.끼Ie Political Economv of Central America Since 1920‘ Cambridge‘ Cambridge Universi‘Y
Press, 1987, page 175.
21 Edelberto Torres쩌vas， π'he Central American Model ofGrowth: C꺼sis for Whom". Latin American Persnectives,
Vol. vn, 1980, pa명e 28.
22 Victor Bulmer-Thomas. The Political 타onomy of Central America Since 1920. Cambridge. Cambridge University
Pπss. 1987, page 193.
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new technologies or for local entrepreneural engagement. The local role tended to be
reduced to that of adminis다ator for foreign capital.23
The result of the decisions made regarding the growth model in the late 1950’s
and 없rly 1960’s was the dramatic increase in foreign investment on one hand and
persistence of a high import coefficient on the other, says Torres-Rivas. And that
accounts as well for another of the problems resulting from the growth effort, the
crippling size of the foreign debt.
The Central American Common Market effort has been criticised for many
specific failures. Bulmer-Thomas cites "the unbalanced way that benefits were
distributed to member countries, the unm때aged penetration by multinational
comp없lies ， the poor employment record and ," most importantly , "the failure to break
the dominance of traditional exports and of the agro-export model. ,,24 What he does
not mention in that article, though many other commentators do, is the observation that
any ’growth ’ pr，이ect which ignored the internal market was not likely to succeed over
time. As Torres-Rivas stated it, "We all know that the market is composed of solvent
consumers, not ci디zens. Of eighteen million of the latter only two million have the
option of participating in the market" .25
23 Edelberto Torres-Rivas‘ ’The Central American Model ofGrowth: Crisis for Whom"‘ Latin American Persnectives-
Vol. VD, 1980, page 30.
24 viκtorBulmer Thomas, "The Economic잉 ofCentral America"‘ Latin American Research Review, Vol. XXIII,
Number 3, 1988. page 156.
25 Edelberto Torres-Rivas,η"he Central American Model of Growth: Crisis for Whom", Latin American Persnectives,
Vol. VD, 1980,page 43.
CHAPTER VII
TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA: THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD
THE HISTORICAL BASIS
In a recent article on the development history of Taiwan and South Korea, as
well as Japan, Paul Kuznets suggests several noneconomic characteristics of the ENICs
πaiwan and South Korea) which underlie the post-World War II LDC development
experience. Both are characterized by ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, relatively
compact geography, subs떠nti외 but manageable pop비ation size, and a Confucian
σadi디on. 1 There are other comparable aspects. Both countries have a history of
colonial occupation, the most recent, pre-World War n, period of which involved the
Japanese. Both were 외so relatively agriculturally dominated until shortly after World
War II and neither are particularly well endowed with natural resources.
The legacy of Japanese occupation is often cited as an important basis for
development from underdeveloped status for the two nations. On the other hand, such
comments are usually accompanied by cautions that the occupation left the two
countries with the typical colonial legacy of disruption and dependency. L.L. Wade
and B.S. Kim describe the legacy in Korea. "The nation ’s human resources had been
left undeveloped by the Japanese and the interconnected industry and infrastructure
built during Japanese rule - 외ways oriented toward Japanese rule in 때y case - was
severed by the p따tition of the nation at the 38th parallel when the United States and the
1 P매I W. Kuznets. 깐be EaSI Asian ModιI of Economic Developmenl: Japan. Taiwan and South Korea· ‘ 흠으ill!핀1£
Develo/lment and Cullural Chanl!e. Vol. 36. Number 3. April 1988. page 535.
--‘’
!l
‘
’
.,‘
new Soviet Union were unable to agree on the basis for a new Korean p이ity following
the Second World War".2
The disruption of the trade with Japan and the inexperience in p이itical and
economic leadership are described as important obstacles for South Korea, contributing
to the "pervasive distress of the (immediate post-World War) period". Some economic
progress was made, however, "only to be largely destroyed during the Korean war of
1950-53". Through the 1950s South Korea’s was seen by writers as one of the lesser
promising underdeveloped economies on the global scene. Larry Westphal, writing in
1990 states that "Observers of the Korean economy in the late 1950s did not expect it
to become one of the world ’s most dynamic. Quite the contrary, it was considered
something of a basket case. ,,3
In the case of Taiwan the investment and resource flows are said to have been
typi따I of a colonized country. The colony supplied Japan with primary products,
P하디C띠arly sugar and 찌ce ， and Japan supplied the colony with manufactured consumer
goods. According to one study, "Until the Second World War altered Japanese
priorities, there was little encouragement of domestic industry beyond the processing of
ag더cultural goods for export and the construction and operation of utilities required to
support this processing. ,,4
As with South Korea, both the Second World War and the succeeding several
y않rs brought considerable destruction to Taiwan. The island was subjected to heavy
American bombing during the war. The bombing is described as having destroyed
2 L.L. Wade and B.S. Kim. Economic Develonmιnl of South Korea. New York. Praeger Puhlish앙rs. 1978. pagdO.
3 Lanγ E. Wesψhal‘ ·lndu~tri미 Policy in an Export-PropιIIιd Economy: Lι‘sons from South Korea' s Experience·.
Journal of Economic Peκl\ectives. Vol. 4. Number 3. Sununer. 1990. page 42.
4 John C.H. Fei. Gustav Ranis and Shirh:y W.Y. Kuo. Orowth with EQuitv: The Taiwan Ca잎. New York. Oxford
University Press. published for The World Bank‘ 1979. page 22.
112
"three-qu따ters of the industrial capacity, two-thirds of power, and one half of the
transport network. ,,5
At the same time, of course, the Japanese evacuation of the island left it without
the administrative and economic leadership of the preceding fifty years. The external
economic connections were also severed. Previously dependent on Japan for its
external markets, the newly liberated island found itself attached to the Chinese
mainland.
This did not represent improvement in the fortunes of the island. Although
Taiwan was not directly involved in the Chinese civil war, the Nationalist regime, the
Kuo Min Tang (KMT) , which was eventually to seek asylum there, used the island as a
source for resources. Both factories and raw materials were gathered and shipped to
the mainland to be used in the battle with the Communist forces. Calvin Clark
describes the post-World War II production level in Taiwan (depending upon the
P따다C비ar product) to range betw않n 25% and 50% of pre-World War II levels. The
production of sugar was reported to have been 6% of the pre-war level in a 1973
study.6
As with Korea, Taiwan entered the 1950s as a less than impressive prospect for
economic development. Taiwan is described as facing 퍼 rather bleak situation at the
time of the R.O.C. ’s evacuation to the island in 1949.7 In spite of the unlikely
prospects, however, something of a base had been laid by the Japanese colonizers, and
in the case of Taiwan the evacuation from the mainland brought substantial advantages.
5 Gustav Ranis‘ "Industrial Development". in Wallcr Galenson. cd .. Economic Growth and Slnlctllrnl Chan!!c in
Taiwan: ’The Po치war Expcrience of th‘ Renllhlic of China. Ithaca New York. Cornell Univen;it)· Press. 1979. page 209.
6 Cal Clark. Taiwan's Development: Imnlications for Contcndinl! Political Economv Parndi l!Dls. New York.
Greenwood Press, 1989‘ page 61. 끼le 1973 study iε An삐lony Y.C. Koo. "Economic Dιvelopmcnt ofTaiwan". in Paul Kπ. Sih.
ed.,Taiwan in Modem Times. New York. St John's University Press. 1973. page 402.
7 Cal Clark‘ op. cit.. page 75.
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Among the KMT leadership were "skilled administrators and entrepreneurs who could
fill the void left by Japanese exclusion of the Taiwanese from these fields. The party,
in addition, was based on a strongly developmenta1ist ideology committed to
nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood.8
FREE MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
Both Taiwan and South Korea started the development process in the 1950s with
prospects that were less than glowing. Yet by the last decade of the century it has
become clear that the effort to transform the economies was not only dramatically
successful, it was done while maintaining a high level of stability, and in the context of
a level of distribution equity which is very high.
In a 1979 study Fei, Ranis and Kuo described income equality in Taiwan as
among the highest in the world with Gini coefficients of .289 before taxes and .285
after taxes.9 A comparable study in South Korea found the Gini coefficient for 1970 to
10be .332, and .389 for 1980. IV Though the numbers for Korea are higher than those
for Taiwan - therefore the distribution equity is not as high - they still place South
Korea among the high equity nations in the world. 11
Both countries have been the subject of a number of studies geared to the
evaluation of government involvement in the development process. In both casεs
government played a substantial role in the process but the methods of development
8 Cal Clark. Ofl. cit.. f1age 76.
9 John C.H. Fei. Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo. Ofl. cit .. ’Thc Gini coefficients. from a 1978 study. are cited in
Shirley W.Y. Kuo‘ Gustav Ranis and John C.H. Fei.까1e Taiwan Success Story. Boulder. Westviιw Press. 1981. f1age 140.
10 Hagen Koo. η'he P이itical Economy of Income Distribution in South Ko야a: 까1': Imflact of the State ’“
Industrialization policies·‘ World Development‘ Vol. 12. October. 1984. f1age 1030.
II The. Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve (the f1loned distribution line) and the f1erfect
distribution line. to the area below the Lorenz curve.
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support differed substan디ally between the two. It is generally recognized that the fact
that both were successful in the endeavor suggests that the source of the success is to be
12found in something other than the speci히c policy decisions made by each country.
The success, in other words, is recognized to be more a function of the dynamic
intervention and management of the developing economies than of any particular
p이icies. Generally, whereas the government of Taiwan has tend려 toward a guiding
and supportive type of function , the South Korean government has been collaborative
and even coercive in its relationship with the private sector.
Both engaged in import substitution type p이ides in the 1950s, and both
switched to managed export-led development p이icies in the next decade. Export-led
development is to be distinguish 잉 from export-led growth primarily in terms of the
policy relationship to comparative advantage. An Export-led growth approach assumes
a static relationship to comparative advantage and recognizes only its present status.
Export-led development, on the other hand, as exempli 잠ed by Taiwan and South
Korea, recognizes comparative advantage as a dynamic phenomenon. In this approach
the present state of the economy provides the resources which are to be managed in
order to build a technically and organizationally more complex level of comparative
advantage. This is represented in the stages of p이icyev이ution since the 1950s in the
two ENICs as shown in Figure 6-1 at the end of this chapter.
It is clear that regardless of how politically and economically stormy the initial
phase was for both countries, it provided the necess따y foundation in both cases for the
expoπ-led phase which followed. In the case of South Korea, policymaking in the
1950s was a function of the apparent inability of the economy to generate ad여uate
12 Some ofthe studie인nclude Pa비 W. Kuznllts. op. cit.: L.L. Wade and B.S. Kim. op. cit.: Larry E. W원Iphal.op.
cit.; Larry E. We잉phal‘ op. cit.; Gustav Ranis. op. cit.: Hagen κ00. op. cit.: John C.H. Fei. Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y.
κ，uo， op. cit.; and H. Pack and L.E. Westph미. ·Industrial Strategy and Tllcbnological Change: Th패ry VerSUI‘Reality· ‘ 핀잉므띄
of Development Realitv,Vol.!!‘ 1986‘ P앨es 87-128.
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levels of exports and savings. Because the economy was expected to remain in a
dependent status for the foreseeable future, policymakers tended to reinforce that status.
They saw their function as the management of imports together with the solicitation of
foreign aid to balance against the imports.
These concerns in Korea were consistent with the former colonial function of
the economy, but they were 외so consistent with the import substitution phase of the
dev밍opment effort, which, with the correct p이icy mix, was geared to building the
internal economy. Foreign trade per se was discouraged through p이icies of currency
overvaluation, high tariffs and quantitative import restrictions. Each of these p이icies
were geared to encourage import substitution and discouraged exportation.
Pack and Wesφhal describe the period of the 1950s as one in which the
industrial base grew at a respecta비e rate due to the import substitution encouraged
investments in light manufactured and non-durable goods. Even more importantly,
they suggest, the "human capital stock was greatly augmented through m매or programs
that instituted universal primary education and achieved nearly universal ad비t
,13 T~"" ;_".:....;~_" ~+ ~:literacy. ’ The institutions of higher education were also expanded and large
numbers of students were trained abroad in technical specialties. It is clear that by the
time of the p이icy shifts to export-led development in the early 1960s, South Korea had
created a comparatively strong industrial base of both physical and human capital.
In Taiwan, as well, the 1950s were a period of early transition toward
industrialization. Fei , Ranis and Kuo describe the period as one characterized by the
diversion of traditional export proceeds away from expansion of the colonial enclave
and toward investment intended to replace previously imported industrial consumer
goods by domestically producf펴 consumer goods. As with Korea, they undertook
13 H. Pack and L.E. Westphal‘ "Industrial Stmt얻y and T，ιchnol앤ieal Chan얀: 끼싸nη Ven;u‘ Reality'’·꾀띤과파
Development Reality. Vol. 22. 1986. Jl떼ge 92.
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classic import substitution. But, 외so as with Korea, what is important to the question
of transition toward modern economic growth is that the allocation of the resources was
intentionally redirected in keeping with the perception of comparative advantage for the
nation.
In keeping with the policy decisions in Korea, the Taiwanese opted to invest
heavily in the population of the nation as the basis for the development effort. K.T. Li
describes the agricultural, human resources and manpower policies of the 1950s as key
14to the later success of the transition. 1... Much of the human resources and manpower
efforts of the 1950s was focused on education. The success in that realm can be seen in
the data described in chapter 9 of this study. By 1960 slightly over 95 % of school aged
children were enrolled in primary schools and 43 % of the high school graduates were
enrolled in schools of higher education. 15
Superficially the 없rly policy measures in Taiwan were typical of an import
substitution effort. Overvalued exchange rates, import restrictions and deficit
government financing were 외I used. But as Fei, Ranis and Kuo point out, "Close
examination reveals substantial differences from the classic (p이icy mix)'’ 16
Agriculture received, for example, supportive attentiQn during the period in the form of
m며or land reform and investment allocated to rural infrastructure. As a result of the
attention, the terms of trade for the agricultural sector dropped very little by the end of
the 1950s from the figures established in 1952. Interest rates as well were kept much
higher than is typic외 for an import substitution effort. As a result, savings were
14K.T. Li. The Evolution of Policy hιhind Taiwan’s Develonmenl Succe앉. New Hav‘1Il. Yal‘: University Press. 1988.
page lOS.
IS Taiwan Statistical Data Book. Republic Of China. Council for Economic Planning and Dιvιlop…ent. 1990. Table
14-8, page 286.
16 John C.H. Pei. Gustav Ranis and Shirlιy W.Y. Kuo. op. cit.. page 27.
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encouraged at a much higher rate than is typical and, it is claimed, resource aIlocation
was more appropriate to the later phases of the transition.
The success of the early phase in Taiwan is dramaticaIIy iIIustrated in the data
ofthε period. Through 1961 , despite pop비a디on growth the real per capita income
incrl앓sed at nearly 3%per y잃r， nonagricultural output increased at 8.7%per y않r，
agricultural output increased at 5.5% and savings stay잉 in the 10% range. The
industrial policy was g않red to what was understood to be an important comparative
advantage in Taiwan, the creation of labor intensive industη. And foreign capital,
especially U.S. aid, was rigorously devoted to the purchase of overhead capital and
industrial producer goods.
That a program like that of either Taiwan or South Korea differs considerably
from that which characterized the Central American countries can be dramaticaIIy
illustrated in the income distribution data mentioned in the previous section of this
chapter. The data show the Gini coefficient for income distribution in both countries to
be improving rapidly during the first decade of the development effort. For Taiwan, in
1953 the coefficient was calculated to be over .55. By 1959 the figure had dropped to
.44, and by 1964 it was approximately .32. 17
In both of the Eastern Newly Industrializing countries (ENICs) the tum toward
export-led development occurr태 in the early 1960s. The methods used in each case,
however, provide a lesson in contrasts. During the import substitution phase the
Korean government began intervening directly in the allocation of resources. A
substanti외 bureaucracy was created for the purpose. It controls the means for plan
implementation, including industrial targets, market protection and loan guarantees,
even issuing permits of entry for many industries.
17 John C.H. Fei. Gus때v RllOis Dnd Shirley W.Y. Kuo. op. cit., pagι 35.
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Taiwan, on the other hand, uses an indicative planning approach which takes the
form of macroeconomic targets and sectoral investment plans. Planners have little
direct authority and limit잉 access to the policy instruments. Unlike South Korea, in
Taiwan there is little linkage between the private realm of the economy and the
economic planners. The Taiwanese government expects to encourage p꺼vate activities
in its policy interventions, confining direct interventions to the provision of soci외 and
physi때1 infrastructure, for example.
In a paper presented at a recent American Economic Association conference,
Yung Chul Park evaluates the two approaches to development as models for other
18national development projects. 10 He is critical of both efforts from the point of view
of their inflexibility as new challenges appeared. Any such new development effort
continuously creates new challenges as it proc않ds through the transition process. At
the 잃me time it is necessary to respond to the global economic and political challenges
which emerge over time. Park observes that while both efforts were clearly successful
in the long run, one of the lessons to be learned from the endeavors is the need for the
governments to be flexible with respect to their roles in the economy as a whole. In
both cases, Park obseπes ， the governments made their largest errors in persis디ng
longer than was desirable in the chosen role with respect to their economies.
Park reports that the leadership in Taiwan were convinced that the concentration
of resources on the mainland was one of the reasons for the Nationalists downfal l.
Therefore they were motivated to avoid such concentration on Taiwan. Regardless of
the explana디on ， the Taiwanese leadership promoted an indirect role for government in
the economy with the effort in the private sector focused on development of a large
number of small and medium size firms. As recently as 1986 the data shows that 98%
18 Yung Ch비 Park. "D.:velopnl.:nt Lc:센ons fnlnl A서a: 까1e Rol.: of Gov.:mm.:nt in Suuth KμNU and Taiwan".댄E
American Economic Review - Pallen; and Pmc‘:.:dinl!s. Vo1. 80. NUll내hιr 2. May 1990. pa댄서 18-122.
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ofTaiwan’s firms employed fewer than 300 p∞pIe， and 48 % employed no more than 5
workers.
This approach creatl잉 a resilience in the economy of Taiwan which goes a long
way toward accounting for the ability to weather external shocks which show much
more clearly in the aggregate data for South Korea, for example, than in that of
Taiwan. The economic leadership in Taiwan promoted a high rate of savings
throughout the transition effort, they took a conservative position with respect to fiscal
and mone띠ry policy and they generated ongoing trade surpluses from the time of the
shift to the export focus on policy.
Park felt that the role-related problem for the Taiwanese emerged in the 1970s
when the development intentions shifted toward large scale, technology intensive export
production. At that time "Entrepreneurs were unable and unwilling to make large
capital investments with a long gestation period. Neither did the government have an
industrial p이icy regime capable of planning and implementing an import substitution
plan (for large capital and intermediate goods) as ambitious as Korea ’s." 19
Others feel that such concerns about the Taiwanese development efforts
represent much ado about very little. Jan Hogendorn wrote respectfl비ly of both the
South Korean and the Taiwanese development efforts, saying that "By and large
Taiwan made even fewer mistakes than South Korea. ,,20 Specifically, with respect to
the encouragement of large capital investment, Hogendorn states that it is hard to argue
with the record which shows manufactured goods exports increasing at "just under 30%
per y않r from 1965 to 1981 and 21 % even in the t slow ’ year, 1984." The ratio of total
exports to GNP in the mid 1980s was approximately 55% , "the highest figure in the
19 Yung Chul Park. op. cit.• page 120.
20 Jan S. Hogendom. Economic Development. New York. Harrer and Row. 1987. pa!!.: 58 and 59.
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world among LDCs of any size, and of these (exports) , about 40% are now heavy
.21industrial goods. ’
The role-related problem which Park, a professor of economics at Korean
University in Seoul, has with the South Korean approach to development is probably
more convincing. Ceπainly the costs are more obvious. Unlike in Taiwan, the
p이icymakers were faced with an 따Tay of structural and institutional problems as the
shift to export expansion was taking place in the 1960s. Foreign lending became
increasingly important in South Korea, rather than less so as it had for Taiwan at the
similar point of policy shift. A low savings rate and chronic current account deficits
made Korean government guarenteed foreign loans necessary.
At the same time, a perceived shortage of administrators and entrepreneurs led
government decisionmakers toward centralization of national economic administration
and toward industrial concentration. The decisions to concentrate on "increasing
returns technologies...forced the government to support a few, selected large producers
in targeted industries. ,,22 Both domestic and foreign savings were channeled to the
resultant large firms through the banking system. The government assumed something
of the role of a p따tnership with these firms, which came to d0!TIinate the
manufacturing sector.
Park feεIs that 외though the government support was necessary during the 없rly
period of export development, the government intervention was not. The
interventionist role I잉 the government to establish a large import substitution program
for capital and technology intensive products in the 1970s. This was a time, Park
suggests, when deregulation of the controlled sectors should have taken place. Instead,
the South Korean Policymakers chose to tighten the grip on manufacturing industries
21 Jan S. Hogendom. 01'. cit..
22 Yung Chul ParI:‘ op. cit.‘ I’age 118.
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and financial intermediaries. Besides causing a worsening of the distribution 여uity
mentioned above, the Gini coefficient increased from .332 in 1970 to .389 in 1980, the
government had become responsible for the failures as well as the successes of the
industrial endeavors.
The resultant excessive risk taking on a large scale, and the low export earnings
and heavy losses which follow잉， Park obseπes ， was a function of the policymakers
inability to back away from the controlled sectors, allowing decisionmaking to take
place on a more realistic global basis. Though some trade and financial liberalization
took place in the 1980s Park describes the p이icy regime in South. Korea as decidedly
based on "development mercantilism". The government has still not been able to
extricate itself from its tightly bound relationship with the industrial groups.
Though the manner of government involvement in the two transitioning
economies were dramatically different, there is little doubt that the government
contribution to rapid industrialization was substantial. Pack and Westphal conclude in
their extensive 1986 study that 치narket forces alone are not responsible for the
purported ’market successes' of the East Asian NICs’1.23 The authors cite a comment
by Tibor Scitovsky which neatly summarizes a key argument for them, and also sheds
considerable light on the role of government in the development process. Scitovsky
states that "Market prices...reflect the economic situation as it is and not as it will be.
For this reason they are more useful for coordinating current production
decisions than they are for coordinating investment decisions, which ...should be
governed by what the future economic situation is expected to be. In underdeveloped
countries.. .investment is likely to have a greater impact on prices, give rise to greater
23 H. Pack and L.E. Wcstl'h미.01'. cit.‘ pall': 87.
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pecuni따y external economies, and thus cause a greater divergence between private
,24profit and soci외 benefit.'
For Pack and Westfall the important duality is not so much between the
production and the investment decisions as suggested by Scitovsky, however, it is
between "investments in established industries where there is a static comparative
advantage and investments in infant industries where there is potenti외 for a
dynamic...comparative advantage. ,,25 To a considerable extent it is this function of
guided investment which initially dis디nguishes between the growth efforts of the
Central American nations and the development efforts of Taiwan and South Korea.
Many others who have studied the development of the ENICs have arrived at
comparable conclusions. Paul Kuznets observed that "This emphasis on ’growth' φy
the government) means that dynamic rather than static considerations are paramount,
and dynamic efficiency is a topic about which the traditional neoclassical market
paradigm has surprisingly little to say. ,,26 Pack as well states that though he has some
doubts about the efficiency of the government intervention by both Taiwan and South
Korea since the mid-1970s, it is unlikely that the private sector could have
accomplished the earlier efforts without the government involvement. Figure 3, below,
represents the history of the p이icy development for the two nations.
Both nations combined import substitution in the early years with an export focus
following the development of the internal economies. While Taiwan used an indica디ve
planning approach with little institutionallinkage of the government and the p더vate
24 Tibor Scitovsky, "Two Concepts of External Econo내niese ， in A.N. Agarwala and S.P. Singh. eds..뀌1e Economics
of Underdevelopment. New York. 0야fo벼 University Press. 1963‘ pages 305 and 306. This anicl~ was reprinted by Agarwala
and Singh from the AI'꺼I. 1954 issue ofπ1e Journal of Polilical Economv‘ University of Chicago.
2s H. Pack and L.E. Westphal, 01'. cit.. page 125.
26 P.때I W. Kuznets, 01'. cit.. page S37.
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economy, the Korean government inteπen혀 directly into the private economy through
what became a substantial policy bureaucracy.
Both nations followed approximately the same broad pattern of p이icy.
The first, generally between 1950뻐d 1960, was the period of internal focus,
the import substitution phase. During this early transition phase Both nations had a
labor surplus, resource poor, and open, dualistic economies with a colonial heritage.
As will be seen in the data presented in chapter 8, labor was employed mainly in
agriculture, a substantial part of which was exported. The resulting foreign exchange,
then, was used to import manufactured consumer goods. A substantial part of the
income which was generated through agricultural production was paid to labor and
land, 없ld it constituted the purchasing power available in the domestic market for
consumption.
The ini다외 phase development effort was focused on developing the economy
internally both in terms of capacity to manufacture a significant paπ of the imported
goods and in terms of the purchasing power n않essary to support that capacity. A
priority was put on the latter goal , the development of national purchasing power, a
goal which was not present in Central America during the post-World War II period.
This is a critical distinction which aligns the efforts in Taiwna and South Korea with
the res않rch and conclusions by Kuznets, and separates the efforts made by the CANs
from the same conclusions.
The second phase, from 1960 to roughly 1980, was the period of external
orientation, where the intent was to focus the economy on export markets. This phase
was focused on generating industries which were capable of producing manufactured
goods which were competitive in world markets. It was during this phase that labor
intensive exports from the industrial sector were added to the agricultural exports. This
was possible because during the 않rlier phase, the capacity, in terms of the industrial
124
capital base, the expertise and the industriallabor was created. Li, Ranis and Fei refer
to this phase in Taiwan as the혈쁘다 substitution phase "because the comparative
advantage of the country has (been) shifted from expoπs based on (Taiwan ’s limited)
natural resources to exports based on labor. ,,27
The most recent phase, since 1980, is referred to by Ranis and Li as the
technology oriented phase in Taiwan. It is clearly a continuation of the external
orientation phase in one sense, but it also represents the maturation of that phase.
During the 1970s both the policymakers and the entrepreneurs promoted the constant
increase in both the quality and the sophistication of products made in the country. The
fact that Taiwan came to be identified with technological competence was entirely by
intent on the part of policymakers. It is also in keeping with the basic tenet of Kuznets ’
conclusions, the emphasis on the development of knowledge and science as a critical
element of modern. economic growth.
The latter phase has been described as the technology sensitive one which
marked the point where the economy was nearing the end of the "transition growth"
(development) period. This is the phase at which the economy began to actually move
into modern. economic growth. It was during this phase that further development began
’ ,, 28to be "marked by routinized reliance on science and technology. ""'-0 The latter phase of
the process, the techn이ogy oriented phase, represents the conscious achievement of
what is referred to in Kuznets' terms as the basic innovation in the modern growth
epoch, the conscious, sustained and institutionalized application of science-fed
technology to industrial production.
27 K. T. Li.Thll Ev"hnilln ‘"f P"licv B‘:hind 1퍼iwon's DllvlllllJlO1llnl S‘l매C~8S.Nιw Hovlln‘ Yolι Univικity Press.
1988, page 36.
28 GuslaV Ranis. 안be Evo삐lion "f Policy in a Compariliw P，ιrspllcliw". in K. T. Li. 꺼III Evolulilln ‘’fPlllicv Bιhind
Taiwan’s Develollmenl Success. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1988. page 10.
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POLICY EVOLUTION DURING THE DEVELOPMENT PERIOD
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TAIWAN
P꺼marv Imnort Substitution
Labor Surolus Period
Comparative Advantage in
Primary Exports
-low interest rates
-overvalued currency
-high tariffs
-investment in education
-foreign 외d solicited
Primarv Exnort Substitution
Labor Surolus Period
Comparative Advantage in
Labor Intensive Exports
-tax syst replace tariffs
-market value currency
-educ for skilled wkforce
-some reduced tariffs
-home mrkt. yet sheltered
-foreign capital solicted
Secondarv Imoort & Exnort
Substitution
Labor Scarcity Period
Comparative Advantage in
skilled labor exports
-price stability sought
-exchng rates undervalued
-market interest rates
-exports increasng in GNP
Focus on Hi e:h-Tech eχDorts
Lab or S않rcity Period
Comparative Advantage in
High-Tech exports
-emphasis on education
in s미ence and technol
-high-tech-firm parks
-emphasis on R&D
-some econ liberalization
SOUTHKOREA
Internal Develonmnt-usin!!
"non-neutral'’ markt oolcv
Import Substitution Focus
-import restrictn/tariffs
and quantative limits
-currencyovervaluation
-universl primary educatn
-large foreign aid inflow
Exoort-Ied Indust꺼alzation
-via "neutral" mrkt nolcv
"Developmnt Mercantilist"
export promotion poley
-markt valu exchang rates
-high real interest rates
-allocation of capital
through governmt banks
-high rates of savings
and investment
-selectv imprt substitutn
-tax reductn for exportrs
-real wages adjusted to
reflect demand/supply
-daily contact with major
exporters by minister
via "export situation
office"
-chaebol conglomerates as
international traders
Some Economic Liberalizatn
Less Direct Intervention
-bank privatization
-interest preferences for
exporters abolished
-interest rates reduced
-internal production of
high-tech inputs
-exporter tax benefits
reduced
Fi웰re 3. The History of Policy in Taiwan and South Korea.
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"THE EAST ASIAN MODEL... ,,29
For Paul Kuznets the "East Asian Model" for development, drawn from the
ε:xperience of Japan, as well as Taiwan and South Korea, is summarized by a list of
seven shared characteristics. They include the high investment ratios, relatively small
public sectors and export expansion which are often discussed by U.S. and Centr외
American neoclassicists as desirable. But they also include attributes which are
typically not mentioned, partie비arly by the Centr;외 Americans. Those are competitive
labor markets, large and efficient investments in human capital, responsible
government intervention into the economy and a well developed capacity to absorb new
30technology.
All of the characteristics distinguished by Pa비 Kuznets in the ’East Asian
Mod리’ are characteristics as well of an economy in transition to modern economic
growth as defined by Simon Kuznets. In his article on the ’East Asian Model ’ Pa띠
Kuznets mentions two other shared characteristics of the East Asian economies. Those
are a high population to land ratio and a paucity of natural resources. He points out
that although those characteristics are more likely to be seen as handicaps, it is entirely
possible that virtue springs from necessity in those cases. "Ample arable land and
abundant natural resources" , he says in the conclusion to the article, 치nainly permit
governments to postpone the difficult decisions needed to promote development (of the
nation as a whole)."
Paradoxically, even that disadvantage was shared by the Central American
n넓ons. Virtue, in the Central American case, did not sp꺼ng from the necessity of
substan디외 pop비a디on and inadequate natural resources. It is entirely possible to
29 Paul W. Kuznets. 깐깨ε East Asian Model of‘ Economic De삐삐nent: Japan. Taiwan and 5‘,lUth KllNa·. 닫띤띤Jl£
Development and Cultural Chanl!e‘ Vol. 36. Number3. Apri11988.
30 P뻐I W. Kuznets. 0 (1. cit.• pages 534 and 535.
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postpone the difficult decisions needed to promote development even without ample
land 뻐d natural resources. As will be seen in chapter nine, the ability to rely
extensively upon external capital and debt also helps to postpone the difficult decisions.
CHAPTER VIn
THE STATISTICS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
THE EASTERN NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
The problems of using national data for comparison are the classic ones,
including differences in data collected, in collection methods, in frequency , in
statistical manipulation before publication and so on. Thus the decision was made to
use data published by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United
Nations.
The indicators which follow in this chapter, are taken from several sources.
Those for South Korea and the CANs were taken from published sources of the
international agencies. They include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
and the United Nations. That data, though it often involved substantial subsequent
calculations and manipulation, is directly consistent with that of the CANs.
The indicators for the Taiwanese economy, on the other hand, are drawn from
very different sources. For the most p따t they are taken from books of data published
by the government of the Republic of China specifically for the purpose of evaluation
of the performance of the economy. The majority of it came from a sizable manual of
data published by the ROC Council for Economic Planning and Development
(CEPD). l Also used was the Industrv of Free China, CEPD, Monthlv Statistics of the
1 Council for Economic Planning and Deyιlopment. Taiwan Stnti~tic미 Dala Bonk - 1990‘ Republic ofChina. 1991.
까lis wasob빼ined through the Chief Economi~1. Economic Diyi~ion. Coordination Council for Nnrth American Aπairs for the
Republic ofChina in Washington DC.
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Reoublic of China, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics and others
which will be noted below.
An important element of a guid잉 development process is the generation,
gathering and publication of the detailed structural data which is necεssary to
dev리opment p이icy. Such data for Taiwan was found to be available in highly dis-
aggregated form , even in the English translations of the data.
Table l-1a (page 1) in the Taiwan Statistical Data Book presents basic
"Indicators of the Taiwan Economy" , including data on the three key sectors.
Subsequent Tables in the Section give further breakdowns of all that presented in l-la.
But the detail goes much fuπher. Section 4 in the same manual, for example, d해S
with the thorough breakdown of data related to agriculture. Section 5 deals similarly
with Industry, Section 7 with Transportation and Communications, and so on through
the book.
As an example it is worth listing the sub-headings in one of those sections, each
of which represent several more pages of breakdown within that sub-heading. Under
Agriculture the sub-headings include the following:
L214
-i67.8.q
“mnηn
Area of Cultivated Land.
Multiple-Cropping Index.
Agricultural Population by Owners and Tenants.
Cultivated L없ld ， Agricultural Cultivation and
Employment.
Agricultural Production.
Area and Output of Principal Crops.
Allocations of Chemi때I Fertilizer.
Chemical Fertilizer AlIocatl해 for Rice Cultivation.
Chemi혜 Fertilizer Used for Sugarcane Cultivation.
Forest Areas and Reserves.
Fores따 Production.
Fisheries Production.
Livestock Production.
Thisp따디C띠ar book of data contains seventeen major headings, including "Science and
Technology" , "Income" , "Education" , "H않1th and Medical Care" and so on. Each of
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those headings represent sub-headings such as those above for Agriculture, and each
sub-heading contains a few pages of further breakdown.
It is not happenstance that the headings in this manual coincide well with the
description of the structural changes necess하y for the Kuznetsian concept of modem
economic growth. Most of the literature of the last decade or so which discusses the
policy decisions since World War II in Taiwan makes mention of the importance of the
Kuznets model.
As was discussed in thε literature review, Kuznets made a strong point of the
need to incorporate science into the development process. Science comes up often in
the discussions and plans of development in Taiwan, and in the Taiwan Statistical Data
뀔으악， the Science and Technology heading breaks down research and development
expenditures by sector, by industry, by type, by fi리d of research , by education of
researchers and on.2 Such data, of course, is necess따Y to the management of the
economy as described in the last chapter regarding the ENICs.
The classic growth indicators, Gross Domestic Product and Gross Domestic
Product per Capita are used in this study because, though they will not distinguish
between economic growth and economic development, they provide a base line which
indicates whether or not the economy as a whole is expanding or contracting. A
contracting economy, of course, is neither growing nor developing. Determining
whether or not an expanding economy is developing requires further indicators which
portray structural elements of the economy and structural change related to those
elements.
2 Sec, for example. K.T. Li‘ Gustav Ranis and John C.H. Fei. The Evolution ofPolicv Behind Taiwan's Develol'lment
S얀뜨짚. New Haven‘ Yale Univeπity Press. 1988. 까Ie book is full of references to Kuzne lS and his conce끼 ofmodem
economic growth, but John C.H. Fei makes panic비ar point of‘ discussing p이icy in the developmcnt proccss in thc introductory
chapter entitled"A Birds cye view of Policy Evolution on Taiwan"‘ p.26-46.
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Figure 4 portrays the GOP figures for Taiwan. It represents a classical growth
process over the 30 years. The data is adjusted to 1981 prices and both GOP and GOP
per Capita are index잉 at 1960 = 100 to facilitate comparison among the seven nations
and to clearly illustrate the pattern of growth over the thirty year period.
TAIWAN - GOP AND GOP PER CAPITA
INDEXED AT 1960 =100
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E띨딛E요. GDP and GDP per Capita for Taiwan. Source: Council for
~nomic Planning and Development. Taiwan Statistical Data 뀔쁘뇨二
1990,Republic of China, 1991. -Calculated from Table 3-2a and Table 2-
2.
The same data for South Korea is shown in Figure 5. The pattern app않rs to be quite
similar to that for Taiwan except for the one y않r drop in GDP which shows up in
1980. That drop will be taken note of later when the larger pattern of indicators is
considered. Here again, the data is adjust잉 to 1980 p더ces and indexed at 1960 = 100
as above for Taiwan.
The first set of indicators which are development-type indicators are thosewhich
portray the initial breakdown of GDP into the three key sectors. Representation of
GDP as composed of agriculture, services and industry represents a fundamental
structural breakdown of the economy.
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That important p따t of the record of structural change is illustrated here in
Figure 6, for the y않rs 1960 to 1989. The picture presented of the changes in the three
SOUTH KOREA - GOP AND GOP PER CAPITA
INDEXED AT 1960 = 100
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E웰댄그. GDP and GDP per Capita for South Korea. Source: The
World Bank. World Tables - 1990, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Calculated from the Country Pages, pp. 340-
343.
m며or sectors is an illustration of Kuznets’ expectations.3 A structural transformation
which is critical to modern. econ.omic growth is, as described by Kuznets, "... the shift
away from agriculture to nonagricultural (industry and services) pursuits. ,,4
The graph clearly illustrates a dramatic decrease in the percentage of agriculture
in GDP. Agriculture declined from 32 percent of GDP in 1960 to 6 percent in 1988.
A dramatic drop indicating a clear change in economic structure. At the same time
industry increased from 24 peπent of GDP in 1960 (it was 16 percent in the early
3 In \he lecture delivered in 1971 upon receipt of \he Nobel Prize in Economics Kuznets describes a high rate of
stl1Jcturaltransfonnation of \he economy as \he \hi벼 (of six) characteristics of 111때em economic gmwth. Specific비Jy. he
desc꺼bes a shift away from ag꺼ωlture and towal녕 industry and seπices as necessaη. See. Simon Kuznets. "Modem Economic
Growth: Findings and Reflections". American Economic Review. V.63. June 1973. pag야 247-258. For \his맨ecific πference
see page 248.
4 Kuznets. 0 1'. cit.. page 248.
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TAIWAN - SECTORS~ PERCENT OF" GOP
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핀웰re 6. Taiwan - The Sectors as a Percentage of GDP. Source:
Calculated from Council for Economic Planning and Development.
Taiwan Statistical Data Book - 1990, Republic of China, 1991. Table 3-
7a - Domestic Product by Kind of Activity.
1950s) to 46 percent in 1988. Again, indicating a corresponding p따t of the m메or
structural transformation seen in the decrease in agriculture. That services 외so picked
up some of the decrease in agriculture can be seen in this graph, though showing a less
dramatic change. Services, here, increase from 42 to 48 percent of GDP.
South Korea shows a very similar pattern. Figure 7 shows the changes in Korea
to illustrate the Kuznetsian expectations with respect to structural change among the
three sectors with some minor distinctions from that of Taiwan.
Here, agriculture declines from 34 percent of GDP to 10 percent in 1988, while
industry rises from 22 to 50 percent of GDP. Thus far South Korea’s is a pattern very
like that of Taiwan. The minor difference때n be seen first in the fact that services
actually decline slightly over the entire period. In the long run it app않rs that more of
the decrease in agriculture was picked up by industry in South Korea than in Taiwan.
Whereas in Taiwan the change in percentage of GDP represented by industry app잃rs to
level off about h외fway through the period, in South Korea it continues to climb,
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Eig브쁘그. South Korea - πIe Sectors as a Percentage of GDP. Source:
The World Bank. World Tables - 1990, Baltimore, The Johns Hop넙ns
U띠versity Press, 1990. C외cula때 from the Countη Pages, pp. 340-
341.
surpassing the percentage represented by industry in Taiwan.
만Ie next development indicator to be examined here is Private Consumption per
Capita. As will be seen in the graphs of Private Consumption for the CANs in the next
section of this chapter, it is entirl리y possible to have ’growth ’, even over an extended
period in a national economy, without an improvement in per capita consumption. On
the other hand, among the changes which are considered necessary by Kuznets as an
indicator of modem economic growth, are those related to output and subsequent
consumption by the population as a whole.
In the discussion of the anticipated structural changes, in his extensive treatment
of modern economic growth in 1966, Kuznets states that though high ra얻s of
population growth are to be expected, even higher rates of per capita product and
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consumption can be expected to occur.5 The data for Taiwan and South Korea in
Figure 8 illustrates this phenomenon well.
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA
TA뻐tAN ANDSOU깨 KOREA
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
o
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
Fig브E효. Private Consumption per capita. 1968 = 100. Source: The
World Bank. World Tables - 1990, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Table 3, pages 10 & II and calculated from
Council for Economic Planning and Development. Taiwan Statistical
Data Book - 1990, Republic of China, 1991. Table 3-8a, Expenditure
on GDP.
It is apparent that even with the relatively rapid pop비ation growth which
characteriz잉 both nations, private consump 디on increased substantially during the two
decades represented. Thus, while increase in consump뎌on accompanied the increase in
GDP for the ENICs, it will be seen in the next section of this chapter that for the CANs
’growth I did not mean an increase in per capita consumption.
A related consump다on indicator is Private Consumption as a Percentage of
GDP. The Kuznetsian expectation for this indicator in a development context is that it
will decrease over the transition period. Figure 9 presents that indicator for South
Korea and Taiwan.
5 Simon KuznelS. Modem Economic Growth: Rate. Structure and Snread. New Haven. Yale Univel히ty Press. 1966.
까Ie discussion of 'Implications of Population Growth ’ hegins on page 56. but even more to the p띠nt here iε the discussion of •Per
Capita Growth of Product’ on pages 63 to 72.
T삐빠에M
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PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AS PERCENTAGE OF GOP
TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA
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턴웰댄요. Private Consumption as percentage of GDP. Source: The
World Bank. World Tables - 1990, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Table 15, pages 58 - 61 and calculated from
Council for Economic Planning and Dev리opmen t. Taiwan Statistical
Data Book - 1990, Republic of China, 1991. Table 3-8b, Expenditure
on GDP.
The increase in total output in a developing nation is expected to provide an
increase in per capita consumption while at the same time showing a decrease in
consumption as a p없t of GDP. Figure 9 shows just that pattern for both South Korea
and Taiwan.
The next development-type indicator which will be examined here is Gross
Domestic Savings. This indicator, also clearly distinguishes the ENICs from the
CANs, and distinguishes the nations which are promoting and investing in structural
change from those which are not.
Figure 10 illustrates the pattern in Domestic Savings as a percentage of GDP for
the two ENICs. For Taiwan the data is available since 1952 while for South Korea the
data in the World Bank format starts in 1968. The pat얻rns are camp하able and
consistent,however. The additional time in the case of Taiwan simply extends the
pattern to the opening y않rs of the development process. Least squares lines have been
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pattern to the opening y않rs of the development process. Least squares lines have been
superimposed on the data for each nation to cl하ify the trend in the data in 않ch case.
These lines simply pass through the center of gravity of the data.6
1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988
GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS~ PERCENT OF GOP
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fu브re 10. Savings as Percentage of GDP. Source: The World Bank.
World Tables - 1990, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1990. Table 14, pages 54 & 55 and Council for Economic Planning and
Dev리opmen t. Taiwan Statistical Data Book - 1990, Republic of China,
1991. Table 3-11 , Savings as Percentage of GDP.
The process of structural change from the dominantly agricultural character of
an underdeveloped economy to the primarily industrial economy which characterizes
modem economic growth r，여uires subs따n디외 capital formation. Recognizing that
consistent data on capital formation is not available for the CANs, the decision was
made to use Gross Domestic Savings because it measures the tendency of the economy
to refrain from consumption for the purpose of investment. It is clear that foreign aid
and foreign investment may create a dissociation of domestic savings from capital
formation as such. But the intent here is not to represent capital formation through
domestic savings, but to represent the capacity in the economy to invest a percentage of
total output in keeping with the findings of Kuznets.
6 An equation for the calculation of 잉uch a trend linc can be found in any basic stalistics ICXI.
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As is to be seen in Figure 10, domestic savings for Taiwan increased over the
development period from 15 percent of GOP in 1958 to 38 percent in 1988. The
increase in savings for South Korea was even more dramatic. From 13 percent of GOP
in 1968, it climb때 to the same 38 percent in only twenty years. As GOP per capita
increased in the ENICs the capacity to curtail current consumption also increased. The
data will reveal that on the other hand, with the exception of Costa Rica, the CANs
ended the twenty year period with a rate of savings which failed to increase during the
’growth ’ period, and which decreased on the whole.
Another important part of the pattern is Gross Oomestic Investment (GOI). In
this case it has been possible to generate two forms of the indicator in order to give two
distinct perspectives on the economies. Figure 11 shows GOI per Capita. It illustrates
two economies with growing populations which also have an annual rate of investment
which is growing subs띠nti외ly faster than the pop비ation. These are economies with
"an acceleration phase in the growth of capital stock. ,,7
Another slice of the same data, GOI as a percentage of GOP, shown in Figure
12,외so supports the notion of a nation engaged in modern economic growth. Kuznets
found that, historically, the developing nations which innovated modem economic
growth sustained rates of GOI at over 20 percent of GOP. The underdeveloped
nations, those which were not engaged in the structural change necess따Y to
dev려opment ， consistently showed a rate less than 20 percent. 8 The mean rates during
the twenty y없rs portrayed for GOI as a percentage of GOP in these two nations is 28
percent for South Korea and 26 percent for Taiwan.
7 Simon Kuznels. "Toward a Theory of Economic Growth". in Robert Lekachman. Editor. National Policy for
Economic W，티fare at Homeand Abmad. New York. Russelland Russ히I. Inc .• 1961. page 37.
8 Simon Kuznets. "Tow뼈 a Theory of Economic Growth". in Robert Lekachman. Editor. National Policy for
Economic Welfare 빼 Home and Abmad. New York. Russelland Russell. Inc.• 1961. pages 36-40.
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T빼WANAND ∞U매 KOREA
1980U.S.∞U쇄S1000900
800
7(찌
600
500
400
300
200
100
o
1~1~lm1~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~
Eig브또과. Gross Domestic Investment per Capita. Source: The World
Bank. World Tables - 1990, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1990. Table 4, pages 16 & 17 and Coun다I for Economic
Planning and Development. Taiwan Statistical Data Book - 1990,
Republic of China, 1991. Calculated from Table 3-8b, Expenditure on
GDP.
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딘웰팍12. Gross Domestic Investment as Percentage of GDP. Source:
The World Bank. World Tables - 19~0 ， Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Table 13, pages 50 & 51 and Council for
Economic Planning and Dev리opmen t. Taiwan Statistical Data Book_..
객앨， Republic of China, 1991. Calculated from Table 3-8b,
Expenditure on GDP.
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The last of the indicators, the rates of literacy for the seven nations under
consideration, again shows a dramatic distinction between the CANs and the ENICs.
Though the UNESCO generated data is limited for South Korea, the conclusions to be
drawn are clear. Figure 14 shows a dramatic decline in illiteracy in all catagories to a
point where South Korea is in the developed nation catagory with respect to the literacy
of the population.
Taiwan shows a very comparable pattern in Figure 13. For Taiwan a detailed
breakdown of the data is available in English. Demonstrating the fact that the data has
야en recognized to be necessary for the development effort, it has been collected and
published in elaborate detail since 1952.
Section 14 of the Taiwan Statistical Data Book for 1990 contains page after
page of data on, for example, the percentage of graduates enrolled in the next higher
L1TERACYR~πs
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힌웰팍끄. Taiwan and South Korea: Rates of Literacy. Source:
ComDendium of Statistics on Illiteracv- 1990 Edition, Division of
Statistics on Education, Office of Statistics, Paris, UNESCO, 1990; P따t
Two, Illiteracy by Country. And Council for Economic Planning and
Development. Taiwan Statisti~aUlata BQok - 1990, Republic of China,
1991. Calculated from Table 2-4a, Population by levels of Education.
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ILLITERACY - SOUTH KOREA
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턴g괴팍과. South Korea: Rates of Illiteracy. Source: Comoendium of
Statistics on Il1iteracv - 1990 Edition, Division of Statistics on
Education, Office of Statistics, Paris, UNESCO, 1990; Part Two,
Illiteracy by Country.
lev리 of schools, the number of students receiving secondary, academic and vocational
education, the number of students rec리ving higher education by discipline, and so on.9
Table 14-8 in the Taiwan Statistical Data Book the "Percentage of Graduates Enrolled
in the Next Higher Lev리 of Schools" , shows a steady climb in all categories over the
four decades. Particularly striking is the first two, the Percent of School-age Children
enrolled in Primary Schools and the Percent of Primary School Graduates enroll잉 in
Junior High Schools. By 1990 the percentages are 99.9% for enrollment in prim따y
school and 99.6% of primary school graduates who continue to the next level.
Considering that those numbers include the rural population, they portray a major
emphasis on schooling for the population as a whole.
9 Council for Economic Planning and Oevelopmcnl. Tai\!l8n_Slllli~lical Oala Book - 1990. or. cil.• see seclion 14.
"Education". pages 277-292.
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THE CENTRAL AMERICAN NATIONS
For the five Central American countries, the data which was readily available
and consistent over a substantial period of time consists almost entirely of ’growth ’,
that is to say, aggregate, type data. Gross National Product and Income data are
readily available, as is derivative data such as GNP per Capita. Even those figures
become difficult to use, however, beyond a couple of decades back, due to changes in
the form in which it is presented.
Even so, some highly aggregate development-type data is available for a long
enough pe더od to test the patterns against the Kuznetsian expectations. That includes
data collected by the World Bank which separates GDP into the three sectors,
agriculture, industry and services. These data are sufficient for the purposes here to
suggest in retrospect whether development took place or not. They would be
thoroughly inadequate to guide ongoing policy, however.
Some of the more important development indicators such as School enrollment,
food production and distribution of employment information is gathered by the United
Nations and the World Bank. But a glance at the Country Pages of the World Bank’s
World Tables for the last few years illustrates that although it is useful in theory, in
r않피ty it is only sporadically available. The development-type data which is available,
though, readily suppoπs the patterns of the growth-type data which is more readily and
consistently available.
For EI Salvador and Guatemala, for example, the fairly sporadic data which is
available in the World Tables shows a clear dεcline in the 1980s in employment, r않1
earnings for those who were employed, r，않I output per employee and earnings relative
to value add잉. The graph below, Figure 15, for EI Salvador presents the data which
is available.
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The comparable data for Guatemala is much more sporadic, and that for Costa
Rica and Honduras is simply not available at 외1. For Nicaragua, on the other hand,
EL SALVADOR - EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS
IN MANUFACTURING
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핀g브팍피. El Salvador: Employment and Earnings. Source: 뀐띠길
Tables - 1990, The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Calculated from the "Country Pages" 228-229.
though the data is sporadic, it shows a unique and interesting pattern which was without
a doubt a function of the siege-like environment in which policy was being made by the
Sandinistas. Specifically, Nicaragua is the only nation among the five where
employment and output per employee increased during the 1980s. earnings, on the
other hand, decreased dramatically as it did in the other Central American Nations.
The graphs above for EI Salvador represent an economy with serious problems,
whether considered from the point of view of growth or development. In the last third
of the 1970s employment began to drop precipitously and has continued to do so since.
Earnings, in terms of value added, stayed near or below the 1968 level while r，εal
earnings, except for a brief jump which coincides with a dramatic drop in employment,
dropped well below the 1968 lev리.
While the data represented above is ad여uate to suggest some insight into the
dev리opment problems, it falls well short of the disaggregated form of the same data
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which would be necessary to make policy decisions in response to the problems
represented there. Management of the economy for intentional development would
require considerable distinction within each of those catagories in order to focus
support or discouragement of specific economic activity.
For all five Central American Nations the classic growth-type indicator, Gross
Domestic Product and Gross Domestic Product per Capita tell a consistent story.
Figures 16 through 20 show that data for the five nations. All five are based on figures
adjusted to 1980 prices in the domestic currency. All five 외so were indexed at 1960
equ외 to 100 for the sake of consistency and to emphasize thε thirty year record.
In the 1960s, with the emergence of the Central American Common Market, the
growth of GDP in the five nations was often cited as illustration of the success of the
effort. Of concern in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, however, was that 외l
five economies experienced a devastating collapse of growth. That is clear in the GDP
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from International Financial Statistics Yearbook, International Monetary
Fund, Washington D.C. , 1980, and World IabJes - 1990, The World
Bank, 1990. Country Pages.
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뀐웰팍잭. Guatem외a: GDP and GDP per Capita. Source: C외culated
from International Financial Statistics_Yearbook, lntεrnational Monetary
Fund, Washington D.C. , 1980, and World Tables - 1990, The World
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figures and it will be seen to be apparent in 외I of the other growth-dependent data as
well.
Even exclusively growth-focused policymakers must have seen a warning in the
n않rly flat GDP per Capita pattern for all five nations. From a development position,
on the other hand, it is especially apparent that improvement in the weI떠re of the
pop띠a다on as a whole is at least in question. Without income distribution data,
however, and there is none available for those nations, addressing questions about thε
incorporation of the population as a whole into the I growth ’ process depends primarily
upon anecdotal information. Of such anecdotal information there is a plethora in
Central America, all giving evidence in retrospect that development did not take place.
But such evidence is far from helpful for p이icy decisions.
More suggestive of development-type concerns, and specifically consistent with
Simon Kuznets ’ proposed indicators of modern economic growth , is data on the three
key sectors, industry, agriculture and services, which comprise GDP. Figures 21
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Figure걷1. Costa Rica: Economic Sectors as Percent of GDP. Source:
W_orldTables - 1990, The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
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핀웰팍걷. Guatemala: Economic Sectors as Percent of GDP. Source:
World Tables - 1990, The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
Univer잉ty Press, 1990. Calculated from the "Coun따 Pages" 272-273.
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E띨브댄앞. Honduras: Economic Sectors as Percent of GDP. Source:
World Tables - 1990, The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Calculated from the "Country Pages" 28S-289.
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Figu팍요~. Nicaragua: Economic Sectors as Percent of GDP. Source:
World Tables - 1990, The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Calculated from the "Country Pages" 416-417.
through 25 illustrate that rela다onship for the five Central American nations for twenty
years. Efforts to push the numbers back further than twenty y않rs were abandoned due
to the thorough inconsistency of the occasional individual country data. In any case it
was apparl하lt that않rlier numbers differed little in pattern from those represented here.
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What is apparent with no more than a glance, is that for all five nations the
pattern is virtually unchanged from the latter 1960s through the latter 1980s. No
structural change in the basic indicators occurred. These are important indicators
regarding economic development from any point of view, but, in the Kuznetsian
scheme they are fundamental.
A similarly aggregate indicator which is comparably suggestive is private
consump디on per capita. The data as presented by the World Bank is stated in terms of
1980 U.S. dollars, and for the purposes here, it was indexed at 1968 equal to 100 in
order to readily compare the patterns for each nation (Figure 26, below). What is
striking here is the dramatic similarity in pattern of the 감ve Central American Nations.
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA
C메TRALAM많l않NNAT10NS
COSTA빼CA
‘’ ‘, -‘’-‘
‘ ’‘ /
xζ홍혼훌---...g‘ -v
400
360 1-
320
280
240 ..
200
160
120
짧 f
o
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
딘웰띤요효. CANs: Private Consumption per Capita. Source: 핀으띠
Tables - 1990, The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Topical Pages, Table 3, p. 10-1 I.
The related indicator, Private Consumption as a Percentage of GDP (Figure 27)
shows almost no change in consump디on as a part of GDP over the twenty crucial
y앓rs. As indicated earlier, the expecta센on for a nation undergoing development
toward modern economic growth is that while per capita consumption is increasing,
consumption as a part of GDP is decreasing. In the case of the CANs (Figure 27) that
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figure actually shows an incr，없se in two cases and a modest decrease in two others.
One of the two showing a deer，않se is Nicaragua, where total output plummeted in the
late 1970s and has changed little since. The other is Costa Rica, a nation which has
proved to represent an interesting 때se of a mix of growth and development indicators.
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Gross Domestic Savings as a percentage of GDP (Figure 28), another aggregate
indicator, is one which can function as an indicator of development over time. Here
for the first time we can highlight a pattern among the CANs which is apparent in a
number of the other indicators as well. That is the distinction of Costa Rica from the
other four nations in areas which relate to some unique p이icy decisions in the ea더y
post World War II period, as well as to the long-standing tradition of pop비ar strength.
Figure 28 illustrates the fact that gross domestic savings ultimately decreased
during the twenty year period for four of the five CANs. As with figure 10 above, the
1없st squares lines have been added to clarify the trends in the data for the five nations.
By comparison, the upward slant for this indicator for Taiwan and South Korea was
discussed 없rlier in this Chapter. What is worth paπic비ar note here is that the only
. GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS AS PERCENT OF GOP
LE힐TSQUARES UNES SUPERJUPOSED
CENTRALAM 댄!CAN N，6;끼α‘s
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other upward slanting line among the seven nations is that of Costa Rica. All of the
other four ended the period with savings as a lower percentage of GDP than that with
which they s따rted .
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Figure 요.8.. CANs: Gross Domestic Savings. Source: World Tables -
객90， The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1990. Topical Pages, Table 14, p. 56-57.
The next indicator for which there is a consistent basis in data for all seven
nations is Gross Domestic Investment (GDI). That indicator is being portrayed here as
a percentage of GDP to create a proportional image (Figure 29). Because of the
differences in GDI relative to GDP from one year to the next the graph looks rather
complex. Least square lines have again been superimposed to highlight the trend over
the period. Comp없ison with the graph for the ENICs in Chapter eight suggests 외so
that the numbers for the ENICs are considerably higher for the entire period.
A simple alternative presentation of the data is the mean of each nation ’s GDI as
a percentage of GDP. Listed below, the averages are within a few tenths of a
percentage point of the same numbers.
Whereas South Korea and Taiwan had percentages in the upper twenties, the
Central American Nations had approximately ten percentage points less for the twenty
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fig브팍29. CANs: Gross Domestic Investment. Source: World Tables
늬요및， The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1990. Topical Pages, Table 13, p. 50-5 1.
y않rs. Again Costa Rica is uniquely outside the pattern. For Costa Rica the numbers
approximate the more successfully developing nations.
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Another revealing way to slice the same data is to look at GDI per capita. The
question here being, was investment in keeping with changes in the pop비ation. Figure
30 yields no surprises in the pattern thus far, but it clearly emphasizes the difference
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between the developing nations and the growing ones. The data for the graph is
a대usted to 1980 U.S. dollars. The two ENICs clearly sustained a pattern of increasing
GROSSDOME얀Ie INVESTMENT PER대PITA
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Figu댄고Q. CANs: Gross Domestic Investment per Capita. Source:
World Tables - 1990,The World Bank, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. Topical Pages, Table 4, p. 14-15.
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per capi따 investment over the period. Costa Rica, ag허n here, approximated the
pattern of the ENICs until 1980 when the dominantly growth p이icies could no longer
be sustained. The other four CANs generated a flat and even declining pattern of per
capita investment over the two decades.
The final set of data which will be included in the mix is the set of literacy rates
for the CANs. The availability of the elaborate set of information on literacy and
education for Taiwan has already been noted as important to the development process
On the other hand, the most striking thing about theand to development policy.
literacy data for the CANs is the paucity of it. Figure 31 displays the only useful data
which is available for 외I five of the nations. It is based on that collected by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
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Costa Rica has collected and used literacy data for decades. This is in keeping
with the substantial emphasis on education which has been an important element of
But none of thepopular consensus on national p이icy for more than forty years now.
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other CANs has any education related data which is useful either for comp따1son or for
policy guidance. For those nations such data is as scarce as is information on income
distribution.
Considering the decades of emphasis on education in Costa Rica it comes as no
surprise that the literacy rate in Costa Rica is at least as high as that in the two rapidly
developing nations. On the other hand, the literacy rates in the other four CANs starts
low - 50 percent or less - and rises only slightly during the critical y않rs of economic
growth. This is a function of decisions made in those four nations to spend little on
schooling for the population in general. Some government funds in the other four
CANs were spent in urban settings, and considerable assistance was available for use
by the already well placed.
A more revealing pattern emerges in this realm with more detailed data.
Besides the national totals, the UNESCO surveys also dis디nguish between urban and
rural pop비ations and between school age children and adults. Figure 32 portrays the
results of three surveys for Costa Rica. It is notable that by 1963 the illiteracy rates for
the entire population were already very low. The rates for all segments of the
population then continue to improve during the subsequent two decades. It is also
predictable that the rates for children are better than those for the ad비ts ， and the rates
for the urban pop띠a디on are better than those for the rural areas.
In all of the CANs a large part of the rural pop비ation continues to live in
subsistence conditions and in those p따ts of the nations there is little or no infrastructure
at all. In those areas education approp꺼ately takes the form of subsistence skills.
The only other of the CANs for which UNESCO has yet prepared data beyond
the early 1970s is EI Salvador. The data on EI Salvador in Figure 33 seπes to
illustrate the pattern which is consistent with the other three CANs, except that by
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going beyond the mid-1970s it also suggests the emergence of a trend with unhappy
consequences for the economic future of the nations in the region. From 1975 to 1980
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the rate of illiteracy actually increased substantially in EI Salvador for both rural and
urban Children. This trend emerged during the latter p따t of the period of economic
’growth’ for EI Salvador. It is generally regarded that it was at the turn of the decade
of the 1970s to the 1980s that the ’crisis’ , the collapse of the p이itical and economic
contract, emerged. That increase in the rate of illiteracy for children reflects p이icy
decisions taken at the national level with respect to whether or not such "soci외
services" could be sustain벼. Education was never seen as a ’growth ’ priority.
Education was regarded as a luxury when development, structural change, was seen as
a threat rather than as a goal.
CHAPTERIX
ECONOMIC GROWTH VERSUS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THE SEVEN NATIONS
THE INDICATORS
Taken together, the data presented in the preceding chapter generates a picture
of consistent distinction between the ENICs and the CANs. The indicators, based on
the Kuznetsian expectations of an economy which is developing toward modern
economic growth, represent the key structural indicators within the context of the
aggregate indicator, gross domestic product (GDP).
The latter indicator, GDP, takεn by itself, is an indicator of growth. This
would simply imply that the aggregate product of the nation is increasing, or failing to
incr않se ， aside from any considerations of structural change. 1 Because growth without
structural adaptation is a phenomenon which is limited by the current structure, a
sustained type of growth requires the structural adaptation the likes of which is
때다cipated by the Kuznetsian scheme. Lacking the structural adaptation, an
underdeveloped economy would not be expected to sustain substantial growth over the
longer term suggested in Kuznets ’ framework, a period of twenty or thirty years.
The requirement of structural adaptation in the context of growth is a
phenomenon which is recognized in most fields. The fact that a given structure limits
1 It is wonh noting h싸re that for Kuznllts the pattern of simple앨gregate inιreas.: in production “ran 야onomy does
not indicate modem economic growth. 까tat conllept requires "the interplay between sustained ris.:s in populatilln and ris.:s in
economic performance substantial enou잉h to assure (a sustainlld) upwa며 trend in pιr capita product.' Simon Kuznets‘ 민엠.!m!
Economic Growth: Rate Structure and Snread.Nιw Havιn. Yale University Press. 1966. page 20.
159
the growth of anything is to be found in discussions by biologists, meteorologists,
chemists, organization theorists, and students of a long list of disciplines. In economics
Kenneth Boulding is one who has discussed the issue extensively and in depth.2
Michael Todaro, in his third world development text, recognizes the phenomenon with
the statement, "Development must, therefore, be concieved of as a multidimensional
process involving m며or changes in social sσuctures ...as well as the acceleration of
economic growth. ,,3 Joseph Schumpete'r, as well, puts considerable emphasis on the
need to expect structural change with growth. In his Them:y of Economic Development
he states that economic development involves "that kind of change arising from within
the system which so displaces i앙 equilibrium point that the new one cannot be reached
from the old one by infinitesimal steps. Add successively as many mail coaches as you
pI않se ， you will never get a railway thereby. ,,4
On the most generallevel, then, the structural data is important to the
consideration of whether or not a growing economy is undergoing a sustained
expansion. In Kuznets ’ terms, the question is whether the underdev리oped economy is
undergoing a transition toward modem economic growth. In the Kuznetsian scheme the
nature of the output must change, the use of that output must change, and the qu외ity
and nature of the input must change.
When the structural data is Assembled for the two groups of economies the
distinction between them becomes clear. While the ENICs could serve as illustrations
of the Kuznetsian expecta다ons for transition toward modern economic growth, the
CANs represent successful growth, especi외ly through the 1960s and 1970s, without the
2 It would be: pointl넙ss to list the: long list of publications in whi‘:h Boulding has discu잃e:d this familiar issue:. A fe:w
examples. however. would include. K‘:nne:th Boulding. "Toward A Gen.:ral Th.:ory Of Economic Growth·. Canadian Journal of
Eιonomicsand Political Sci.lnc,:. Volume 19. Au딩ust 1953. pag.:s 326-340: also Boulding's 탁띄꾀멤띤.!!. Sagβ Publications.
Be:v딩rly Hills. 1978: and Human B.:t싸mlent. Sage: Publications. B‘v.:rly Hills. 1985.
3 Micha.:1 Todaro. E씨lIlol11ic Oev.:loOln.:nt in th.: Thi삐 W‘.Irld. Fourth Edition. μngman. N‘:w York. 1989. pag.: 88.
4 Jo똥ph A. Schump.:ter.까I': Th.:orv of Economic O.:v딩looment‘ Transaction Bookι Nιw Brunswick. 1983. page 64.
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structural transition to be expected of development. The one aberrant case among the
five CANs is Costa Rica. some of the indicators for Costa Rica more nearly
approximate the expectations of development. This is as might be expected given the
number of post-Wo더dWarIIp이icy decisions which, intentionally or not, supported a
tendency toward development.
THE PATTERNS
The indicators for the ENICs illustrate a clear pattern of change in the economic
structure of both countries. In Figures 4 and 5 it is clear that there was a rapid rate of
growth in both the total and the per capita product for the two countries. At the same
time, the anticipated shift in structure away from agriculture and toward industry is to
be seen in the plots of the three sectors for each nation in Figures 6 and 7.
Private Consumption per Capita (Figure 8) also increased continuously and
rapidly for the ENICs, as did Gross Domestic Savings (GDS) as a percentage of GDP
(Figure 10). For both nations the GDS increased rapidly from less than 15 percent of
GDP to well into the 20 뻐d 30 percent realms which Kuznets found to be characteristic
of developing economies.
As is to be anticipated, given the relatively high level of savings, Gross
Domestic Investment (GDI) is 외so well within the range of peπentage of GDP (Figure
12) which the expectations of modern economic growth would have us look for. Both
the mean and the average rates are in the upper twenty percent for both of the ENICs.
GD! per capita (Figure 11) 외so increased at a steady rate for the two countries, with
some second하y patterns which were discussed above.
The literacy indicators (Figures 13 and 14) for both countries again fall neatly
within the pattern to be expected of economies well engaged in modern. economic
growth. Taiwan shows an exemplory high level of literacy in Figure 13 and as
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described in chapter 8, that data is the tip of an iceberg of data on schooling and
literacy which documents four decades of m며or investment in education of the
population.5 Although the UNESCO generated data is sparse for South Korea, the
pattern is unmistakable. In the ten y않rs documented by the United Nations agency the
literacy rate had already reached a level approximating that for the developed nations.
The economic growth of the CANs presents a pattern in the indicators which is
consistent and striking in its similarity among the five na다ons. Costa Rica is the only
one of the five which shows some distinction. The distinction is understandable given
the history of somewhat more democratic poli디C외 and economic decisionmaking which
is associated with that country.
The important differences which app않r for Costa Rica include the realms of
edu때tion ， where the decision was made in the 없rly 1950s to pursue universal
education for the population; social security, where law supports benefits for the
employed and to a lesser extent for the population as a whole; and in a different kind of
security for the population, assurance that the military cannot enforce policy decisions
by the nationalleadership because there is no military.
The GDP data in Figures 16 through 20 illustrates the fact that aggregate
economic increase took place through the decades of the 1960s and the 1970s. GDP
increased substantially in 외I of the nations during those years. GDP per Capita,
however, increased relatively little, and if the data were available it is likely to show
that income distribution worsened during the period.6
S A source ofelaborate data on education and literacy in Taiwan is the manual mentioned ~arlier in this chapler.
Council for Economic Planning and Devo:lopment. Taiwan Stal피icalD매ta Book - 1990.Rιpublic 01 China. 1991.
6 The smalle꺼ng of data on aιcumulation and movement ofwo:alth and빠 ωnsiderable an~ιdotal informalion which is
available unanymously suppons the obs‘πation that income distribution worsened.
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The representations of the three key economic sectors for the CANs, Figures 21
to 25, is likewise striking in its consistency among the five nations and in its illustration
of the fact that no structural change took place. Keeping in mind that GDP for all five
nations rose steadily for twenty y않rs ， then fell dramatically in absolute terms, it is
notable that none of the sectoral data shows a response of any sort.
At just the point of the exp비sion of Somoza by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua the
three sectors show a substantial 'flinch’. Specifically what is shown by the graph is
that the services sector expe더ences a substantial drop in response to the major civic
disruptions, industry experiences a lesser drop, agriculture shows a sharp and
temporary jump in percentage of GDP as a result. By the following year both services
and industry are up and agriculture is back to roughly where it was the previous y않r.
Regardless of the ’flinch ’, the Nicaraguan economy shows no change in structure
whatsoever in the twenty y없다.
Unlike the pattern of structural change shown by two ENIC nations, the other
four CANs show little of significance with respect to developmen t. It is worth noting
that the graphs indicate a slight increase in industry as a percentage of GDP for Costa
Rica in the latter 1970s, with no subsequent change. For Honduras, on the other hand,
a decrease in agriculture in the mid 1970s was associated with a comparable incr않se in
the services sector. This app않rs to have represented a less than positive superfici외
change in structure which was sustained through the 1980s.
The graph of private consumption per capita, Figure 26, extends the pattern
created by the previous data in several respects. As distinct from the ENICs, 외1 tive of
the CANs display a pattern of slight increases over the first ten years followed by
another ten years of decrease to near or below 1968 levels. This pattern follows that of
GDP per capita very closely in the CANs and reflects the fact that the sectoral
structures showed no change during the period.
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Whereas with the ENICs the economies displayed the important development of
increased production and consumption by the population as a whole, the CANs showed
almost no change in that regard. Among the CANs the increase in consumption tended
to stay within the narrow range of consumers who benefitted from the economic
growth, that being the elite and those who functioned to support the ongoing state of
the economy. It was not allocated to those who would support a change in the structure
of the economy. That is, whereas among the ENICs an import뻐t structur외
development was the inclusion into the economy of the large percentage of the
popula디on which was previously either external or marginally involved, among the
CANs neither the consumption nor the production activities were extended to include a
larger range of the pop비ation. In an important sense, this was a ’ comp따ative
advantage' which was ignored by the CANs, due to the ideological constraints on the
definitions of compara다ve advantage which was discussed in earlier chapters.
Figure 28, Gross Domestic Savings, portrays essentially the difference between
total production and the consumption of it. Though Costa Rica shows an increasing
percentage of GDP being saved over the twenty years, the other four CANs show a
decreasing percentage going to savings. For those other four, while GDP was
incr，εasing through the latter 1970s, the part of it which was set aside from consumption
did not increase. When put together with other indicators this one becomes even more
meaningful. There was no change among the key sectors, savings continued to be a
relatively low percentage of GDP, and the related figure , investment as a percentage of
GDP (see Figure 29 and the mean values) , remains similarly low for the entire period.
When the domestic investment per capita figures are consulted (Figure 30) the
observations regarding lack of change are reinforced even further. While the ENICs,
and to a considerable extent Costa Rica as well, generated an increasing investment per
capita as GDP increased, the four CANs concluded the twenty year period with the
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same per capita investment as that of twenty years 않rlier. A slight increase in the
latter y않rs (the 1970s) of the ’growth ’ period was completely erased during the crisis
y않rs.
The final element of the pattern, an important development indicator, is the
change in the rate of Illiteracy. A substanti떠ly illiterate popula디on is incapable of
participating adequately in the process of modem economic growth. Among other
aspects, the m때y facets of industrialization, be it agriculture, manu삶.cture or services,
require a literate workforce. Thus, inevitably, an economic development undertaking
must deal with the problem of inc!1없sing literacy 않rly in the process.
An important indicator of development, then, is the changing level of literacy
over a several y않r period. But what is p따tic비arly telling, especially over the shorter
run of a few years, is the breakdown within the tota1 literacy level. That is, the
distinction between the urban and rural populations and the child and ad비t populations
is important for policy guidance.
Child literacy wi1l likely, though not necessarily, be the leading edge of the
process, and within that category, urban children would be expected to represent a
relatively high gain in literacy rather quickly. This represents the gene!외 assumption
having to do with 없se of access for the urban pop비ation and a higher valuε in literacy
for urban economic endeavors. But development p이icy makers may well determine
that investment in ruralliteracy would generate a good medium term payoff. The
example of Taiwan serves well in that respect. A determined effort was made at the
beginning of the development effort to include the rural as well as the urban pop비ation
in the nation외 education policy.
Four of the CANs, consistent with the emphasis on growth of thε economy saw
little direct benefit in literacy for the pop비ation as a whole. In fact, education, while
not ignored, is considered to be a social service, not an integral paπ of economic
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growth. Thus, in Figure 33 above, the increase in illiteracy in children between 1975
and 1980 in El Salvador reflects the cutbacks in the already minimal services which
became universal in Central America· during the 1980s.
A summary representation of the indicators for the seven nations is given in the
figures below. The ques다on to be answered is whether or not the indicators coπespond
to the expec때ons of Kuznets modern economic growth.
The first two indicators, GDP and GDP per Capita, though necessary to the full
pattern of dev히opment indicators, are growth indicators when taken alone.They are
necessary but not sufficient in the package of development indicators. The following
indicators, those representing the sectors, the use of output, and literacy, contain the
range of development indicators used in this study. These are the structural indicators.
Each indicator is evaluated individually as discussed previously in this chapter and in
chapter eight, all in keeping with the expectations drawn from Kuznets mid-century
statistical studies.
The smoothed data from chapter 8 is here compared to the Expected Pattern of
Indicators as presented in chapter 4. Figure 34 reproduces the expected pattern , and
those following contain the statistics of the seven nations represented as trend lines.
The data in 않.ch case has been smoothed by means of a least squares technique for the
앓ke of cl따ity.7
The GDP and GDP per capita panels (Figures 35 and 36) highlight the fact that
while the ENICs present a pattern in keeping with the Kuznetsian expectations, the
CANs do not. Even though for the CANs the GDP alone appears to increase slightly
during the period, due to the smoothing of the years of the collapse with the earlier
y않rs of growth, GDP per capita makes a very poor showing throughout. The panels
7 1..:ast squar.:s calculation is a stan‘lard statistical me!hod ror estahlishing trends in linear dala. The me!hod “r
calculation of !he tr.:nd lines can he round in any basic statistics text.
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with the three sectors (Figures 37 and 38), also make clear that the ENICs developed in
accord with the Kuznetsian expectations, while the CANs remained essentially
untouched by the limited growth which took place du더ng the period.
Private consumption per capita did not increase for the CANs, while it did for
the ENICs (Figure 40). And private consumption as a p따t of GD? simply stayed high
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for the CANs (Figure 41) while it decreased in keeping with the expectations for a
developing economy for the ENICs (Figure 42). With domestic savings as well
(Figure 43) the development related incr，않se is cl않r for the ENICs, while the CANs,
with the excep다on of Costa Rica, show an overall decrease.
Gross domestic investment (GDI) increased to over 25 %of GDP for the ENICs
(Figure 44), as is consistent with Kuznets’ expecta다ons for development, while for the
CANs it actually decr，앓앓d from the already low level at the-beginning of the period.
Atthe 앓me time, GDI per capita (Figure 45) for the ENICs incrl않sed by three to four
times the initiallevel. In the CANs, on the other hand, GDI per capita continued
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unchanged for all the five nations except Costa Rica, which increased slightly. For
Costa Rica the incr，없se was approximately one half the ini디외 level.
Literacy, the final indicator, is poorly represented in Figure 34. The
expectation, however, is that literacy climb rather quic외Y to arrive at a rate of
approximately 90% for the adult population and that it happen within a decade or two
of the initiation of the development process. It is clear in Figure 46 that the ENICs
achieved the goal 없다y in the process,때d it is equally clear that the CANs did not.
With the exception of Costa Rica, the literacy rate for the CANs is well below the 90%
level, and it is little above the rates from the middle p따t of the century.
One of the few points at which indicators appear, even on the surface, to
disagree with the expecta디ons of modem economic growth is with respect to gross
domestic investment for Taiwan. It is worth noting that while the curves for both
nations app않r relatively flat rather than increasing as expected, the fact is that both
nations during that twenty year period are 외ready well within the expecta디ons for
investment for a developing nation. The mean rates for GDI to GDP during that period
is 28 percent for South Korea and 26 peπent for Taiwan. Both nations showed the
incr，않se from the ten to fifteen percent levels of investment during the 1950s and 않rly
1960s.
It is clear that the ENICs both fit the profile of the nation in transition toward
modem economic growth according to the findings of Kuznets. These are nations in
sustained development, not nations with economies which are merely growing in size.
The differences in the patterns with respect to the two sets of nations is striking.
Costa Rica is the only nation of the five which shows patterns in the indicators
anywhere between fully conforming to the pattern of development and completely
failing to conform to the pattern. For the five CANs, even the growth indicators, GDP
and GDP per Capita, when examined over the full thirty year period, indicate poor
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growth perform뻐ceo Taken alone, much of the first twenty y않rs of the period for the
CANs, on the other hand, suggests strong and continuous growth for the five. Even
GDP per Capita increased somewhat during that period for four of the five.
It is the performance with respect to both GDP 없ld GDP per Capita as of the
latter 1970s which tells the compelling story of the differ ，εnce between economic
growth and economic development for the underdeveloped nations. Had we examined
only the y않rs from 1960 to the latter 1970s we would have been impressed by the
growth, as indeed many were. As development indicators, however, they depart from
conformation in the latter 1970s when the growth collapsed and was followed by some
y않rs of contraction. In three of the five cases, ten y않rs after the collapse the nations
were still below the level of GDP gained ten y않rs earlier. In Costa Rica and Honduras
a return to the pre-collapse levels occurred in seven and four years respectively. In
none of the five cases, though, did GDP per Capita return to its former level, and only
in Costa Rica has it increased at 외I from the crash level of the early 1980s.
Among the three sectors in each of the CANs (Figure 38) there is no indication
of structural change. Through the period of satisfying GDP growth in the 1960s and
1970s there is almost no hint of either an increase in industry or a decrease in
agriculture as a part of GDP. For Nicaragua the single year ’flinch ’ in the pattern in
the three sectors (Figure 25) occurs in 1979, just the point of the Sandinista revolution.
Immediately thereafter the economy returns to the pattern of two y않rs eariier though
on a continuously lower level of GDP.
A couple of other minor patterns within the major monotonous sectoral one is
that in Costa Rica (Figure 21) there actually is a small decrease in agriculture as a
percentage of GDP, together with a minor increase in industry. There actually was, in
other words, a small change in the structure of the economy in the direction of
industrialization. In Honduras as well , agriculture decreases several percentage points
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in the early part of the period, but paradoxically it seems to have been replaced as a
P따t of GOP by the services sector. This is not a positive change, p따tic비arly given
the constant incr，없se in total external debt over the same period.
Private consumption per capita (Figure 26) actually decreases for two of the
nations, stays the same for two of them and increases slightly for the Costa Ricans.
Interestingly, consump.tion increases slightly just before and during the collapse of GOP
in all of the nations other than Nicaragua, where the large decr，εase in consumption
continues after the arrival of the Sandinistas.
Private Consumption as a percentage of GOP reinforces the per capita
observations. Here there is little significant change over the two decades, but there are
some interesting minor patterns. In two cases consumption as a p따t of GOP actually
increases over the p려od ， in one there is no change and in the case of Costa Rica there
is a decrease of twelve percent. This latter is in keeping with the expectations of a
development transition, and it is consistent with the increase in gross domestic savings
as a percentage of GDP (Figure 28) for Costa Rica. Though all four of the other five
nations show a decrease in the amount of savings in GOP over the period, Costa Rica
shows an increase of more than ten percent.
Likewise, while gross domestic investment (GOI) per capita (Figure 30)
decreases slightly for the other four CANs, Costa Rica shows a small increase despite
the major dip in response to the collapse of GOP. GD! as a percentage of GDP shows
an en다rely consistent pattern for the five na다ons. While GD! increases significantly as
ap따t of GDP for Costa Rica, it starts low and ends even lower for the other four
nations. For all of the other four CANs investment climbed somewhat prior to the
collapse, but the decline from that point took investment as a p없t of GOP to a point
where it was consistently even lower than it had been at the beginning of the period.
The mean values for GD! as a percentage of GDP confirm the patterns on the graphs.
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The mean value for Costa Rica is 24 percent, a value which locates the country among
those in the developing realm according to Kuznets ’ findings. The value for the other
four is 15 to 19 percent for the period. Those values, according to Kuznets, do not
suggest a development pattern.
Though the data for literacy among the CANs is sparse relative to the elaborate
data collected by the ENICs, it is consistent with the other observations. Costa Rica,
again, stands out among the four as having achieved a rate of literacy which , in this
case, would be entirely supportive of the transition toward modern economic growth.
The background for this accomplishment was discussed in 않rlier chapters.
Literacy for the other four nations was considered to be a luxury, not a requisite
investment. For that reason literacy improved little, even during the period of
satisfactory growth, generally 1960 to the late 1970s. The detailed graph for illiteracy
for El Salvador (Figure 33) indicates that even the unimpressive decrease in illiteracy
rates (increase in literacy) from 1960 to 1975 has reversed. The rates of illiteracy for
children, both urban and rural, has worsened substantially. In the case of urban
children the rate worsened from 1975 to 1980 by just the amount it had improved over
the preceding fifteen y않rs. This data is especially meaningfi비 in that the rate for urban
children is considered to be the crucial one. It is urban children who are most likely
over the succeeding years to fill the needs of increasing industrialization.
Leaving Costa Rica aside, it is worth noting that none of the other four Central
American nations show a consistent sign of economic development during the decades
following World War II. Clearly simple growth is there in the early part of the period.
For all of them there is the display of economic growth about which writers both
during and since that time have waxed enthusiastic. But in 외1 five nations the growth
was not sustainable and it was not matched by GDP per Capita. For all five of the
nations there was no change in the structure, and for four of them, there was
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inadequate savings and investment as well. It is the latter concern, that of investment,
which relates to the failure to invest in education, and thus, to invest in 뻐 important
component of modern economic growth.
CHAPTER X
STRUCTURAL CHANGE
GROWTH IN CENTRAL AMERICA, DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA
The indicators used in this study made clear distinctions between the two groups
of nations. As discussed in Chapter nine, for all of the indicators the ENICs illustrated
the expectations for a nation undergoing transition to modern economic growth. Both
nations have increased total output in a sustained manner while at the same time
accomplishing a consistent increase in per capita output. At the same time the data
illustrated a substantial decrease in the agricultural sector which was mirrored in a
comparable increase in industrial production, with little change in the services sector.
Private consumption per capita increased for the ENICs while the same figure as
a percentage of GDP decreased. This can happen only if total output is increasing at a
rate which is sufficiently faster than population growth that a larger amount of output
can be 외located to both private consumption and investment. In both of the ENICs the
P따t of GDP allocated to investment since the middle of the century increased to over
25% of the total, a figure which the studies by Simon Kuznets suggested was necess따y
to sustained growth. Given the consumption and investment indicators it comes as no
surprise that domestic savings in both countries increased during the period.
The literacy figures confirm the large amount of data and anecdotal material
regarding the investment in training and education by the ENICs. Paul Kuznets
describes the investment in education in South Korea as averaging 9% of GNP for the
ten years 1966 to 1975. At present both Taiwan and South Korea are emphasizing
"knowledge intensive" and "skill intensive" production , thus increasing the
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’ comp따a다ve advantage’ which was created through 없rlier investment in education. 1
The resultant high literacy rates for both countries are consistent with and necessary to
the achievement of modem economic growth according to Kuznets findings.
For the CANs on the other hand, each indicator illustrated failure to achieve the
expectations of a nation in transition to modem economic growth. All five nations
were unable to sustain aggregate growth when they encountered the combination of
internal and external stresses in the latter 1970s. The Central American Common
Market began obviously disintegrating in the last y않r of the decade of the 1960s, and
continued to fall away as a functioning entity through the 1970s. The inability to
compel structural development either through the planned integration scheme or
through the creation of a regional common market organization, with authority beyond
that of the individual nations meant that decisionmaking took place essentially on
subnationallevels. Regional decisionmaking never took place. It had always been
strictly subject to individual national approv외， and national decisionmaking was done
on the historically established basis of the interests of the oligarchy, the elite, who were
in control of the nations. Both the original designs for growth and the internal and
external challenges of a decade or two later were understood from the point of view of
the sub-national interests.
During the period of incr，않se in total output for the CANs The increase in GDP
per Capita was disappointingly small. Since the collapse of GDP in Central America in
the 1970s, GDP per capita c이lapsed also, of course, and has not increased since. The
sectoral indicators, an important one in the Kuznetsian scheme, show c1않rly that no
significant change took place in 뻐Y of the five nations either before or after the
collapse. The nearly complete lack of response to the collapse in those indicators, as
I Paul W. Kuznets. "An East Asian Mo‘lei for Eωnomic Devell)pment". ECOIl')ll1ic Develorllllent and Cultuml Chanee,
Vol. 36. Number 3 ‘ Apri11988. page 520 and 527.
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well 잃 to the origin외 growth in ouφut ， underscores the lack of permeability of the
social and economic structure.
Private consumption per capita increased very slightly prior to the collapse but
then in all cases either returned to the level of fifteen or twenty y없rs earlier, or fell
even lower. That too is inconsistent with the expectations for development established
by Kuznets. But beyond that, as was discussed above, according to occasional studies,
the income distribution in the region, already highly inequitable, worsened during the
post-World War II period. Thus the implications of a slight increase or decrease in
consump디on per capita under those circumstances are not what they would be in a
development environment. In reality, among the CANs, private consump디on is
prim따ily a function of the small number of wealthy and the administrative element of
the popula다on ， not of the population as a whole.
Consumption as a p따t of GDP starts very high among the CANs, 75 to 80
percent, and stays high for all the nations. In two cases it climbed to well over 80
percent in the latter 1980s. Savings, of course, reflects the consumption figures. With
the excep디on of Costa Rica, savings as a percentage of GDP decreased during the
period, as did domestic investment, in spite of the high rate of external borrowing
during the period.
The rates of literacy, the final indicator in the 따ray ， further substantiate the
pattern. During the time the ENICs were investing heavily in education and training
for the populations of their countries, the CANs were making token efforts which were
consistent with the widely held view that education for the majority of the population is
a luxury. As discussed in previous chapters, the Costa Rica case is very different from
that of the other four CANs. There, universal education has been actively pursued
since shortly after World War II. In the other four countries literacy increased by a
few percentage points during the twenty years after 1960. The latest data, however,
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that for El Salvador, shows that illiteracy illiteracy actually increased among children in
the nation betweεn 1975 and 1980.
The data illustrates that although the Central American nations enjoyed more
than twenty y없rs of economic growth following World War II, they did not develop,
they underwent no transformation of the economy to approach modem economic
growth. What the Central American nations accomplishεd during that period is perhaps
more likely described as a retardation of industrialization comp따able to that written
about by Robert Clower, et 외 in Growth Without Develooment: An Economic Survev
of Liberia2
The situation in Central America is compaI때Ie in many ways to that of Liberia
as desc더b잉 by Clower. A look at the growth in Liberia from 1950 to 1960 suggested
to Clower that
sustained economic (expansion) widely shared among the population is
likely to occur only if a major share of income gains... is devoted to
policies of structural change and development - education, public
administration, and industrial and agricultural research and extension.
Only in this way is there any hope of creating the skilled and reliable
workers, effective managers and administrators, and widespread
knowledge and use of efficientproduct~on techniques necessary for
sustained growth of per capita income. J
This statement about Liberia in 1966 applies very well to Central America
nearly 30 y않rs later. At this point the ’East Asian Model' as described by Paul
Kuznets even more accurately presents the development pattern for underdeveloped
nations beginning the transition with characteristics which are very similar to those of
the Central American nations.
2 Raben Clower. George DlIlton. Mitchell HlIrwitz lind A.A. WlIlt κSurvevof Libe꺼a‘ EV Inston. N thwestern Universi Y P야S8. 1966.
3 Raben Clower‘ Georg잉 DlIlton. Milchell HlIrwitz lind A.A. WlIlters. op. Cil .. pllge 40.
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IN CENTRAL AMERICA: THE YIELD OF GROWTH
The data for four of the five Central American nations reveals no developmental
movement toward a Kuznetsian modem economic growth. Those nations, EI Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, underwent a period of simple economic growth
during the 1960s and 1970s which manyexpected to automa디cally transform the
region. The published expec따tion was that aggregate growth alone would cause the
five small economies to become independent, developed economies which were capable
of being managed for the benefit of the pop비ation as a whole.
Unlike in the case of the ENICs, however, the necessary institutions were not
developed, nor was investment made in the population as a whole through education,
entrepreneural incentives or physical infrastructure. By far the largest benefit of the
increased income went to a few individuals and families rather than the nation as a
whole or the population in the larger sense, such as would have been necess따y for
development of the economy. As described in 않rlier chapters, this was accomplished
through refusal to effectively tax wealth and substantial incomes, through the
availability of low interest loans on a large scale only, through incentives for
technologically efficient development rather than for labor inclusive processes, and
other such policies. Even the 않rIy increases in the GDP per capita figures were
statis디cal phenomena rather than real increases in welfare for the majority of the
population.
The lack of significant structural change in the three sectors for all five nations
is clear from the data. The implications of the use-of-output data is not so cl않r， on the
other hand. That data, which changes, where it changes at 외1 ， in the wrong direction
for development, represents decisions made in the interests of a small p따t of the
population of each nation. All three elements of the use of output included in this
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study, depict the function of a small economic and p이i다따I elite and a tiny middle
class. Thus they tend to indicate responses of self interest to the economic turning
points, rather than responses of concern for national interest.
Consumption, for example, is not constrained in favor of savings and
investment. With the exception of Costa Rica the CANs experienced decreased savings
and decreased investment over the twenty year period represented, with consumption as
ap따t of GDP which actually increases in a couple of cases. The important question of
how that consumption and lack of saving was distributed cannot be answered. The data
is simply not available. Strong suggestion is found , however, in data collected
occasionally by interested local groups and international agencies.
A 1989-90 study conducted by the United Nation ’s Economic Commission for
Latin America and the C따ibbean (ECLAC) found that the numbers of people living in
poverty in the region had increased by twenty percent or more since 1970. The study
reported that "Thousands of middle class families (in Central America) have joined the
ranks of the poor and the already poor have dropped into abject poverty. ,,4 The
ECLAC study calculated the percentages of people living in poverty in the region as
follows.
Country
Costa Rica
EI Salvador
Guatemala
Hunduras
Nicaragua
Percentage of people living
below the poveπy line.
40%
86%
87%
68%
80%
Some challenge even those figures. Honduran Catholic Bishop Raul Coπiveau
is reported to have disagreed with the Honduran government estimate from which came
4 Central American Renon. Gualemala Cily. Inforpn.:ss Cιntrl18mι꺼cana. Vol. XVII. Number 30. August 10. 1990
page 233.
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the 68%figure above. Corriveau reports a church study which puts the figure in
Honduras at 95%, with 35 %in the extremely poor catagory.5
For the most part these and other such figures are not directly useful to a study
such as this, except to indicate, in the complete absence of consistent and dependable
data over time, that none argue that the Central American nations are better off or even
as well off as they were prior to the growth of two and three decades ago. The only
argument is how much worse are the conditions in those nations. The 따rayof
positions range from that of the individual governments who argue that conditions are
only very bad, to that of the private international agencies who state that they are
disasterous and have been for some time. There is clearly no argument that in any
sense have conditions improved since the 1960s.
Early in the development process, the policym와얻rs in Taiwan made the
decision to take advantage of the abundance of labor, the prime competitive advantage
of the country at the time, by developing the labor force to supply the emerging
industrial base. That meant a large national investment in education , and it meant
encouraging the development of the small industry which suited the conditions of the
country at the time.
During the same period the Central American p이icymakers universally made
the decision to invest in imported technology rather than in domestic capacity. In the
context of the Central American Common Market all five nations adopted p이icies
which encouraged importation of high cost, labor saving technology which seemed to
allow the avoidance of investment in the pop비ation. An extensive Brookings
Institution study of 1978 cites such policy decisions as central to the already
5 "Central American SUllunit Focuses on Social Issuιso. Tim원 of the Amerkus. WashinglM D.C.• Decemb‘:r25.
1991.
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degenerating economic growth record in the region.6 William Cline states in that work
that the m며or focus of policy during the 1960s and 1970s "had only a limited impact
on the generation of new jobs - yielding new positions for perhaps three percent of the
labor force in the region." He goes on to say that in r，않lity the gain was "possibly
even less in view of the sectoral shift toward capital intensive industry" , replacing the
more labor intensive indusσY which existed 않rlier. 7
In one of the studies presented in the Brookings text the authors describe the
long standing unemployment and underemployment problem in the region as having
been "aggrevated by what has been referred to as labor-saving techn이ogical change in
the main productive sectors of the economy, including agriculture. ,, 8 The importance
of the issue addressed in their own study, say the authors, is "the emphasis that has
been placed on technological change as a source of economic growth." They found
that the focus on technology "has had an implicit bias against the use of labor. ,,9
The essential policy recommendations of the Brookings study included
abandonment of the "traditional practice in Central America" of maintaining low
interest rates and other direct and indirect subsidies for the importation of technology.
The authors argued as well against the direct reduction of wages, the standard and
ongoing policy response to unemployment questions in the region. The suppression of
wages was seen to be unwise because of the already unrealistically low level of wages
6 William R. Cline and Enrique 0ιIgado. Editors. Economic II1IC l!rntill l1 in CCnlrnl Allie바a. Washington. D.C.•까Ie
Brookings Institution. 1978.
7 William Cline :md Enrique Delgado. op. ιit .• page 406-407.
8 Charles R. Frnnk. Max A. Soto and Carlos A. Sevilla. "Thc Dιmand for Labor in the Manufacturing Industry in
Centrnl Ame꺼ca’. in Cline and Delgado. op. cit.. page 127.
9 Frank‘ ctal. op. cit.• pages 134 and 157.
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in the region, and 외so because of the "very low share of wages in the industrial value
added in Cenσal America... 10
The economic program undertaken in Central America after World War II was
one of growth, measured by the increase of GDP, not development. In terms of the
conclusions from the many studies of the process by Simon Kuznets, a serious problem
of growth without structural change, that is, without development, is that it is not
sustainable. The experience in Central America following World War II app없rs
almost as an illusσation of that conclusion.
The German Press Agency (DPA) reported recently that a number of Central
American organizations are urging new development models. The Commission for
Dev밍opment and the Environment for Latin America and the Caribbean is cited as
having stated that "After more than a half century of deficient growth...we are at a
total standstill. ...The grave economic crises are products of an exhausted model of
economic growth." The Commission concluded saying that the governments 개ave not
,11
undertaken (the necessary) profound political, economic and soci외 reforms. ’
COSTA RICA: GROWTH OR DEVELOPMENT?
Although Costa Rica stands out among the Central American nations as
economically better off and politically far more stable, it is still catagorized among the
underdeveloped nations of the world. In the smoothεd data for the indicators in chapter
nine, Costa Rica 외so registers conformation with the expectations for development in
four of the eleven catagories. Thus it stands as distinct from the other four CANs
10 Willium Clin.: and Enriqu.: Dlllgado. ‘’p. cit.• puge 164to 171.
II C.:nlrul Am.:rica R':"OI1. GUlIt.:mala City. Infoll'Nss C.:ntroamllrillunD. Vo l. XVIII. Numbllr 9. M띠πh 8.1991 ,
pages 70 und 71.
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where no single indicator registers in conformation with the expectations for the
뼈lsformation of the economy toward development.
It is important to note that in the case of Costa Rica three of the four
conforming indicators occur in the use-of-output catagory. Those are consumption,
savings and investment as percentages of GDP. Neither consumption nor investment
per capita registered as conforming. It other words, neither consumption nor
investment increased on a per capita basis at a rate which would be considered
appropriate in a.developing economy. Under those circumstances, the fact that
consumption as a p따t of GOP decreased, becomes no more than nominally a
development indicator. The decrease of consumption as a percentage of GOP fails to
suggest a structural change in consumption patterns when consumption per capita does
not increase at the same time.
A similar argument should be made with respect to investment. In view of the
fact that investment increased only slightly on a per capita basis, due to a considerable
extent to the GOP collapse of the 1970s and 1980s, the fact that investment increased
as ap따t of GOP becomes weakened as an indicator of structural change. A related
phenomenon with respect to investment there, is that Costa Rica has much more
successti띠ly courted both foreign aid and foriegn investment since the collapse than
have the other four na디ons. In other words, there is reason to believe that the
relatively stronger performance in the realm of investment is at least in part a function
of its continued attractiveness to foreign capital.
Closely related to the reasons for that attractiveness is the fourth conforming
development indicator, the record of literacy. Costa Rica is a nation which has a
record of relatively successful political democracy which extends back approximately
150 y않rs as an official phenomenon, to the period of independence from Spain. But
the democratic nature of the nation of small farmers in a region of plantation
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agriculture antedates the independence from Spain. The c이ony was considered a
completely useless backwater among the marginally productive colonies of the isthmas.
It was considered to be unworthy of either attention or expenditure on the p따t of
Spain. So habits of democratic government are record잉 even under Spanish rule.
It is that national character which accounts in considerable p하t for the high
achievements in literacy. An immediately post-World War II liberal government
sponsored universal education as socially important. Education was promoted
fin때ci외ly as an alternative to a standing army, and the military was disbanded. There
is still no standing army in Costa Rica. This is in dramatic distinction from the other
Central American nations where the prime purpose of the national armed forces is the
control of the populace.
Hence one of the prime explanations of the attractiveness of Costa Rica to
foreign capital. In spite of an economic c이lapse which was as dramatic as that in the
rest of Central America, the political situation remained stable and political decisions
continued to be made through the essentially democratic processes.
In spite of the literacy, however, and in spite of the record of investment, the
signs of development are weak. Sectoral change is central to the transition process to
be expected in the Kuznetsian format, and there was little recorded for Costa Rica.
GDP showed intermittent, though not sustained, growth and GDP per capita had still
not achieved its pre-c이lapse level ten years later. The country has many
developmentallyat 없C다ve attributes, and it may even be a strong candidate for
development in the future, but in terms of this study there is little to suggest that
development was either intended or accomplished in Costa Rica in the decades
following World War II.
The Costa Rican example does illustrate the importance of the complete pattern
of indicators for representation of economic developmen t. The accomplishment of a
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developed economy requires the absorption of science and technology to the extent that
the entire economy functions on an industrialized basis. That implies the
transformation of the economy so that a high rate of literacy is coupled with a high
consumption per capita, though consumption as a percentage of GDP has decreased to
allow for more than twenty five percent of the GDP to be invested. That structure rests
on a total output of which agriculture is a small p따t and industry contributes
substantially.
That Costa Rica app않rs as an anom외y in this study suggests rich ground for
further research. On the one hand it app않rs that Costa Rica may be on the route to
development without the industrialization necessary to the Kuznetsian scheme. On the
other hand industrialization is not the only indicator by which Costa Rica fails the test
of development. With further pursuit of the study, however, it may be determined that
the bi-polar structure suggested in this study - either growth or development - is an
excessive simplification of the possibilities for a sustainable economic expansion.
Another disection for research which the author discovered in the development
of this study is the role of external debt in the growth or development of a economy.
Some experimentation with the statistics of external debt for each of the seven countries
resulted in some suggestive correlations with others of the indicators and with some of
the historical events of the post-World War II pe꺼od ， national, regional and global.
In Taiwan, for example, external debt was reduced to a minimum early in the
development campaign through domestic savings and investment. As a result the
economy was not seriously impacted by the global debt crisis of the 1970s and
following. In fact Taiwan became a net foreign lender during that period while South
Korea was struggling with external debt. The CANs, on the other hand , already
heavily indebted when the global debt problems emerged, were seriously crippled by it
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at a time when many other of the problems of growth without structural change were
innundating them.
A third interesting possibility for further research relates to the data which is
coming available on the direct incorporation of science and technology as a p이icy issue
into the development process. Taiwan, for example, began collecting data in the late
1970s on research and design (R&D) expenditures by type, by institution, by field of
research, and so on. These and other data gathering efforts in South Korea and other
newly industrializing nations suggest the viability of a project which extends the set of
development indicators to include a science and technology variable directly, rather
than representing it indirectly through education.
FINAL COMMENTS
It is clear that there are many other valid explanations for the failure of the
CANs to achieve success in the growth effort in the latter p따t of this century. It is
equ외ly clear that there are many reasons for the development success of the ENICs
during the same period. Many of the alternative explanations were explored in chapter
four.
And yet it remains necess따y to provide policy guidance for the Central
American economies, all of whom are still in crisis. While the alternative explanations
considered in chapter four provide important historical insights, none of them, whether
taken individually or as a group, provide the understanding that governing the
economic development of a nation is akin to guiding the emergence of a new industry.
Many economic p이icymakers still fail to comprehend the complex management process
through which the ENICs built industrialized economies from the dependent
agricultural economies of the 1950s.
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In recent y않rs there has been a good bit of interest in understanding the
development success of Taiwan and South Korea. The Central American governments
among others, with the blessing of U.S. and international agency economists, have
waxed enthusiastic about export-led growth again, pointing to the experiences of the
않st asian economies as justification for their enthusiasm. What is left out of such
discussions is that export-led growth describes something that has taken place in Central
America since the colonial period.
Export-led increase, in other words, was only one aspect of a complex
development process in the ENICs. In both cases a carefully orchestrated period of
internal development preceeded the export phase of the process. It was only after an
internal economy had been planted and nurtured to some strength that the economies
were opened to the global market. And at that the opening took place in phases. In the
case of Taiwan, when the "export substitution" phase was initiated in the early 1960s
the economy was much changed from ten years earlier. 12
Land reform and infrastructure projects had made agriculture a strong
contributor to the internal economy as well as to export earnings, literacy was all but
universal, income equity was well along in its climb to among the highest in the world,
뻐d manufacturing for internal demand had increased several-fold. Against this
background the export substitution phase was inagurated. Industrial growth was still
being financed through primary exports supplemented by foreign aid. But through the
following ten ye없's industrial exports based on low-skilled labor replaced both the
prim따y exports and the foreign aid. By the end of the 1960s the labor market had
12까I': following writ.:rs n:f.:r to th.: se:cond m매orpolicγ phas.: in Taiwan as th앙 "~xpon substitution" phase:. This is
the period wh.:n industrial .:xports base:d on unskill닝d labor an: int~ntionally substitul.:d lor th.: traditional p꺼mary .:xports. S.:.:
Figure 6-1 in chapter 6 for sp.:cilic n: f.:n:nι.: til that p잉꺼od. AI~ 잉.:. John C.H. F.:i. Gustav Ranis and Shirleγ W.Y. Kuo.
Growth with EQuitv: Th‘: Taiwan Case.Nιw York. Oxford Univo:rsity Pn:ss. 1979. pages 26 π'. Also so:앙 a n:cιnl surv녕Y by댄ξ
흘띤E띤꾀， "A 다Ian맏 ofFa따e: A Survey ofTaiwan", Octob.:r 10. 1992 (Spo:cial Re생arch s빠삐I).
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entered what Fei et 외 describe as the condition of labor scarcity, high wages, and
exports based on increasingly higher levels of skill and capital intensity.
This is not the approach to export-led growth being contemplated by the Central
Americans at present. The simple promotion of exports by the five nations amounts
essentially to the continuation of a growth-type policy without likelihood of either
improv잉 welfare for the pop비ation or industrialization in keeping with the concept of
modem econ.omic growth.
To a considerable extent the question revolves around the concept of
comparative advantage. As Pack and Wesφhal put it in a 1986 article, liThe
neoclassicals have popularized an essentially static theory of comparative advantage. ,, 13
Pack and Westphal argue instead that in the latter part of the twentieth century and
beyond, industrial strategy is a matter of managing change to achieve dynamically
effective industrialization. Such a pursuit of dynamic comparative advantage, they say,
requires the government to take an active role in fostering an appropriate development
process, and that distributional issues and intersectoral balance of supply and demand
are key in that process. 14 In a more recent article Wesφhal pointed out that this is the
strategy used by South Korea since the 1960s. It is one of creating comparative
advantage in some industries while exploiting the already existing comparative
advantage in others. 15
As was made apparent in earlier chapters in discussions of the theorists, no one
proposes the role of government in the development process to replace the market. W.
Arthur Lewis and others who saw the neoclassical theory as a starting place for policy,
13 H. Pac!.: and L.E. We히phal. "Industrial Stmtegy and Technological Change: 까leory Versus Reality'. 믿믿믿화파
Develonment Economics‘ Vol.22. 1986. page 90.
14 H. Pac!.: and L.E. Westphal. op. cit .. pages 125 and 9 1.
15 Larry E. Westphal. "Industrial Policy in an Expon Propelled Economy: Lessons from South Korea's Expe더ence".
Journal of Economic Persnectives. Vol. 4. Number 3. Summer 1990. page 53.
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not as a tightly constrained replacement for judgement, insisted that the inclusion of the
perspec다ves of other disciplines is necεssary to guidance of the development process.
Some, including Albert O. Hirschman 뻐d Walt Rostow, suggest that
approp더ate policy can only be made on the basis of judgement informed by the cultural
and historical circumstances of the subject nation. Both argued that I않dership must bε
exercised by the 리ite on the spot, not through the application of theory from a distance
as is suggested by the neoclassicists whose p이icy recommendations are invariant with
respect to neutral policy and dependence on the market.
Paul Kuznets, in the conclusion to his discussion of the East Asian Model of
development, points out that two aspects of the model are particularly noteworthy.
’'One is that p이icy typically works by influencing rather than replacing private market
decisions~" The other is that the heavy emphasis on economic expansion, and the
public’s expectation that that is an ongoing committment on the part of the government,
l’means that dynamic rather than static considerations are paramount, and dynamic
efficiency is a topic about which the traditional neoclassical paradigm has surprisingly
little to say... 16
The outcome of this study argues for the intentional management of a
developing economy. Through intervention the ENICs transformed the structures of
their economies. These were economies which in the middle of the century were
dominantly agricultural, dualistic importers of industrial goods. They were
transformed into prim따ily industrial economies with highly equitable income
distribution and a high level of literacy and skills in the pop비ation. The ENICs are
concluding the century with economies which are competing aggressively in the global
industrial market. In the terms of Kuznets and Rostow, both Taiwan and South Korea
16 Pa비 Kuznets. op. cit.. page 536 and 537.
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have successfully incorporated the current level of science and technology into the
majority of the national produc디on.
The five CANs did not undertake intervention for the purpose of development
of either the national or the regional economies. The last vestage of the intentional
development scheme for the region, a scheme which was created and supported with
the help of the United Nation ’s Economic Commission for Latin America, was qu잃hed
soon after 1960. As shown through the indicators in the last chapter, the aggregate
growth in the 1960s and the 1970s was not supported by the changes in structure which
would have been necessary to either industrialization or contin뼈d aggregate increase.
The CANs left investment decisions to market processes. Which is to say that
in the final analysis there was no long range p이icy in the interest of the nations as
units. Thus, with the exception of Costa Rica, no investment was made in education or
skills for the important labor input in industrial production.
Consumption of GDP continued to be high, and investment and savings
continued to be low. As a result, there is reason to suggest that the nations actually
increased their vulnerability to external impacts and their dependence on foriegn
support. As the subsistence aspects of the economies were traded for dependence on
imported industrial production, the ability to adjust to changes in the glob외 economy
decreased. Thus the decreased output in the five nations in the late 1970s and 1980s
was replaced by dramatic increases in debt.
It is apparent that the growth experiment of the CANs was a calamitous failure.
The effort was made in the expectation of gaining benefits through simple economic
growth without undergoing the social, poli디cal and economic costs of transformation in
the supporting economic structure. The result is described by Central American writers
as ’the crisis I.
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